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25 October

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Elections and Voting. Punch Card Machine. Punch cards stacked here. Punched here ... California recall. Less than 1% missed (under voted) for yes/no ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: 25 October


1
25 October
  • Elections and Voting

2
Punch Card Machine
Punch cards stacked here
Punched here
3
US Attitudes re e-government
  • Beliefs
  • 45 agree that giving personal information would
    improve service
  • Same percentage believe that doing so risks
    security and privacy
  • Balance 54 believe that government should
    proceed slowly
  • Actions
  • Only 25 of e-government users use it for
    transactions
  • Yet 70 execute commercial transactions
  • Is this a difference in attitudes or availability?

4
Homeland security
  • Ability to share information
  • Between federal agencies
  • With local governments
  • Potential benefit to terrorists
  • Hacking
  • More information
  • National identity cards
  • US citizens against
  • Other countries more positive

5
Exploring e-government
  • Federal www.us.gov
  • State www.nc.gov
  • County www.co.orange.nc.us
  • City www.ci.chapel-hill.nc.us

6
Electronic votingWhat are the issues?
  • What are the requirements for elections?
  • Key ones
  • Secret ballot
  • Assurance that your vote is counted
  • New York Times editorial (13 June 04) a vote
    for president should be at least as secure as a
    25-cent bet in Las Vegas.
  • Should we be worried about possible
    manipulations?
  • Did you have problems reading the article?
  • What voting problems did you find?

7
Voting Problems
  • Ballot stuffing
  • Buying votes
  • Improperly marked ballots
  • Under voting
  • People who give up
  • Over voting
  • Which of these are addressed with electronic
    voting?
  • Which of these are exacerbated with electronic
    voting?
  • Experience
  • India ended up with worse corruption problems

8
What is included in e-voting
  • Range of Systems
  • Optically scanned paper
  • Touch screen systems
  • Internet voting
  • All Processes (what is the weakest link?)
  • Registration
  • Ballot design
  • Voting
  • Counting of votes
  • Recounts

9
Major concerns raised
  • Correctness
  • Certification process
  • Digital divide
  • System set up
  • Auditing (recounts)
  • Accessibility
  • Internet vulnerability

10
Correctness
  • Should code be open source?
  • Belief that more eyes are valuable
  • Easier to hack
  • Corruption
  • Vulnerability improved by open source
  • Checking for errors that hackers can exploit
  • Malicious changes primarily a concern of which
    version is running

11
Certification process
  • More than 40 states require certification
  • But what does it mean?
  • Need to guarantee certification of last minute
    fixes or changes not always possible
  • Both California and Indiana found themselves
    using uncertified code

12
Digital Divide
  • More generally an e-government concern
  • Intimidation
  • Could become a new literacy test
  • California recall
  • Less than 1 missed (under voted) for yes/no
  • But nearly 10 under voted in the candidate
    selection

13
System Set Up
  • Lack of local technical skills
  • Large number of local polling stations
  • Short set up time

14
Auditability vs. Privacy
  • Storing the full record means that someone could
    get at the information
  • Acceptable in England
  • Secret Ballot Act of 1872
  • Requires that each ballot be tied to the voter
  • Records held as a state secret

15
Auditing (recounts)
  • Voter Verified Audit Trail
  • Print a copy
  • Voter verifies
  • Puts it into a ballot box
  • Used for
  • Routine audits (random)
  • Recounts
  • Problems
  • Cost Australia opted out
  • Training

16
Why do an audit?
  • If you can only identify a problem, what is the
    remedy?
  • If audit can also produce the corrected results,
    more valuable

17
Broward County, Florida
  • special election to fill a state House seat
  • victor won by only 12 votes
  • 137 of the electronic ballots were blank
  • Florida law requires a manual recount
  • but no paper ballots
  • recount isn't possible

18
Are there other options?
  • Code can be verified against manipulating
  • Example encryption within the system
  • But, needs to get into the system
  • User interface is the vulnerable spot
  • Assuming no program errors, can we be sure that
    people will read a screen version correctly if
    they made a voting mistake?
  • Depends
  • Primarily on the quality of the ballot design

19
Partial Solutions
  • Turnout separate track of how many people voted
  • Number of votes cast should match
  • Need to count abstentions
  • Need to track people who quit in the middle
  • Does not help to determine if the vote went to
    the right person

20
Accessibility
  • Florida ban on plastic templates with holes for
    use by the visually impaired because NOT
    CERTIFIED
  • How do you address this problem without
    compromising privacy?
  • How is it done today?
  • Generally, advocates for the visually impaired
    prefer electronic voting
  • Techniques to support them, primarily audio
  • What about the paper audit trail?

21
New Mexico this past weekend
  • Only two voting machines certified by the federal
    government for disabled and non-English speaking
  • Neither measures up to state law that requires
    voter-verified paper record
  • Upgrade would require 1000/machine

22
Internet vulnerability
  • Denial of Service Attacks
  • Spoofing and Man-in-the-Middle
  • Lack of Control of the Voting Environment

23
Denial of Service Attacks
  • Prevents people from getting at a server
  • Particularly problematic when theres a time
    limit
  • Disrupted election in Canada in 2003
  • One study 10,000 attacks in one week in 2001
  • Distributed Denial of Service
  • Large number of machines, called zombies or
    slaves, are used to perpetrate
  • Regional attacks

24
Spoofing and Man in the Middle
  • Basically, insert a component between the client
    and the server
  • User interacts with what appears to be a real
    server, but component in the middle can change
    votes!

Real server
Client/server
Real client
25
Voting Environment
  • Worms, Viruses, Trojan Horses
  • Problematic if you need to have special software
    on your system
  • Spyware compromises privacy

26
A case study Georgia
  • 2000 potpourri of voting
  • 2 hand-counted paper
  • 73 mechanical lever
  • 17 punch card
  • 67 optical scan
  • 0 touch screen
  • 3.5 under votes no vote cast for president
  • Overall 4.4 under vote rate

27
Georgia Current Status
  • Complete conversion to touch screen by November
    2002
  • Testing of 250,000 ballots
  • Signature of code that detects modification with
    a probability of 1/10,000,000,000
  • Oversight of the deployment process
  • Under vote rate of less than 1
  • No recount capability

28
Florida (NY Times, July 15 04)
  • The touch-screen voting machines intended to cure
    many of the ills of 2000 have raised a host of
    other concerns here just four months before the
    election.
  • A new state rule excludes the machines from
    manual recounts
  • The integrity of the machines was questioned
    after a problem was discovered in the audit
    process of some of them
  • Sun-Sentinel reported that touch screens failed
    to record votes six times more often than
    optical-scans in presidential primary
  • Voting rights groups filed a lawsuit last week
    challenging the recount ban
  • A Democratic congressman has also sued to request
    a printed record of every touch-screen vote

29
New North Carolina Law
  • Lets try to find it www.nc.gov
  • Hints
  • House Bill 238 and Senate Bill 223
  • Title Public Confidence in Elections

30
Key NC Requirements
  • Machine requirements
  • vendor cover damages resulting from defects in
    the voting system, including costs of a new
    election
  • comply with all federal requirements for voting
    systems
  • include in precinct returns votes cast outside of
    the precinct
  • electronic voting systems generate a paper record
    of each individual vote cast
  • paper record generated by the DRE voting system
    be viewable by the voter before the vote is cast
    electronically and voter may correct any
    discrepancy
  • vendor will supply source code if they fail to
    debug, modify, repair, or update the software or
    file bankruptcy
  • For optical scan and direct record electronic
    voting systems, sample hand-to-eye count of the
    paper ballots or paper records of a sampling of a
    statewide ballot item in every county

31
Next Area Medicine
  • Impact of computers in medicine
  • Two assignments (again paper)
  • Precis of a procedure or device made possible by
    computers
  • A website with useful medical advice
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