Title: RAF Chinook Helicopter Crash. 1994, Mull Of Kintyre
1RAF Chinook Helicopter Crash.1994, Mull Of
Kintyre
2Background
- On June 2 1994 an RAF Chinook helicopter that was
carrying 25 anti-terrorism experts as well as
four crew members crashed near the Mull of
Kintyre in Scotland. - Accident Investigation led by Department of
Transports Air Accident Investigation Branch.
3Background (Continued)
- Investigation concluded that there was no
evidence of a technical malfunction of the
helicopters control system. - Later RAF Inquiry, blamed the crash on the two
pilots - However new investigations have since pointed to
strong evidence that Chinooks FDEC control system
was faulty.
4FADEC Control System Development and Testing
History
5Will Cover
- Overview of FADEC Project Development
- Errors Found During Tests
6FACEC Development History
- Mark one Chinook to undergo series of
modifications - One Improvement was new FADEC Control System
- First Control System to Have Full Authority Over
Engine - However When First Conceived, FADEC Was to Have
Manual Backup Mode
7The Parties Involved
- Boeing as Main Manufacturer
- Multiple Subcontractors
- Tensions Arouse
- Communication Failures Between Various Parties
- Disagreements Arouse
8Disagreements Continued..
- Little Concern Given To Lack of FACEC Safety
Features by MOD - This Despite Boeing Classifying FADEC System as
Safety Critical Component - RAF Also Voiced Concern About FADECs Planned
Tests - RAF Thought They Were Too Late in The Project
Lifecycle
9Errors Found During Testing
- Chandler Evans Report from 1987
- Lycoming Endurance Tests Reports
- B2 Error
- F3 Error
- E5 Error
10E5 Error
- Related to Control of N2 Sensors That Monitored
Rotor Speed - Run-Down
- E5 Code Had Fatal Flaw
- If Both Sensors Were Knocked Out FADEC Lost
Control of Engine Speed - Putting More Fuel In Engine, Causing Over-speed
11Other Errors
- Aeroplane and Armament Experimental Establishment
Investigation - Code Contained a "very large number of errors
- EDS-Scicon
- Found so Many Errors That They Commissioned the
Report After Investigating Only 20 of the Code
121989 Chinook Mk2 Ground Test
13Chinook Mk2 Ground Test
- Took place on 20th January 1989
- It would cost the RAF 5 million
- Circumstances that caused the accident had been
highlighted 3 year earlier - Some of the fault codes displayed would also
appear in the 1994 Mull of Kintyre crash
14Chinook Mk2 Ground Test
- During the first week of testing E5 fault codes
kept registering on the DECU (Digital Electronic
Control Unit) - So a change to the test plan was decided
- The change would be to disconnect N2b rotor speed
signal to simulate small arms fire and to
validate the design of the FADEC
15Chinook Mk2 Ground Test
- During power up on the morning of January 20th an
E5 fault code registered on the DECU - Effectively meaning the FADEC had disconnected a
N2 signal on power up - Meaning only one sensor was being read
- So when remaining signal was disconnected no N2
signals were being received by the FADEC
16Chinook Mk2 Ground Test
- Due to the design flaw in the FADEC
- When both N2 signals were lost the FADEC thinks
there is no rotor speed - So the maximum amount of fuel is sent to the
engines - Causing an engine overspeed
17Chinook Mk2 Ground Test
- When the remaining N2 signal was disconnected
number of things happened- - the engine noise increased
- there was an increasing whine from the
transmission system - a torque split developed
18Chinook Mk2 Ground Test
- A torque split is when a mismatch occurs
between the power supplies to the two engines - This was significant as a torque mismatch was
found in the 1994 crash
19Chinook Mk2 Ground Test
- When the rotor speed reached 142
- Co-pilot pressed the Emergence Engine Fuel Cut
Off Lever - Which cuts fuel to engine
20Chinook Mk2 Ground Test
- The E5 fault code and the torque mismatch errors
would later be found the 1994 wreckage - Textron-Lycoming later identified a failure in
the design of the FADEC system was cause for the
rotor overspeed accident
21AAEE Recommendations
22AAEE Recommendations
- Aeroplane and Armament Experiment Establishment
(AAEE) - Where the final testing of the Chinook took place
- AAEE have no say whether the Chinook should be
given a Certificate of Airworthiness
23AAEE Recommendations
- Final say is with the RAF
- the RAF can release into service an airplane
with one wing if it believes there is an
operational need for it (RAF Justice Report,
p4-4)
24AAEE Recommendations
- In November 1993 before the AAEE was able to
give a positive unquestionable recommendation - The RAF gave permission for the FADEC-equipped
version of the Chinook the go ahead for
operational service
25AAEE Recommendations
- The reasons the RAF gave for their decision were
- - US Army had no critical problems during ground
and flight testing - The chance that both FADEC systems fitted to the
two engines would fail was unlikely
26AAEE Recommendations
- Problems with RAF reasons -
- US Army was using a different FADEC system
- Assumes the FADEC will fail in a predictable way
which would cause the engines to rundown safely.
This didnt happen in the 1989 accident - But the Chinook Mk2 went into service despite
concerns
27Crash Investigation
Russell Daniels
28Will Cover
- Overview of the day the Chinook ZD576 crashed
- Investigation into the Chinook ZD576 and the
FADEC system aboard this and other MK2 Chinooks
29Restrictions in place
- On the day of the crash restrictions were still
in place on the Chinook MK2 ZD576. These were
still in place partly because the software had
not been re-written to take into account some of
the possible problems
30Overview of the Crash
- On Friday 2nd June 1994 The Chinook MK2 ZD576
piloted by Jonathon Tapper and Richard Cooke
crashed into the Mull of Kintyre (Scotland) - Everything seemed normal up to 18 seconds before
the crash. The pilots entered a pre-planned
change of course into the navigation computer
31Overview of the Crash Continued..
- However, the Chinook did not make this intended
turn and flew straight on and crashed into the
Mull - If nothing else this would have put Tapper at
risk of breaking the icing restrictions due to
the cloud cover at the top of the Mull - Squadron leader Robert Burke knew Tapper. He
would have not broke the restriction. He was the
most by the book pilot I knew
32Overview of the Crash Continued..
- The investigators into the crash concluded that
there was no technical evidence of a technical
malfunction capable of causing the crash of the
MK2 Chinook - Blame was placed upon the two pilots and they
were convicted of gross negligence.
33Other FADEC equipped MK2s
- The AAEE at Boscombe had suspended trails during
the time of the crash of the MK2 Chinook due to
the lack of explanations from the FADECs
contractors over incidents that had frequently
occurred over a period of a couple of weeks
34Investigation Into The Crash
- Fault codes were found in the memory of the
surviving control systems (including E5) but
the contracts of the FADEC system said that it
wasnt significant - The accident inquiry team were NOT told that the
ministry of defence was currently suing the
FADECs contractor mainly over defects in the
design of the FADEC
35Investigation Continued..
- Many things were left out of the report from the
AAIB crash investigators such as the problems
with the PTIT gauges before the day of the crash
and on the day of the crash which has lead to the
engine of the ZD576 being changed
36Investigation Continued..
- The RAF report inquiry did not mention anything
about the EDS or the AAEE reports on the
inadequacies in the Chinook MK2 FADEC system - The torque mismatch two months earlier was also
left out which was one of the reasons for the
engine being changed
37Four Years Later
- Four years later another Chinook MK2 helicopter
piloted by Bric Lewis went out of control The
Chinook is falling out of the sky yet the
displays show no warning lights no evidence of
technical malfunction Lewis shouted
38Lewis and a MK2 Chinook
- This Chinook did a 360-degree barrel roll but
somehow Lewis managed to land it. If he and his
crew had died then the crew would most likely
have be found accountable, as this investigation
also found NO EVIDENCE of technical malfunction
as with the ZD576
39Modified FADEC System
- The Dutch were satisfied with the FADEC software,
but did not acquire the FADEC software until
years after the crash of the ZD576. In this time
modifications were made. Textron claims that the
software was 99 the same as the ZD576. Others
claim that it is less than 95 the same
40To Conclude
- To conclude no technical evidence could be found
in order to blame the FADEC system for the crash.
This however does not mean that the crash wasnt
due to the FADEC system onboard