The Contrived Korean Crisis Causes and Prospects

1
The Contrived Korean CrisisCauses and Prospects

• Tim Beal
• Korea University, Seoul
• Victoria University of Wellington, NZ

2
Overview

• Historical background
• Clinton Agreed Framework
• Bush Contrived crisis
• Positions and Prospects

3
Historical background

• Cultural and national coherence
• Koreas long recorded history as homogenous
  people in relatively unified peninsula
• Nationalism
• Resistance to foreign domination
• Squeezed between China and Japan

4
China and Japan

• China saw Korea as one of its tributary states
• Japan saw Korea as first colony and beachhead on
  mainland Asia
• Hideoyoshis invasions 1592, 1607
• Japanese colony 1910-1945

5
Liberation

• 15 August 1945 Korea liberated from Japanese but
  divided into two parts
• US initiative, Soviet acquiescence
• This division root of subsequent events
• Problems- Korea War to present crisis
• Positive - Aid from competing patrons
• US far richer South Korean economic success

6
Division and war

• 1945-50
• Two contesting states set up
• North DPRK
• Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea
• South ROK
• Republic of Korea
• June 1950 rising tensions and mutual incursions
  lead to war
• Northern offensive nearly succeeds

7
Korea War

• 1950 armistice in 1953
• 3-4 million dead, huge devastation, especially in
  North
• Divided families, bitterness and hostility
• Low-level warfare between North and South

8
Consequences

• ROK
• Authoritarian or military editorships until late
  1980s
• Continued US military presence and domination
• DPRK
• Kim family dynasty
• Nationalism, Confucianism, Stalinism.
• US first war that US did not win still rankles

9
DPRK

• Three aims
• Independence
• Economic growth
• Unification
• Mirrored in ROK
• Better economic performance than ROK until late
  1970s or 1980s

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(No Transcript)
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Growth with vulnerability

• Very strong growth
• Industry
• Agriculture
• Agricultural growth mainly due to industrial
  inputs
• Mechanization
• Fertilization
• Irrigation
• Electrification

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Juche

• Self-reliance
• Mirrored in South
• Continued hostility from US and allies
• 50 years of sanctions, military pressure
• Attempted to establish relations with US since
  1960s
• Tried to open to Europe in 1970s
• Dependence on trade/aid relationship with
  Socialist bloc

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Collapse of Soviet Union

• Precipitated latent crisis
• Then exacerbated by bad weather in mid 1990s
• Collapse of trade with Soviet Union devastated
  industrygtgtgtagriculture
• Resulted in famine
• 200,000-2 million deaths
• Considerable malnutrition

14
Foreign policy

• DPRK had long sought to increase independence by
• Economic self reliance
• Playing USSR and China off against each other
• Making (inept?) overtures to US allies
• Seeking better relations with US
• After 1990 key goals
• Normalization of relations with US
• Engagement with capitalist world economy
• Historical overviewgtClinton and Agreed Framework

15
Clinton and Agreed Framework

• DPRK two main nuclear objectives
• Electricity
• Security (assumed but denied)
• Need for electricity often overlooked
• Key constraint on economic recovery

16
Soviet reactors

• Tried to get LWRs from Europe but couldnt
  because of US sanctions
• Agreement with USSR gtgtsigned NPT
• USSR collapses no reactors
• 1993 says it will withdraw from NPT so can
  develop nuclear power
• US worried Clinton contemplates airstrikes, Kim
  Young-sam says no

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Carter visit

• Jimmy Carter meets Kim Il Sung
• Agreement forced upon Clinton
• No equivalent of Carter today

18
Agreed Framework

• Four main clauses
• Important sub-clauses
• Secret ancillary agreements

19
Agreed Framework I

• I Both sides will cooperate to replace the DPRKs
  graphite-moderated reactors and related
  facilities with light-water reactor (LWR) power
  plants.
• Due 2003 five years behind schedule

20
Agreed Framework II-III

• II The two sides will move toward full
  normalization of political and economic
  relations.
• Little progress except late 2000 frozen by Bush
• III Both sides will work together for peace and
  security on a nuclearfree Korean peninsula

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nuclearfree Korean peninsula

• US to give formal assurances against the threat
  of nuclear weapons
• Bush Nuclear Posture Review threatened preemptive
  nuclear strike
• DPRK implement N-S denuclearization agreement
• Enriched uranium would breech that
• IV. Both sides will work together to strengthen
  the international nuclear non proliferation
  regime.

22
AF problems and positives

• Democrats lost control of Congress and had
  difficulty implementing AF
• Kim Dae-jungs sunshine policy
• Engagement with North was necessary to prevent
  war
• Collapse of DPRK would be disastrous for ROK
• Defuse tensions, move to peaceful reunification
• Pressure on Clinton gtgtPerry Report gtgtUS DPRK
  modus vivendi

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2000

• June Pyongyang Summit
• October Secretary Albright visits Pyongyang,
  returns with invitation for Clinton
• DPRK announces end of Arduous March
• Normalization of relations with US in sight
• Hence end of economic crisis
• ClintongtBush

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Bush and the contrived crisis

• October 2000 peace in sight
• DPRK plutonium facilities frozen
• October 2002 crisis erupts
• US suspends oil shipments, formally rupturing AF
• DPRK
• Withdraws from NPT
• Reactivates plutonium program
• June 2003 says it will develop nuclear
  deterrent
• What happened?

25
Bushs ABC policy

• Bushs foreign policy based on ABC
• Anything But Clinton
• Repudiation across the board
• Iraq to Korea
• Richard Armitage 1999
• A Comprehensive Approach to North Korea
• Criticism of AF but no major proposals
• Except including missiles

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Bush and NK

• Attitude not a policy
• Period of malign neglect
• Low key review of NK policy
• 2001/2
• Nuclear Posture Review
• Violation of NSA of NPT
• Axis of Evil
• October 2002 James Kelly in Pyongyang
• Enriched Uranium allegations

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Kelly confrontation

• Kelly alleged
• DPRK had covert EU program in violation of AF
• DPRK admitted this
• However
• DPRK has denied both program and admission
• EU allegation problematic

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Problematic EU allegation

• Not new, so why bring it up then?
• Relationship with AF
• Substance and credibility
• Importance

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Not new

• Gilman Report 1999
• there is significant evidence that North Korea is
  continuing its activities to develop nuclear
  weapons.  Remarkably, North Korea's efforts to
  acquire uranium technologies, that is, a second
  path to nuclear weapons, and their efforts to
  weaponize their nuclear material do not violate
  the 1994 Agreed Framework

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Relationship with AF

• EU would not violate AF, but would breech N-S
  nuclear accord
• However, ROK has not formally complained to DPRK
• Because it does not believe them? Thinks other
  things are more important? Thinks the accord is
  dead?

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Substance and credibility

• Even if true weaponization only a distant and
  very uncertain possibility
• (Pollack The United States, North Korea, and the
  end of the Agreed Framework. Naval War College
  Review, 2003. LVI(3), lthttp//www.nwc.navy.mil/pre
  ss/Review/2003/Summer/art1-su3.htm
• USA Today report 4 November 2003
• N. Korean nuclear efforts looking less
  threatening
• http//www.usatoday.com/news/world/2003-11-04-kor
  ea-usat_x.htm
• Experts say it is possible some U.S. officials
  exaggerated the extent of the uranium program to
  torpedo AF

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Importance

• Overshadowed by plutonium program scarcely
  mentioned now
• BBC Report on nuclear program does not mention it
• 17 July 2003 The intelligence black hole over
  North Korea

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Why then?

• EU program
• Not new
• Not direct violation of AF
• Prospect of weaponization uncertain and distant
• Why tear up AF and provoke reactivation of
  plutonium program?

34
Pollack thesis

• Jonathan Pollock
• US Naval War College
• Administration shaken by
• New revelations about EU program
• September 2002 summit between Koizumi and Kim
  Jong Il

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The K-K trigger

• Sees collapse of AF as triggered by K-K summit
• Armitage only given one days warning of
  announcement
• Coincided with new findings about enriched
  uranium
• Kelly visit announced 1 week later
• Collapse AFgtgtcollapse of Pyongyang accord
• the DPRK had opened the door to a new
  relationship with Americas most important Asian
  ally

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New revelations?

• Pollack works for US Naval Collage, I dont
• EU program may be as unsubstantial as Iraqs
  weapons of mass destruction
• Excuse, not a cause
• Bush administration wanted to tear up AF
  thought they could get a better deal

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Positions and prospects
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DPRK

• National survival
• The opportunity to engage in the international
  economy without US hindrance
• Sanction, access to international loans,
  relations with ROK, Japan
• US compliance with AF
• LW reactors and compensation for delay, economic
  and humanitarian aid

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25 October 2002 statement

• clarified that it was ready to seek a negotiated
  settlement of this issue on the following three
  conditions firstly, if the U.S. recognizes the
  DPRKs sovereignty, secondly, if it assures the
  DPRK of nonaggression and thirdly, if the U.S.
  does not hinder the economic development of the
  DPRK

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Sequencing

• Other main issue of contention between DPRK and
  US
• US wants DPRK abandonment of nuclear program
  before US concessions
• DPRK wants simultaneous actions

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Simultaneous actions

• DPRK wants
• Economic and humanitarian aid
• Opening diplomatic ties
• Building nuclear reactors
• Nonaggression treaty
• DPRK offers
• Willingness to give up nuclear development
• Allow nuclear inspections
• Give up missile exports
• Finally dismantle nuclear facilities
• Pyongyang Ready to Consider Washington's Offer
  of Written Security Assurance, DPRK Foreign
  Ministry statement 25 October 2003

42
US policy

• Based on hostility, refusal to negotiate
• Struggle between realists and neocons
• Realists
• Want removal of NK threat even even if such an
  outcome might trigger severe instability and
  potential military dangers (Pollack)
• Neocons
• Want to use NK threat as means to bring about
  collapse

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Limited talk, no negotiation

• Sen. Joe Biden
• What we need to do is have more contact with
  North Korea. There were only 40 minutes of
  one-on-one dialog with North Korea last August in
  Beijing. That, with the translation requirements
  in such an exchange, is barely enough time to
  clear one's throat
• Senator Biden's Congressional Record comments on
  North Korea -- on the occasion of introducing
  Senate Resolution 256, 31 October 2003

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Odd man out

• North Korea has been trying to end enmity with
  the United States using a strategy of tit for
  tatcooperating when the United States cooperates
  and retaliating when Washington reneges. South
  Korea, Japan, China, and Russia are urging
  engagement too, setting aside a century of mutual
  rivalry and animosity to try to coax the United
  States into negotiating with North Korea. They
  have yet to succeed
• Leon Sigal
• director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative
  Security Project at the Social Science Research
  Council in New York, and author of Disarming
  Strangers Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea
  (1998

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Prospects

• Both sides showing more flexibility
• DPRK cannot shift very much from negotiating
  position because embedded in national interest
• China, Russia, ROK share common objectives
• Negotiation to remove nuclear issue
• Avoid collapse of DPRK

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US?

• Continued struggle between realists and neocons
• Perhaps strengthening of Democrats position
• All impacted by Iraq (Afghanistan, Taiwan
  Straits)
• Semi-negotiations but no conclusive ones
• Neither war nor peace

47
Waiting game

• US presidential election campaign will overshadow
  and dampen
• Everyone waiting for next US president
• That may offer opportunity for resolution of
  US-DPRK conflict