Crowd behaviour in CBRN incidents

1
Crowd behaviour in CBRN incidents

• John Drury
• Department of Psychology
• Sussex University
• Acknowledgements
• Chris Cocking (London Metropolitan University,
  UK)
• Steve Reicher (University of St Andrews, UK)
• The research was made possible by a grant from
  the Economic and Social Research Council
• Ref. no RES-000-23-0446.

2
Overview

• Early models of mass reactions to emergencies
  crowd panic
• Practical implications and problems
• Explaining social behaviour in emergencies
• London bombs (7/7) study
• Theoretical and practical implications

3
Early models of mass reactions to emergencies
crowd panic

• In the face of threat
• Instinct overwhelms socialization
• Emotions outweigh reasoning
• Rumours and sentiments spread uncritically
  through contagion
• Reactions are disproportionate to the danger
• Competitive and selfish behaviours predominate
• Ineffective escape

4
Practical implications of crowd panic

• Emphasis on physical aspects of public space
• Communication less important

5
Empirical problems for crowd panic

• Panic is actually rare (Brown, 1965 Johnson,
  1988 Keating, 1982 Quarantelli, 1960).
• Lack of crowd panic (examples)
• atomic bombing of Japan during World War II
  (Janis, 1951)
• Kings Cross Underground fire of 1987 (Donald
  Canter, 1990)
• 9/11 World Trade Center disaster (Blake, Galea,
  Westeng, Dixon, 2004)
• The problem is often people not taking the
  emergency seriously rather than taking it too
  seriously!

6
Explaining social behaviour in crowds in
emergencies

• Order and co-operation are common.
• e.g. Beverly Hills Supper Club fire, 1977
• Theories of social behaviour
• Normative approaches norms, social roles guide
  behaviour
• Affiliation people seek the familiar, stay in
  given groups

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Explaining the extent of co-operation

• People also help strangers
• Self-categorization theory
• shared fate creates sense of we-ness (shared
  identity)
• people care for and help others in the crowd in
  an emergency because they cognitively group them
  with self

8
London bombs (7/7) study

• Secondary data
• (i) Contemporaneous interviews with survivors
  and witnesses, from 141 different articles in 10
  different national daily newspapers.
• (ii) 114 detailed personal accounts of survivors
  (web, London Assembly enquiry, books or
  retrospective newspaper features.
• Primary data
• 12 face-to-face interviews plus seven e-mail
  responses
• data from at least 145 people, most of whom
  (90) were actually caught up in the explosions

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Our research questions

• Was there crowd panic (i.e. predominance of
  personally selfish behaviours)?
• How common was help?
• How far was any help explicable in terms of
  shared identity?

10
Was there crowd panic?

• There was talk of panic
• 57 eye-witness accounts used the term panic.
• 20 eye-witness accounts explicitly denied that
  there was panic
• BUT
• 37 accounts referred to calm amongst those
  affected by the bombs
• 58 to an orderly evacuation.

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How common was help?

• In the personal accounts
• 42 people reported helping others
• 29 reported being helped by others
• 50 reported witnessing others affected by the
  explosions helping others
• this Australian guy was handing his water to all
  of us to make sure we were all right I I was
  coughing quite heavily from smoke inhalation and
  so Id got a bit of a cold anyway which
  aggravated it and also I mean he was really
  helpful but when the initial blast happened I was
  sat next to an elderly lady a middle aged lady
  and I just said to her are you all right?
  (Edgware Road)

12

• Selfish, competitive behaviour was rare
• Personal accounts only four cases of people's
  behaviour that could be described as personally
  selfish, and six cases where the speaker
  suggested that another victim behaved selfishly
  to them or to someone else.

13
Explaining help Affiliation?

• Most of the people affected were amongst
  strangers
• nearly 60 people in the personal accounts
  reported being amongst people they didnt know
  (including 48 people who were actually on the
  trains or bus that exploded)
• only eight reported being with family or friends
  at the time of the explosion.

14
Explaining helpShared fate, shared identity

• There was a widespread fear of danger or death
  through secondary explosions or the tunnel
  collapsing.
• Secondary data Occasional references to unity
  and shared fate, e.g. Blitz spirit
• BUT no references to dis-unity either
• Interview data
• Nine out of twelve were explicit that there was a
  strong sense of unity in the crowd
• References to unity were not only typical but
  also spontaneous and elaborate/detailed
  empathy, unity, together, similarity,
  affinity, part of a group, you thought
  these people knew each other, vague solidity,
  warmness, teamness, everybody, didnt
  matter what colour or nationality.

15
Explaining helpEveryday norms?

• Is the unity and helping described different from
  social relations normally on the trains and just
  before the bomb?
• CC can you say how much unity there was on a
  scale of 1-10
• LB1 Id say it was very high Id say it was 7 or
  8 out of 10
• CC ok and comparing to before the blast happened
  what do you think the unity was like before
• LB1 Id say very low- 3 out of 10 I mean you
  dont really think about unity in a normal train
  journey, it just doesnt happen you just want to
  get from A to B, get a seat maybe
• Therefore not simply everyday norms

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Theoretical conclusions

• CBRN versus other kinds of emergencies? to the
  extent that the attack puts people all in the
  same boat, the psychological effects will the
  same.
• Hyams, Murphy Wessely (2002) Responding to
  chemical, biological or nuclear terrorism The
  indirect and long-term health effects may present
  the greatest challenge. Journal of Health
  Politics, Policy and Law, 27, 273-291.
• Shared social identity is the psychological basis
  for the concept of resilience (collective
  self-help, resources and recovery in disasters)

17
Practical implications

• If panic is wrong and crowd behaviour is social
  and meaningful
• More emphasis on communicating with the crowd and
  less on the crowd as a physical entity (exit
  widths)
• If there is a willingness to help among strangers
• The emergency services need to allow and cater
  for peoples willingness to help each other.
• Treat the public as an ally
• (Cf. Glass Schoch-Spana (2002). Bioterrorism
  and the people How to vaccinate a city against
  panic. Clinical Infectious Diseases, 34,
  217-223.)