Natural Kinds, Naturalistic Epistemology and Philosophical Method

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Natural Kinds, Naturalistic Epistemology and
Philosophical Method

• Richard Boyd
• October 2007

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Big Questions

• Goodman, The New Riddle of Induction
• Quine, Natural Kinds and Epistemology
  Naturalized
• ? Renewed interest in philosophical naturalism
• Naturalism? About kind? About epistemology?
  About metaphysics?
• Philosophical naturalism?
• Relationship between philosophy and (other)
  sciences?

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BIG CONCLUSIONS METAPHYSICS OF KINDS

• KINDS ARE DISCIPLINE SPECIFIC SOCIAL ARTIFACTS
• REALITY OF KINDS CONTRIBUTION TO
  ACCOMMODATION OF DISCIPLINARY PRACTICES TO CAUSAL
  STRUCTURES
• REALISM STILL OK
• NEED TO REFORMULATE MIND INDEPENDENCE SOCIAL
  PRACTICES ARE METAPHYSICALLY INNOCENT

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BIG CONCLUSIONS EPISTEMOLOGY

• NO FOUNDATIONS RELIABILITY OF METHODS IS
  RADICALLY CONTINGENT
• NO CONTEXT OF DISCOVERY VS CONTEXT OF
  CONFIRMATION
• NO INTERNAL VS EXTERNAL FACTORS
• NO A PRIORI CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
• NO TRANSPARENCY RE SOURCES OF SCIENTIFIC
  JUDGMENTS
• NEEDED AN EPISTEMOLOGY OF INEXPLICIT INSIGHT,
  ERROR RE ACCOMMODATION
• (ALMOST) ALL EPISTEMOLOGY IS (NATURALISTIC)
  SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY

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BIG CONCLUSIONS SEMANTICS AND REPRESENTATION

• REFERENCE LANGUAGE MEDIATED ACCOMMODATION
• REFERENCE ? SOME LY TRUE CONCEPTIONS, LY
  RELIABLE METHODS
• ?ANY A PRIORI (EVEN LY) TRUE/RELIABLE
  CONCEPTIONS, METHODS. INDEED,
• CONCEPTUALLY CENTRAL BELIEFS/INFERENTIAL
  PRACTICES SOMETIMES IRREDEEMABLY FLAWED!
• TRUTH, REFERENCE ARE EPISTEMIC NOTIONS
• NEEDED SEMANTICS OF INSIGHT/ERROR TO GO WITH THE
  EPISTEMOLOGY OF INSIGHT
• TRUTH/FALSITY SPECIAL CASES OF SUCCESSFUL/FAILED
  ACCOMMODATION

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Background Philosophy of Science, I
Projectibility and Confirmation

• To a good first approximation
• At time, t, in research community, C, T is highly
  confirmed by evidence, E,
• ?
• T is projectible by standards current in C at
  t,
• AND
• E favors T over all relevant alternatives (
  rival theories also projectible _at_ C, t)
• AND
• E was gathered so as to control for artifacts
  suggested by theories projectible _at_ C, t.
• WHERE Projectibility plausibility given the
  theories best established _at_ C, t.

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Background Philosophy of Science, II
Projectibility is Evidential

• Projectibility, unprojectibility are evidential _at_
  C, t
• Theory, T, is projectible ? already some
  indirect evidence _at_ C, t for T
• T is unprojectible ? already some indirect
  evidence _at_ C, t against T
• Projectibility comes in degrees
• T is highly projectible no highly projectible
  rival ? minimal additional evidence required
• T is highly unprojectible ? Ignore T altogether

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Example Neutrinos

• Puzzle ß-decay. Neutron gives off electron to
  become proton
• E.g, 3H ? 3He e- (Tritium to helium 3 an
  electron)
• 1913 discovered that total energy 3H gt energy
  3He energy e-
• Energy not conserved??
• 1930 Wolfgang Pauli new particle 1933 F.
  Perrin (almost) massless!
• Projectible just because preserves conservation
  of energy
• Experimental confirmation
• 1956 Faint light emissions 15 microseconds
  apart in tank of CdCl2 solution near nuclear
  reactor predicted by theory of neutrinos (Reines
  and Cowan). Neutrinos detected! Nobel Prize to
  Reines 1995.
• Role of projectibility
• Suppose theory of neutrinos predicts flashing
  lights but no crisis re conservation of energy
• Then, theory of massless particle not
  projectible
• Experiment no evidence at all for neutrinos!
• But T highly projectible, so experiment counts
  as neutrino detection

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Objectivity Reliability of Theory Dependent
Methods

• Basic methodological rule Carefully choose from
  among relevant alternatives ( theories
  recommended by best current theories),
  controlling for effects suggested by best current
  theories.
• Why is this rule reliable? In particular, what
  makes relying on current theories reliable?
• NOT Their currency
• IN FACT ly their approximate truth
• Basic rule reliable ly to the extent that
  current theories are relevantly ly true!
• So, for any C, t, Methods in C at t are
  reliable is
• highly contingent and
• anything but a priori
• So, there are no foundational inductive methods!

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The Naturalistic Epistemology of Objectivity, I
Context of Discovery and Context of Confirmation?

• Rule for objective testing Test T under
  circumstances where its most likely to go wrong
  if its not (relevantly, approximately) true.
• Rule for identifying such circumstances Refer to
  alternative projectible theories.
• When is rule reliable?
• Simple answer _at_ (C, t,) just when often enough
  te truth is among projectible alternatives.
• Naturalistic answer _at_ (C, t), just when, often
  enough, te truth is among alternatives actually
  proposed and publicized as projectible.
• Whats implied?
• Appropriately reliable cognitive/conceptual
  structures
• Appropriate social structures of scientific
  communication
• Appropriate patterns of funding, encouragement
  of research directions,
• ? No distinction contexts of discovery and of
  confirmation

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The Naturalistic Epistemology of Objectivity, II
Characterizing Appropriateness for
Cognitive/Conceptual Structures

• How do background theories _at_ (C, t ) inform
  projectibility judgments?
• Simple answer Theories explicitly accepted _at_
  (C, t) provide reasons to identify some
  alternatives as plausible others as implausible.
• Naturalistic answer Indirectly _at_ (C, t)
  explicit theories interact with, inform, and are
  informed by, tacit commitments, conceptual
  structures, trained intuitions, etc. All these
  determine judgments of relative plausibility.
• Whats the relevant analogue to approximate truth
  for tacit commitments, conceptual structures,
  trained intuitions, etc.?
• Accommodation thesis The relevant analogue is
  accommodation of conceptual, linguistic and
  methodological practices to causal structures.
• Natural kinds provide an example of accommodation.

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An Accommodationist Theory of Reference and
Natural Kinds

• Key idea (Locke, Goodman, Quine, Putnam, )
  Successful inductive/explanatory practice
  requires accommodation between linguistic,
  conceptual, taxonomic resources and relevant
  causal factors.
• Referential hypotheses Hypotheses about how
  language-world relations contribute to
  accommodation in particular disciplinary
  matrices.
• Natural kinds are social/linguistic artifacts
• The kind natural kind is itself a natural kind in
  the theory of how accommodation is achieved.

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Reference

• For terms ti in a matrix M and families, Fi , of
  properties
• t1 ? F1
• .
• ti ? Fi
• .
• tn ? Fn
• Satisfying Epistemic Access and Accommodation
  Conditions

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Epistemic Access and Accommodation

• Epistemic access condition There is a systematic
  causally sustained tendency for what is
  predicated of ti within M to be approximately
  true of things which satisfy Fi, i1,..,n.
• Accommodation condition This fact, and the
  causal powers of things possessing F1,..,Fn,
  explain how the use of t1,..,tn in M contributes
  to whatever tendency there is for the
  accommodation demands of M to be satisfied
• Remark Accommodation sometimes requires that
  Fis be homeostatic property clusters.

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Metaphysical Lesson The Reality of Kinds

• Dont ask Is X a natural kind?
• Ask instead To what extent/how does the
  deployment of X contribute to accommodation in
  discipline D?
• Realism?
• Kinds are social constructions
• Theyre real if we are and if they correspond
  to relevant causal structures
• Mind independence?
• Beaver dams are social constructions but
  theyre real
• Real issue Do minds/social practices make
  causal reality?
• Realist answer (2N2C) Human social practices
  make no non-causal contribution to causal
  structures. No one here but us animals!

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Kinds, Modality and Modal Intuitions

• Received view (term t refers to K in actual
  world, w w other possible world)
• Actual world uses of t refer in w to K
• Ks definition in w is the same as its
  definition in w
• Intuitions reliable guide to Ks definition,
  modal properties
• Problems
• For HPC K definition is a clustering an
  actual causal process
• Its historically and situationally
  individuated ?members of the cluster vary? Same
  variation across possible worlds
• Trans-world individuation context dependent,
  depends on trans-world individuation of
  disciplines ? individuation often ambiguous
  often breaks down altogether for (even modestly)
  distant possible worlds
• BUT, intuitions deliver determinate (hence
  false) judgments
• Philosophically interesting phenomena are HPC
  knowledge, rationality, reference, justification,
  goodness, representation, mentality, personhood,

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Appropriateness for Cognitive/Conceptual
Structures Truth and Reliability as Special
Cases of Accommodation.

• Approximate truth special case of accommodation
• ly governed by Tarski-style compositional
  semantics
• via accommodation accomplished through use of
  natural kind terms
• Reliability of particular methods reliability
  with respect to approximate truth
• Representational function of projectibility
  judgments, intuitions, research styles, hunches,
  etc.
• causal contributions (/-) to reliability of
  practices via alignment with causal structures,
  where
• /- contributions are determined by overall
  inferential/practical architecture (cf. natural
  kinds)
• Representational function ( computational role)
  may be distributed not localized (e.g.,
  projectibility judgments distributed over
  colleagues, referees)
• Needed A better representational theory of
  insight.

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The Naturalistic Epistemology of Objectivity,
III Sources of Background Theories, Concepts,

• Which theories, doctrines, etc. determine
  projectibility judgments _at_ (C, t)?
• Simple answer The most fundamental findings in
  C at t.
• Naturalistic Answer Complicated story
  involving two important factors.
• Plurality of sources
• Disciplinary diversity
• Borrowed expertise (auxiliary hypotheses,
  instrumentation,)
• Unrefereed common knowledge (or error)
• Each of these ? limited individual critical
  expertise
• Social certification of expertise
• By universities, journals, academies, etc
• Relative prestige of research institutions,
  groups
• Each factor socially orchestrated ? No viable
  internal/external distinction

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Naturalistic Epistemology, III, contd
Objectivity and Social Embedding

• When are scientific methods objective?
• Simplistic (but common answer) When
  presupposition free
• Simple naturalistic answer When background
  theories, methods, etc are ly true, reliable,
• More sophisticated naturalistic answer Depends
  also on the political economy of science _at_ (C, t)
• When are scientists confident about a finding?
• 1. Published in major journal
• 2. From respected author or research group
• 3. Results relatively unsurprising
• When do scientists subject a finding to special
  scrutiny?
• Failure of one or more of above.
• When are such practices reliable?
• When 1-3 reliably indicate approximate truth
• When not? Social ideology in science.
• E.g., literature on race, intelligence, IQ
• When corrected?
• Science and external political struggles.

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The Naturalistic Epistemology of Objectivity, IV
Conceptual Analysis and Critiques of Scientific
Judgment

• How to understand, criticize the
  conceptual/inferential structures of science?
• Simple (logical empiricist) answer Formally
  rationally reconstruct concepts scientists
  actually use.
• Simple naturalistic answer Analyze the
  concepts scientists actually use as
  approximations to real definitions (cf. causal
  descriptive theories of reference)
• More complicated naturalistic answer
  Acknowledge malignant conceptual meanings
  massively mistaken concepts central to scientific
  communication practice.
• Conceptual meaning of term q at (C, t)
  cognitive/inferential commitments regarding q
  with which one must engage in order to understand
  literature, practice.
• Two sorts of engagement
• Uncritical Acceptance. Think ordinary
  sophisticated practitioner
• Critical Special stance for historian or
  philosopher of science

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Malignant Conceptual Meanings Human Sociobiology

• PREMISE Early human behaviors of kind B had
  evolutionary function F.
• CONCLUSION The underlying, innate and relatively
  nonmalleable (perhaps unconscious) motive of
  contemporary behaviors of kind B is ly to
  accomplish F.
• Such inferential patterns define the human
  sociobiological literature, are presupposed in
  the writing/reading of articles.
• Their inappropriateness follows from principles
  all their authors acknowledge.
• Daly, M. and M. Wilson. 1997. "Child Abuse and
  Other Risks of not Living with Both Parents," in
  L. Betzig ed. 1997. Human Nature A Critical
  Reader. New York Oxford University Press
• PREMISE In early humans evolutionary function
  of child rearing was to enhance survival of
  own/relatives children
• CONCLUSION we should expect parental feeling
  to vary as a function of the prospective fitness
  value of the child in question to the parent.
  NB In contemporary societies.
• Malignant meanings!

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Metaphilosophical Conclusion Nonreductionist
Philosophical Naturalism

• Quine Philosophy is empirical and continuous
  with the empirical sciences
• Simple (REDUCTIONIST) reading metaphysics
  physics epistemology individual perceptual,
  cognitive psychology
• Correct (NONREDUCTIONIST!) reading Philosophy
  continuous with empirical sciences including
  social, cognitive and linguistic architecture and
  political economy of science.
• No distinctly philosophical methods
• Philosophical/linguistic/modal intuitions
  trained judgments ? sources of a priori knowledge
• FINAL CONCLUSION ALL THIS ? PHILOSOPHY IS NOT
  JUST CONTINUOUS WITH, BUT AN ESSENTIAL COMPONENT
  OF, SOUND SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE.

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Postscript Clarifying Foundationalism (An
Approximation)

• Let F some set of foundational beliefs.
• MF methods justifiable either a priori or by
  reference to members of F
• Foundationalism in domain D with respect to F
  Whenever p (in D) is known its justifiable
  ultimately from premises in F using methods in
  MF.
• Foundationalism is more or less radical/modest
  depending on choice of F
• Modest foundationalism Take F q q is a
  priori or q is (true and) commonsensical and
  could be doubted only as a philosophical
  exercise
• NOTE Modest foundationalism for D Research
  in D is (pre-D) common sense iterated.
• Theory-dependence of scientific methods ? For
  scientific D, no version of even modest
  foundationalism is true. Science is not
  pre-scientific common sense iterated!