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Weizmann Institute of Science Israel

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Election Day. Carol. Bob. Carol. Elections for class president ... Election Day. Carol. Alice. Bob. 1. 1. 1. 1. Carol. Alice. Alice. Bob ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Weizmann Institute of Science Israel


1
Deterministic History-IndependentStrategies for
Storing Informationon Write-Once Memories
Moni Naor
Tal Moran
Gil Segev
Weizmann Institute of ScienceIsrael
2
Securing Vote Storage Mechanisms
Moni Naor
Tal Moran
Gil Segev
Weizmann Institute of ScienceIsrael
3
Election Day
Carol
Alice
Alice
Bob
  • Elections for class president
  • Each student whispers in Mr. Drews ear
  • Mr. Drew writes down the votes

Carol
  • ProblemMr. Drews notebook leaks sensitive
    information
  • First student voted for Carol
  • Second student voted for Alice

Alice
Alice
Bob
4
Election Day
  • What about more involved election systems?
  • Write-in candidates
  • Votes which are subsets or rankings
  • .

Carol
Alice
Alice
Bob
Alice
1
1
  • A simple solution
  • Lexicographically sorted list of candidates
  • Unary counters

Bob
1
Carol
1
5
Secure Vote Storage
  • Mechanisms that operate in extremely hostile
    environments
  • Without a secure mechanism an adversary may be
    able to
  • Tamper with the records
  • Compromise privacy
  • Possible scenarios
  • Malicious software embeds secret information in
    public output
  • Colluding voters can obtain complete memory dump
  • Poll workers may tamper with the device while in
    transit
  • Majority of existing techniques are vulnerable in
    this setting
  • Cryptographic tools require private storage
  • Memory representation may leak sensitive
    information
  • Subliminal channels

6
Main Security Goals
  • Tamper-evidencePrevent an adversary from
    undetectably tampering with the records

Integrity
  • History-independenceMemory representation does
    not reveal the insertion order

Privacy
  • Subliminal-freenessInformation cannot be
    secretly embedded into the data

7
This Work
Goal A secure and efficient mechanism for
storing an increasingly growing set of K elements
taken from a large universe of size N
  • Supports Insert(x), Seal() and RetreiveAll()

Cast a ballot
Count votes
Finalize the elections
  • Why consider a large universe?
  • Write-in candidates
  • Votes which are subsets or rankings
  • Records may contain additional information (e.g.,
    160-bit hash values)

8
This Work
Goal A secure and efficient mechanism for
storing an increasingly growing set of K elements
taken from a large universe of size N
Our approach
  • Tamper-evidence by exploiting write-once memories
  • Due to Molnar, Kohno, Sastry Wagner 06
  • Information-theoretic security
  • Everything is public!! No need for private storage

Initialized to all 0sCan only flip 0s to 1s
  • Deterministic history-independent strategy in
    which each subset of elements determines a unique
    memory representation
  • Strongest form of history-independence
  • Unique representation - cannot secretly embed
    information

9
Our Results
Deterministic, history-independent and
write-oncestrategy for storing an increasingly
growing set of Kelements taken from a large
universe of size N
Main Result
  • Previous approaches were either
  • Inefficient (required O(K2) space)
  • Randomized (enabled subliminal channels)
  • Required private storage

10
Our Results
Deterministic, history-independent and
write-oncestrategy for storing an increasingly
growing set of Kelements taken from a large
universe of size N
Main Result
Application to Distributed Computing
First explicit, deterministic and non-adaptive
Conflict Resolution algorithm which is optimalup
to poly-logarithmic factors
  • Resolve conflicts in multiple-access channels
  • One of the classical Distributed Computing
    problems
  • Explicit, deterministic non-adaptive -- open
    since 85 Komlos Greenberg

11
Previous Work
  • Molnar, Kohno, Sastry Wagner 06
  • Initiated the formal study of secure vote storage
  • Tamper-evidence by exploiting write-once memories

PROM
Encoding(x) (x, wt2(x))
Initialized to all 0sCan only flip 0s to 1s
Logarithmic overhead
12
Previous Work
  • Molnar, Kohno, Sastry Wagner 06
  • Initiated the formal study of secure vote storage
  • Tamper-evidence by exploiting write-once memories
  • Copy-over list A deterministic
    history-independent solution

A useful observation Naor Teague 01 Store
the elements in a lexicographically sorted list
Problem Cannot sort in-place on write-once
memories
  • On every insertion
  • Compute the sorted list including the new element
  • Copy the sorted list to the next available memory
    position
  • Erase the previous list

O(K2) space!!
13
Previous Work
  • Molnar, Kohno, Sastry Wagner 06
  • Initiated the formal study of secure vote storage
  • Tamper-evidence by exploiting write-once memories
  • Copy-over list A deterministic
    history-independent solution
  • Several other solutions which are either
    randomized or require private storage
  • Bethencourt, Boneh Waters 07
  • A linear-space cryptographic solution
  • History-independent append-only signature
    scheme
  • Randomized requires private storage

14
Our Mechanism
  • Global strategy
  • Mapping elements to entries of a table
  • Local strategy
  • Resolving collisions separately in each entry
  • Both strategies are deterministic,
    history-independent and write-once

15
The Local Strategy
  • Store elements mapped to each entry in a separate
    copy-over list
  • l elements require l2 pre-allocated memory
  • Allows very small values of l in the worst case!

Can a deterministic global strategy guarantee
that?
  • The worst case behavior of any fixed hash
    function is very poor
  • There is always a relatively large set of
    elements which are mapped to the same entry.

16
The Global Strategy
  • Sequence of tables
  • Each table stores a fraction of the elements
  • Each element is inserted into several entries of
    the first table
  • When an entry overflows
  • Elements that are not stored elsewhere are
    inserted into the next table
  • The entry is permanently deleted

17
The Global Strategy
  • Each element is inserted into several entries of
    the first table
  • When an entry overflows
  • Elements that are not stored elsewhere are
    inserted into the next table
  • The entry is permanently deleted

OVERFLOW
OVERFLOW
Universe of size N
18
The Global Strategy
  • Each element is inserted into several entries of
    the first table
  • When an entry overflows
  • Elements that are not stored elsewhere are
    inserted into the next table
  • The entry is permanently deleted

OVERFLOW
Universe of size N
19
Analyzing The Global Strategy
  • Each element is inserted into several entries of
    the first table
  • When an entry overflows
  • Elements that are not stored elsewhere are
    inserted into the next table
  • The entry is permanently deleted
  • Unique representation
  • Elements determine overflowing entries in the
    first table
  • Elements mapped to non-overflowing entries are
    stored
  • Continue with the next table and remaining
    elements

Universe of size N
20
Analyzing The Global Strategy
  • Each element is inserted into several entries of
    the first table
  • When an entry overflows
  • Elements that are not stored elsewhere are
    inserted into the next table
  • The entry is permanently deleted

Table of size K
Stores K elements
Subset of size K
Universe of size N
Table of size (1-)K
Stores (1 - )K elements
Where do the hash functions come from?
Table of size (1-)2K
21
Analyzing The Global Strategy
  • Identify the hash function of each table with a
    bipartite graph
  • Bounded-Neighbor Expander
  • Any subset S of size K contains K elements with
    a low degree neighbor w.r.t S

S
OVERFLOW
Universe of size N
OVERFLOW
LOW DEGREE
22
Bounded-Neighbor Expanders
  • Any subset S of size K contains K elements with
    a neighbor of degree l w.r.t S
  • Given N and K,
  • Minimize M and l
  • Maximize

S
Universe of size N
Table of size M
23
Open Problems
  • Non-amortized insertion time
  • In our scheme insertions may have a cascading
    effect
  • Construct a scheme that has bounded worst case
    insertion time
  • Improved bounded-neighbor expanders
  • Memory lower bound
  • Our non-constructive solution K ?log(N)
    ?log(N/K) bits
  • Obvious lower bound K?log(N/K) bits
  • Find the minimal M such that subsets of size at
    most K taken from N can be mapped into subsets
    of M while preserving inclusions
  • Integrate the mechanism into existing schemes

24
Open Problems
  • Non-amortized insertion time
  • In our scheme insertions may have a cascading
    effect
  • Construct a scheme that has bounded worst case
    insertion time
  • Improved bounded-neighbor expanders

Thank you!
  • Memory lower bound
  • Our non-constructive solution K ?log(N)
    ?log(N/K) bits
  • Obvious lower bound K?log(N/K) bits
  • Find the minimal M such that subsets of size at
    most K taken from N can be mapped into subsets
    of M while preserving inclusions
  • Integrate the mechanism into existing schemes
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