Improving Reliability of Direct Recording Electronic Voting Systems

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Improving Reliability of Direct Recording
Electronic Voting Systems

• Eric Lazarus

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Pro-DRE

• Pre-DRE technology has huge error rates
• Accessibility
• No time to wait for security
• Easier to count electrons
• Adding paper will
• Not add security
• Make the system less trusted by the public
• Add cost and complexity
• These systems are not worse than older technology

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Anti-DRE

• You cant trust computers
• You cannot test them
• You cannot reliably inspect them
• The current generation is not architected for
  verifiability or security
• It would not be hard to do better with crypto,
  paper ballots, etc. (Study AutoMark!)
• Small conspiracy theory
• Bathtub problem

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Anti-DRE Points of Vulnerability
Software Developed (Very High)
Terminal Built (High)
Software Built (Very High)
Terminal Shipped (High)
Software Certified (Low)
Terminal Stored (High)
Software Shipped (High)
Terminal Software Refreshed (Very High)
Terminal Tested (Low)
Each technology is different but there are big
vulnerabilities at each stage of the process
which are not addressed. Ratings reflect my
concern areas.
Terminal Shipped to Polling Place (High)
Terminal Stored at Polling Place (Medium)
Terminal Setup at Polling Place (Medium)
Terminal Setup at Polling Place (Medium)
Polling (Medium)
Poll Closing (Low)
Votes Transmitted (High)
Votes Tallied (Medium)
Tallies Transmitted (Low)
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Pro-DRE The real problems are
Voter Registered
Voter Roll Maintained
Roll Manipulation
Voter Informed of Voting Location
Intimidation
Voter Checked In
Vote Recorded
Ballot Box Stuffing
Vote Tallied
Result Reported
Results Audited
Result Certified
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Assessment of arguments?

• Which have merit?
• Which dont?
• How do we create public trust given the debate?

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Election Practices Report Card

• What do you like?
• What do you not like?
• What is confusing?

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BC Neutral on DRE/VVPT Question

• Assuming that you are using DRE machines, what
  can you do?

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Project Goals

• Bring together the civil rights and computer
  security community
• Develop recommendations that would improve the
  situation 2004 only

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Recommendations

• Independent security team
• Assessment cover
• Hardware Design
• Hardware/Firmware Configuration
• Software Design
• Software Configuration
• Election Procedures
• Physical Security

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Recommendations

• Implement the critical recommendations
• Provide thorough training
• Parallel testing
• Permanent independent technology panel
• Standard audit procedures to verify correct
  operation and uncover security breaches
• Incident reporting

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Recommendations for 2004

• Not bad idea for 2006
• We hope that we can exceed this standard

FOR MORE INFO...
www.votingtechnology.org
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Best thing that can be done
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Outside Expert

• Engaged an expert in computer security

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Pre-Election Logic Accuracy Testing

• User interface testing!
• Automatic self-test scripts
• Test audio and other accessibility interfaces.
• Test all ballot positions in all languages.
• Test intensively by hand some machines in a
  realistically simulated election
• Explain all pre-election testing to those who
  have come to observe

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Parallel testing

• Parallel testing during Election Day,
  simulating a real election (poll opening, voting,
  and poll closing) on a few machines randomly
  selected from polling places on Election Day.

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Seals

• Seal with numbered tamper-evident seals and log
  all physical (paper and electronic) polling place
  records then check and log seal numbers when
  received from polling place.
• Logged, numbered, tamper-evident seals to prevent
  use of the voting machines between the time they
  pass pre-election testing and the poll-opening
  process.
• Machine has a unique secure key/password.

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Incident Handling and Reporting

• Keep sufficient paper ballots on hand at each
  polling place to ensure no voter is turned away
  due to system failures.
• Forward incident reports to the responsible state
  official(s) and to the Federal Election
  Commission or to the Election Assistance
  Commission.
• Incident reports available to news media and the
  public

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Questions?
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Interesting things to discuss

• What do poll watchers need to know?
• How do we apply the BC recommendations at this
  point?
• Tricks for dry run of the election