Electronic voting systems:

1
Electronic voting systems the good, the bad,
and the stupid

• By
• Varun Jain

2
Introduction

• Florida 2000 election fiasco, drew conclusion
  that paper ballots couldnt be counted
• Computerized voting system, DRE (Direct Recording
  Electronic System) was assumed to be the only way
  out.

3
The Good

• Accurate election counts
• Replaced machines that were virtually impossible
  to rig
• Reported the results shortly after the polls
  close
• Proved cheaper and more reliable than the old
  systems

4
Few Horror Stories

• In January 2004, only one contest was included on
  the ballot. Yet, of the 10,844 votes, 134 were
  for no one.
• In November 2003, in Boone County, Indiana, more
  than 144,000 votes were casteven though Boone
  County contains fewer than 19,000 registered
  voters, and, of those, only 5,532 actually voted.
  
• When the polls opened in Hinds County,
  Mississippi, in November 2003, voters arrived to
  find that the DREs were down. One report claimed
  the machines had overheated, making all the
  voters stand in long lines till 8 p.m. until a
  new election was scheduled.

5
The Bad

• Security threat - Diebold voting machine software
  is available on an open FTP Web site
• Diebold uses a single DES key to encrypt all
  data. Thus, an attacker with access to the source
  code would have the ability to modify voting and
  auditing records
• Diebold officials dont understand cryptographic
  security
• Diebold system is so complicated that security
  risks is always there because of poorly trained
  election officials
• Reports revealed physical security problems
• Threat involving the supervisors card

6
Software bug that prevents Audit

• Diebold and ESS had count of something between
  two-thirds and 80 percent of the ballots cast in
  the November 2004 election
• The audit log contained results for some
  nonexistent machines, and it also failed to
  report all the results for the machines that were
  in operation.
• Bug Onetriggered by a low battery
  conditioncaused corruption in the event log
• Bug Two caused the election management system to
  misread the machines serial number
• Computer crash made backup, necessary

7
Alternatives

• DREs can be equipped with earphones and various
  devices
• DREs that produce voter-verifiable paper ballot
• Optical scan voting machines can be used
• Precinct-based optical scanners allows the voter
  to recheck his vote.
• Hybrid models offers a touch screen like a DRE
  the machine marks the optical scan ballot
• Another system includes a screen that operates
  with an attached stylus.
• Cryptographic voting systems provide an encrypted
  receipt
• The OVC (Open Voting Consortium is building an
  open source voting system that will run on PC
  hardware and produce a voter-verifiable paper
  ballot.

8
Conclusion

• Technological issue mixes with politics
• Election officials had a painful learning
  experience
• Education process continues