Commonwealth of Virginia

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Commonwealth of Virginia FluEx 08 Functional
Exercise
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Flu Exercises

• Aug 06 Tabletop Ex (TTX)
• Statewide FluEx, Oct 06
• Cabinet TTX, Sep 07
• Mid Atlantic Region NGA TTX, Nov 07
• FluEx 08, Nov 20-21 08

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Exercise Purpose and Scope
Purpose The purpose of FluEx 08 is to provide
the Commonwealth with the framework through which
State, local, private and civic organizations can
demonstrate preparations and response to a
State-wide crisis involving an influenza pandemic
(PI). The exercise will also revisit key issues
identified in previous PI exercise After Action
Reports (AARs). Scope FluEx 08 will emphasize
mitigation and response strategies (policies,
decisions and practices) among State and local
government, private sector and non-governmental/ci
vic partners during a period of PI progression
from an acceleration interval into a peak
transmission interval in November 2008.
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Overarching Objectives

• Demonstrate the adequacy of emergency response
  plans relevant to a pandemic response.
• Provide an opportunity for the healthcare
  community to demonstrate preparedness
  capabilities and capacities including
  coordination and communication, medical surge,
  mass prophylaxis, laboratory testing and other
  variables appropriate for a pandemic response.
• Identify and discuss policy decisions
  corresponding to functions most needed to
  decrease mortality, social disruption, critical
  infrastructure degradation, economic strain and
  other adverse consequences of an influenza
  pandemic.
• Identify additional steps necessary to assure
  Virginia is prepared for an influenza pandemic as
  well as appropriate areas for improvement and
  corresponding corrective actions.

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Scenario

• Pandemic influenza outbreak that will impact the
  Commonwealth and affect the entire United States.
  
• The exercise will begin as significant cases of
  disease are assessed as a US Government Response
  Stage 4 and a World Health Organization Phase 6.
• Definitions
• US Government Response Stage 4 First Human Case
  in North Atlantic
• World Health Organization Phase 6 Pandemic
  Period Increased and Sustained Transmission in
  the General Population

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Venues and Staffing

• Venues
• VDH Emergency Communication Center
• Virginia Emergency Operations Center
• Local Health Districts
• Hospitals
• Local EOCs (or Emergency Managers participating
  at HDOSc)
• Private stakeholders (e.g., Dominion, American
  Waterworks)
• Others
• SIMCELL

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Participating Agencies

• Federal Agencies
• CDC
• FEMA
• CIA
• DOD
• Commonwealth of Virginia Agencies
• Department of Education
• Department of Emergency Management
• Department of Health
• - Local Health Districts
• - Emergency Communication Center
• Department of Historic Resources
• Department of Transportation

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Participating Agencies (continued)

• Commonwealth of Virginia Agencies (continued)
• Division of Consolidated Laboratory Services
• Virginia Information Technologies Agency
• Emergency Operations Center
• Virginia National Guard
• Virginia State Police
• Local Agencies
• Local Health Departments and Negotiated
  Participants (such as County Emergency
  Management Agencies)
• Virginia Associations
• Virginia Broadcasters Association
• Virginia Healthcare Association
• Virginia Municipal League
• Virginia Association of County Officials

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Collateral Exercises

• 26 LHDs conducted Mass Vaccination Drills
  (13,000)
• 2 X Health Alert Network Drills
• Implemented Antiviral Deliveries

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Strengths

• First use of recently completed VDH Alternate
  ECC.
• Good communication interoperability internally
  and externally.
• Provided sufficient periodic updates and
  regularly scheduled media conferences to assure
  dissemination of relevant media and public
  information through the effective use of the
  State JIC and Public Information Officers
• Implemented bed surge capacity plans and
  conducted bed tracking.
• Executed inter- and intra-regional medical mutual
  aid agreements.
• Demonstrated good communication between Emergency
  Support Functions.
• HAN and CDC alerts worked well.
• Conducted many ambitious and successful mass
  vaccination drills.
• Implemented State Antiviral Distribution Plan
  with actual deliveries.

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Needed Improvements

• Critical communication networks are outsourced
  (VITA), delaying response and resolution.
• WebEOC was not initially configured for ECC
  access to review mission assignments WebEOC
  interface and information (user rights).
• Procedure adherence needed to assure NIMS/ICS
  compliance.
• Coordination of external information (media)
  programs with JIC and non-English speaking media
  needed disconnect with the PIO in the ECC and
  JIC
• VDH Phone Inquiry Center (PIC) SOP/setup and
  implementation guidance needed.
• VEOC mission movement between the ESFs was
  challenging .
• Resource requests were answered by ECC instead of
  being redirected to the VEOC/EMAC. Resource
  requests need to include more information.
• FEMA should evaluate staffing capabilities,
  onsite reporting and JFO structure for a pandemic
  scenario, and the all-hazards scheme may be
  inappropriate for this event.