COUNTERINSURGENCY FMI 3-07-2

1
TOP FIVE MOST DEADLY TACTICS TECHNIQUES
PROCEDURES (TTPS) AS OF 1 APR 05
PHOTO SOURCE AL JAISH AL ISLAMI (ISLAMIC ARMY)
IN IRAQ, http//www.globalterroralert.com
2
SOURCE DISCUSSION
THE FOLLOWING OPEN SOURCE WEBSITES WERE USED AS
PRIMARY SOURCES TO OBTAIN PHOTOS, ATTACK
INFORMATION (DATE, TIME, LOCATION, INSURGENT
OPERATION INFORMATION), COALITION FORCES (CF)
UNIT INFORMATION, AND STATISTICS (VARIOUS OTHER
RESOURCES WERE RESEARCHED AS WELL, SUCH AS FOX
NEWS, YAHOO NEWS, ARMY KNOWLEDGE ONLINE, AND
OTHER OPEN SOURCES, INCLUDING VARIOUS RADICAL
WEBSITES, ETC) MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITY SMART CARDS (U) http//www.mcia.osis.gov/
products/smart_card/ttp/index.htm AL QAEDA
TACTICS AND CAPABILITIES (U/FOUO)
http//www.osis.gov/JITF-CT/index.htm COUNTERINSUR
GENCY FMI 3-07-22 http//www.fas.org/irp/doddir/ar
my/fmi3-07-22.pdf FORMER IRAQI ARMY GUERILLA
WARFARE MANUAL, SEP 86 http//www.brookings.edu/f
p/saban/iraq/index.pdf http//www.dod.gov/release
s/ http//www.centcom.mil/CENTCOMNews http//casua
lties.org/oif/stats.aspx http//www.globalterroral
ert.com http//www.defendamerica.mil/archive/2004-
09/20040902pm1.html http//www.blackwaterusa.com/
btw2004/articles/ttp1.ppt http//www.albasrah.net
(Anti-US Bias) http//www.abolkhaseb.net/images
(Anti-US Bias) http//www.middle-east-online.com/e
nglish (Anti-US Bias)
3
TOP CAUSES OF DEATH (HOSTILE ACTS)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
VBIED MOVED UP FROM 6 TO 3 SINCE JAN 05
(CHART DOES NOT INCLUDE ALL HOSTILE NON-HOSTILE
DEATHS ONLY TOP TEN HOSTILE CAUSES OF DEATH
1710 TOTAL AS OF 1 APR 05)
SOURCE http//www.centcom.mil/CENTCOMNews
http//casualties.org/oif/stats.aspx,
4
KILLED WOUNDED BY MONTH/SERVICE UP TO 1 APR 05
ARMY NAVY MARINES AIR FORCE COAST GRD
TOTAL 1031 29 456 16
1 1533 (AS OF 4/1/05 INCLUDES
RESERVES/GUARD/CIVS)
PERIODS OF SIGNIFICANT CASUALTIES APR-MAY 04
NAJAF UPRISING AUG-OCT 04 BUILD UP TO
FALLUJAH NOV 04 FALLUJAH OPERATION JAN 05
ELECTIONS
SOURCE http//casualties.org/oif/stats.aspx,
5
HIGHEST THREAT AREAS 1 APR 05
AL ANBAR PROVINCE IS STILL THE MOST DANGEROUS
AREA AFTER ADDING AL ANBAR (VIC), RAMADI AND
FALLUJAHS KIA FIGURES TO TOTAL 394 KIA INCLUDES
ONLY 15 TOP HIGH THREAT AREAS.
SOURCE http//casualties.org/oif/stats.aspx,
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ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) ATTACK TRENDS

MARCH DATA NOT AVAILABLE
SOURCE http//www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/in
dex.pdf
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ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) ATTACK TRENDS
IRAQI CIVILIANS KILLED BY ACTS OF WAR

WHILE IT APPEARS BY OPEN SOURCE REPORTING THAT
AIF OPERATIONS HAVE SLOWED, ACTUALLY AIF HAVE
SHIFTED TARGETING FROM CF TO IZ TARGETS. AIF ARE
NOW KILLING IZ CIVILIANS AND ISF AT ONE THE
HIGHEST RATES EVER, ACCORDING TO THE AVAILABLE
OPEN SOURCE DATA.
SOURCE http//www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/in
dex.pdf
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1 SAF ATTACKS

• SAF DURING CLOSE COMBAT - DIRECT ACTION
• LIMITED SAF FIRES (TO HARASS) ON
• PATROLS
• CONVOYS
• DRIVE-BY ON CHECKPOINTS

PHOTO SOURCE http//www.abolkhaseb.net/images/ma
hdi-resistance/pages/1092130982_2802_jpg.htm
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SAF DURING CLOSE COMBAT - DIRECT ACTION
-PLANNED TARGETS TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY -MASSED/
UNMASSED FIRES -TARGET EXPOSED CF/INA/ING
PERSONNEL THAT ARE MOUNTED OR DISMOUNTED -FIRES
ORIGINATE FROM AIF IN -BUILDINGS -HOMES
-AROUND STREET CORNERS -VEHICLES
-DEFENSIVE POSITION(PREPARED/HASTY)
-TUNNELS -SAF THREAT COMES FROM ALL AGES AND SEXES
PHOTO SOURCE CHILD SOLDIERS http//www.albasrah
.net/images/moqawama/pages/moqawama_55_jpg.htm
WOMEN PROTESTING http//www.albasrah.net/images/mo
qawama/pages/015_gif.htm
10
SAF HARASSMENT ON PATROLS/CONVOYS
-UNPLANNED/TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY -NON-MASSED
FIRES -PERFORMED BY 1-2 AIF WITH RIFLES OR
PISTOLS -TARGET EXPOSED CF PERSONNEL ON VEHICLES
-EXPOSED TRACK COMMANDER -EXPOSED
GUNNER -SAF MAY ORIGINATE FROM AIF IN -TOP
OF BUILDINGS OR HOMES -WINDOWS OF BUILDINGS
OR HOMES -AROUND STREET CORNERS
-VEHICLES/MOTORCYCLES -MIXED IN WITH
PEDESTRIANS -AIF WILL IMMEDIATELY BREAK CONTACT
PHOTO SOURCE http//www.albasrah.net/images/iraq
i-resist/pages/r2863957857_jpg.htm
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SAF DRIVE-BY
-PLANNED -REQUIRES 1-2 AIF WITH AK-47S -MOST
OFTEN AGAINST CHECKPOINTS -CAR DRIVE-BY (MOST
COMMON METHOD) -MOTORCYCLE DRIVE-BY -TARGET
EXPOSED PERSONNEL SUCH AS -CF -IRAQI
NATIONAL GUARD (ING) -IRAQI NATIONAL ARMY
(INA) -IRAQI POLICE SERVICE (IPS) -AIF WILL
IMMEDIATELY BREAK CONTACT -PRE-PLANNED EXFIL
ROUTES
SOURCE TCP VIC FALLUJAH, IZ, http//www.albasrah
.net/media/sound/falluja.htm
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2 AIF IED ATTACKS

• IED ON LINEAR ROUTE
• AIF ARE EMPLACING FEWER IEDS
• YET, AIF ARE EMPLACING MORE POWERFUL IEDS
  (REQUIRES MORE AIF PERSONNEL TIME TO PREPARE,
  EMPLACE, DETONATE)
• DETONATED BY MANUAL OR REMOTE DETONATION
• PLANNED, RECONNOITERED, PHOTOGRAPHED/VIDEOTAPED
• IEDS CAN BE EMPLACED IN VARIOUS LOCATIONS
• ON ROADS (IN HOLES, DEAD ANIMAL CARCASSES,
  CONCRETE, ASPHALT, OR UNDER DEBRIS)
• ALONG ROADS (MEDIAN, SHOULDER)
• THROWN FROM BRIDGES
• CREEK BEDS

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2 AIF IED ATTACKS

• MULTIPLE ROADSIDE IEDS OR DECOY, MANUAL/REMOTE
  DETONATION
• IED THREAT TO DISMOUNTS
• SUICIDE IED MANUAL DETONATION

-AIF ARE DEPLOYING MORE IEDS (AVERAGE 30 PER DAY
FEB 05, VERSES 25 PER DAY APR 04) NOW THEY ARE
FOCUSING ON ISF, NOT CF. -HOWEVER, US CASUALTIES
STILL REMAIN AT AN ALL TIME HIGH FOR THE FIRST
QUARTER 2005.
SOURCE BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, IRAQI INDEX 11 MAR
05
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(No Transcript)
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(No Transcript)
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DECOY IED ATTACKS
SOURCE MCIA IED SMART CARD PHOTO SOURCE
http//www.strategypage.com/gallery/articles/milit
ary_photos_200412100.asp
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SUICIDE IED ATTACKS

• TARGETS ARE PLANNED AND RECONNOITERED
  PHOTOGRAPHED/VIDEOTAPED
• OFTEN INSIDE JOBS
• REQUIRES 4-8 AIF
• WALK UP METHOD OF ATTACK
• TARGETS ARE PEOPLE
• CF, IPS, ING, OR INA BASES OR POSTS
• KEY IRAQIS IN THEIR OFFICES
• KEY IRAQIS IN THEIR RESIDENCES
• KEY IRAQIS IN THEIR CARS
• IEDS CARRIED BY
• SUITCASE
• BAG
• BACKPACK
• VEST

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3 VBIED ATTACKS

• STATIONARY, NON-SUICIDE VBIED
• -PARKED VBIED
• -DROP-OFF VBIED
• -VBIED DIVERSIONS
• -UNWITTING VICTIM-DRIVER IN VBIED
• -VBIED DECOYS

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VBIED ATTACKS (NON-SUICIDE)

• PARKED VBIEDS
• -REMOTE CONTROL OR COMMAND DETONATED VBIED
  
• VBIED IS STATIONARY/UNMANNED FROM AN OVERWATCH
  POSITION, AIF MAY USE A HARD WIRE OR A REMOTE
  CONTROL DEVICE (CELL PHONE, GARAGE DOOR OPENER,
  ETC.) TO DETONATE AS TARGET PASSES.
• MAY BE A STRIPPED VEHICLE (STRIPPED OF
  SEATS/TIRES, BODY DAMAGE).
• MAY BE A JUNK YARD VEHICLE THAT AIF SIMPLY PUT
  TIRES ON AND PLACED NEXT TO ROAD AS A VBIED. MAY
  EVEN HAVE BEEN HASTILY REPAINTED.
• MAY APPEAR TO BE A FUNCTIONAL VEHICLE, BUT PARKED
  WITH HOOD UP. MAY HAVE FUEL CANS STACKED NEARBY
  OR IN BACK SEAT.
• -COMPLEX AMBUSH AIF OFTEN INITIATE A
  COMPLEX ATTACK WITH A STATIONARY
• VBIED (SINGLE OR MULTIPLE) THAT IS DETONATED ON
  A CONVOY OR CF BASE AIF CONTINUE THE ATTACK
  WITH RPGS, MORTARS AND SMALL ARMS FIRE (SAF).
  NOTE AIF CLAIMED TO HAVE USED SEVEN VBIEDS
  DURING ABU GHRYAB PRISON ATTACK 3 APR 05.

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VBIED ATTACKS

• DROP OFF VBIED A VBIED IS DRIVEN AND PARKED
  NEXT TO TARGET (FOR EXAMPLE ING FORMATION)
  DRIVER WALKS AWAY FROM VEHICLE AND DETONATES.
• DIVERSIONS A VBIED EXPLODES IN ANOTHER PART OF
  THE TOWN, AT THE SAME TIME AIFS ATTACK AN IRAQI
  POLICE STATION.
• UNWITTING VICTIM-DRIVER AIF PLANTS AN IED ON A
  VEHICLE OF AN UNWITTING EMPLOYEE, POLICEMAN OR
  GOVERNMENT WORKER, THEN DETONATES THE VBIED AS
  THE VICTIM DRIVES THEIR VEHICLE VICINITY OF THE
  TARGET (OFTEN A GOVERNMENT BUILDING, ETC).

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VBIED ATTACKS

• DECOYS
• -STATIONARY VBIED SIGHTED BY CF CONVOY CONVOY
  STOPS AT A SAFE DISTANCE SECOND DEVICE SUCH AS
  BURIED IED IS DETONATED ON STOPPED CONVOY.
• -CFS FIND AND BEGIN TO CLEAR A VBIED (DECOY) OR A
  SIMPLE IED, WHEN A SECOND VBIED NEARBY DETONATES
  ON THE CF EOD TEAM.
• -PUSH AWAY VBIED-- CF IDENTIFY A BROKEN DOWN,
  ABANDONED VEHICLE BLOCKING AN MSR CF HMMWV
  BEGINS TO PUSH THE VEHICLE OFF THE ROAD AIF IN
  OVERWATCH REMOTELY DETONATE THE BROKE VEHICLE
  JUST AS THE HMMWV BEGINS TO PUSH IT.

PHOTO SOURCE CNN
22
4 RPG ATTACKS

• SINGLE RPG FIRED AT A CF, INA, OR ING TARGET TO
  HARASS
• BUILDING
• BASE
• PATROL
• CONVOY
• CHECKPOINTS
• RPG FIRED DURING CLOSE COMBAT DIRECT ACTION

PHOTO SOURCE FIGHTING IN IRAQ
http//www.abolkhaseb.net/images/mahdi-resistance/
index.htm
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RPG ATTACKS ON CONVOYS/PATROLS

• -LIMITED PLANNING
• -TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY
• -UNMASSED FIRES
• -PREFER TO FIRE AT VEHICLES RATHER THAN BUILDINGS
• -TARGET CF, ING, INA, OR IPS
• -AIF WILL QUICKLY BREAK CONTACT

PHOTO SOURCE FIGHTING IN IRAQ,
http//iraq4ever.blogspot.com/ MAHDI MILITIA,
http//www.abolkhaseb.net/images/mahdi-resistance/
pages/r977494193_jpg.htm
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RPG FIRED IN CLOSE COMBAT

• -HASTILY PLANNED
• -UNMASSED FIRES
• -MAY BE COMBINED WITH SAF
• -TARGET PERSONNEL, A BUILDING, VEHICLE
• -TARGET CF, ING, INA, OR IPS
• -OCCUR DAY OR NIGHT
• -AIF MAY BREAK CONTACT WHEN
• -FACING SUPERIOR FIREPOWER
• -AIR/GROUND QRF ARRIVE

PHOTO SOURCE MAHDI MILITIA, http//www.abolkhase
b.net/images/mahdi-resistance/pages/r3220281186_jp
g.htm
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5 AIF AMBUSHES

• HARASSMENT AMBUSHES ON PATROLS/CONVOYS
• INTENT IS TO ATTACK AND THEN IMMEDIATELY WITHDRAW
• MAY USE ONLY AK-47SRPGS
• DAY OR NIGHT
• COMBAT AMBUSHES ON PATROLS/CONVOYS
• INTENT IS TO ATTACK AND DESTROY TARGET IN KILL
  ZONE
• MAY OFTEN BE COMPLEX AMBUSHES (IEDAK-47SRPGSLIG
  HT MACHINE GUNSMORTARS)
• DAY OR NIGHT

SOURCE FORMER IRAQI ARMY GUERILLA WARFARE
MANUAL, SEP 86
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AIF HARASSMENT AMBUSH

• -TARGETS COMBAT PATROLS OR
• CONVOYS
• -INTENT IS TO HARASS
• -PROBABLY LESS HEAVILY ARMED
• -LAY IN WAIT, ATTACK AND WITHDRAW
• -PREPLANNED, RECONNOITERED
• -PHOTOGRAPHED OR VIDEOTAPED
• -AMBUSH ELEMENT CAN BE STATIONARY
• OR IN VEHICLES
• -POSSIBLE STATIONARY AMBUSH
• ELEMENTS
• -MAIN FIRING LINE (AMBUSH LEADER
• IS INCLUDED IN THIS GROUP)
• -SECURITY ELEMENT.

SOURCE FORMER IRAQI ARMY GUERILLA WARFARE
MANUAL, SEP 86 PHOTO SOURCE http//www.abolkhas
eb.net/images/mahdi-resistance/pages/mahdi-resista
nce6_jpg.htm.
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AIF COMBAT AMBUSH

• -TARGETS COMBAT PATROLS OR CONVOYS
• -INTENT IS TO CAUSE MAXIMUM DESTRUCTION OF
• CF (OR ING/INA/IPS) VEHICLES/EQUIPMENT AND
• MAXIMUM CASUALTIES
• -PROBABLY A COMPLEX AMBUSH MAY HAVE
• MINED ROADSIDE
• -LAY IN WAIT, ATTACK, DESTROY EQUIPMENT
• VEHICLES, KILL CF PERSONNEL IN KILL ZONE, AND
• WITHDRAW
• -PREPLANNED, RECONNOITERED
• -PHOTOGRAPHED OR VIDEOTAPED
• -AMBUSH ELEMENT CAN BE STATIONARY OR
• IN VEHICLES
• -POSSIBLE STATIONARY AMBUSH ELEMENTS
• -MAIN FIRING LINE (AMBUSH LEADER IS
• INCLUDED IN THIS GROUP)
• -SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT GROUP
• (DEMO TEAM TO DESTROY VEHICLES
• EQUIPMENTS IN KILL ZONE AFTER

SOURCE FORMER IRAQI ARMY GUERILLA WARFARE
MANUAL, SEP 86 PHOTO SOURCE FIGHTING IN
KARBALA http//www.albasrah.net/images/iraqi-resis
t/pages/r3290927916_jpg.htm FIGHTING IN RAMADI
http//www.alchahed.net/ramadi_101004.htm
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SAF/RPG ROLLING AMBUSH(5 JUN 04, BLACKWATER
AMBUSH)
?
?
?
?
BIAP

• FRIENDLY CONVOY (VICINITY BAGHDAD AIRPORT
• -TWO VEHICLE (SUBURBANS) CONVOY TO BIAP
• -SOFT BODY LEADS ARMORED TRAILS
• -LEAD VEHICLE-4 PERSONS TRAIL VEHICLE-3 PERSONS
• EQUIPPED M4S BODY ARMOR, RADIOS, AK-47S, HGS
• -LEAD TOOK RPG HIT TRAIL PULLED ALONG SIDE
• -DEFENDED AS LONG AS POSSIBLE 4 KIA, 2 WIA
• -WITHDREW UNDER FIRE
• -COMMANDEERED VEHICLE IN ON-COMING LANE TO ESCAPE

• AIFS
• -VEHICLES ATTACKED, PASSED RETURNED
• -TWO VEHICLES STOPPED IN FRONT
• -PKM (ARMOR PIERCING TRACER?), SAF, RPG
• -FIRED/MANEUVERED ON TARGET
• POSSIBLE FLANK UNIT
• -POSSIBLY MORE THAN ONE AIF VEHICLE IN REAR
• -COLLECTED CASUALTIES BEFORE DEPARTING
• -DISCIPLINED

DIAGRAM SOURCE http//www.blackwaterusa.com
29
COMPLEX AMBUSH ON PATROL/CONVOY
1. IED INITIATES AMBUSH HALTING CONVOY.
3. REAR OF CONVOY ATTACKED BY RPG, FROM
OPPOSITE SIDE OF ROAD.
T
T
2. GUN TEAM ENGAGE CONVOY, DRAWING ATTENTION TO
THEIR SIDE OF THE ROAD.
DIAGRAM SOURCE http//www.blackwaterusa.com/
btw2004/articles/ttp1.ppt
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MORTARS-WITH AMBUSHES
-PLANNED FIRES AGAINST CF, INA, ING OR IPS
PATROLS/CONVOYS -MASSED FIRES WITH SAF, MACHINE
GUN, RPG, IED, AND/OR VBIED -EXPLOIT MAXIMUM
RANGE OF MORTAR SYSTEM -IMMEDIATE DISPLACEMENT
AFTER FIRING -SYSTEM TRANSPORTED BY -VEHICLE
-CART -MOTORCYCLE -HAND CARRIED BY
CREW -DAY OR NIGHT FIRES -EXPLOIT RESTRICTED FIRE
ZONES (HOUSES, APARTMENTS, OR BUILDINGS)
SOURCE FORMER IRAQI ARMY GUERILLA WARFARE
MANUAL, SEP 86
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ANALYST COMMENTS

• AIF FIRING SMALL ARMS IN CLOSE COMBAT REMAINS THE
  1 CASUALTY PRODUCING TACTIC
• THE IED REMAINS 2 CASUALTY PRODUCING TACTIC
• AIF ARE ACTUALLY DEPLOYING MORE IEDS THAN BEFORE
• HOWEVER, ARE TARGETING IRAQI SECURITY FORCES MORE
  THAN THE COALITION
• VBIED ATTACKS MOVED UP FROM 6 TO 3 SINCE JAN 05
• AIF HAVE REALIZED THAT THE VBIED IS THE NEXT MOST
  DANGEROUS THREAT TO MOUNTED CF BESIDES THE
  SUICIDE VBIED
• VEHICLE IS EASY TO OVERLOOK ON SIDE OF ROAD
• CAN HOLD A MUCH LARGER EXPLOSIVE THAN AN IED
• DOES NOT REQUIRE CONCEALING/BURYING (BURIED IED)

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ANALYST COMMENTS

• AIF HAVE CHANGED THEIR TARGETING FOCUS TO INA,
  ING, AND IPS TARGETS
• AIF MAY BEGIN TARGETING PRIME MINISTER,
  PRESIDENTS/VICE PRESIDENTS, AND ASSEMBLY MEMBERS,
  AS THE IRAQI TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT ASSUMES
  POWER APRIL 2005
• (DATA MAY NOT BE ALL INCLUSIVE GREAT CARE WAS
  GIVEN TO ACCURACY, BASED ON AVAILABLE OPEN
  SOURCES)
• POCs vincent.mclean_at_leavenworth.army.mil,
  penny.mellies_at_leavenworth.army.mil, ADCSINT,
  TRADOC, FORT LEAVENWORTH, 913-684-7920