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Comments on Financial Stability of Swedish Pension system

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Gets close B-C link without transition costs. Very generous. high replacement rate and minimum pension. Automatic stabilizers for system: ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Comments on Financial Stability of Swedish Pension system


1
Comments on Financial Stability of Swedish
Pension system
  • for Urban Institute Conference
  • by Estelle James
  • February 2006

2
Main points
  • Swedish system is very clever
  • Gets close B-C link without transition costs
  • Very generous
  • high replacement rate and minimum pension
  • Automatic stabilizers for system
  • unexpected outcomes reduce benefits,
  • increase outlays from general state budget
  • Different starting points limit relevance to US
  • our benefits start much lower
  • using general budget as shock absorber likely
    means making large deficit still larger

3
Very clever
  • NDC gets labor market benefits of close
    benefit-contribution linkage without high
    transition costs of FDCNDC is PAYG
  • NDC is PAYG, therefore has low implicit return,
    doesnt increase national saving, not
    automatically sustainable as population ages.
    Financial stability achieved in other ways.
  • NDC is not redistributivethis is achieved by
    separate minimum pension guarantee (interferes
    with benefit-contribution linkage at bottom end)

4
Very generous benefits
  • Replacement rate now 65, expected to be 55 in
    future, of which 2/3 from NDC, 1/3 from FDC
  • Minimum pension is 30-40 average wage. May fall
    due to price indexation, but authors expect wage
    linkage to continue many retirees receive it.
  • Also, recipients of minimum pension get housing
    supplement (90 of rent paid by government)
  • Generous minimum permits risk-taking, high
    expected return, in FDC
  • Minimum benefit in Sweden is higher than our
    average benefit

5
Very generous generosity costs
  • Contribution rate 16 for NDC 2.5 for FDC up
    to ceiling 8 paid without benefit for all
    wages above ceiling
  • 3-4 quasi-universal occupational pension
  • govt budget pays for guaranteed pension,
    housing allowance, disability and survivors
    insurance, pension credits for those on parental
    or sickness leave, childcare years and
    unemployedcosts equivalent to 12-14 wages??
    (unclear)
  • Total cost35 of payroll??
  • (medical insurance and long term care)

6
Built-in stabilizers mechanisms
  • If people live longer than expected, annuity
    factor on notional accumulation rises so annual
    benefit falls for new retirees
  • Notional account is indexed to wage growth (g) so
    future benefits fall if g is low. If g lt 1.6,
    benefits fall for current retirees also.
  • ABM (automatic adjustment mechanism) if
    (notional assetsbuffer fund)ltpension
    liabilities, due to falling fertility or lf
    participation rates, notional accounts and
    current benefits fall
  • Note no automatic adjustment for guaranteed
    minimum, housing supplements, disability
    insurance, and other expenditures from govt
    budget. In fact, these will probably increase.

7
Built-in stabilizers where does risk go if not
borne by NDC?
  • Brunt of unexpected outcomes is borne
  • mainly by present and future benefit cuts, except
    that bottom is protected by minimum pension
  • secondly by increases in general government
    spending
  • No automatic increase in contributions
  • starting point is high benefit contribution
    rate
  • No rise in retirement age, fall in minimum
    pension
  • Most uncertain items put into govt. budget but no
    calculations of costs under alternative scenarios
  • Authors claim that some of government spending
    will increase national saving, but this wont
    happen if financed by larger budget deficit

8
Relevance to U.S.in principle but limited in
practice
  • In principle we could have automatic adjustment
    when life span increases, growth decreases or
    expected PDV of revenues lt PDV of liabilities
  • But we are starting with much smaller benefits
    and no minimumnot clear we want benefits to bear
    most of brunt of unexpected events
  • We could have a formula that splits adjustment
    between benefits, contributions, retirement
    age, and specifies distribution of cuts by income
    class
  • but we would have a hard time agreeing on this
    (long term commitment on income distribution)
  • We could shift uncertain spending items into
    govt. budgetbut this would be difficult given
    deficit
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