Title: NBA 600: Session 5 Customer Access to Information 4 February 2003
1NBA 600 Session 5Customer Access to
Information 4 February 2003
2Todays Class
- Finish material from last time
- Saw new IT can change industry structure,
demanding focus on strategy
- Finish considering examples of where new IT
resulted in (required?) new business models
- Start discussing value of information to the
customer
- Sometimes can also lower costs
- Can remove information bottlenecks, which may be
profitable components of old structure
- Can be used to enhance value of other goods and
services
3Reflect Whats a Business Model
- Business model how to profitably generate value
for the customer
- Focus on customers and their needs
- What they value and will pay for
- Simple story for expressing the value
- Omits focus on competition
- Which comes from competitors, suppliers,
customers, substitutes, new entrants
- Business model mediates between value creation
and new technology (Chesbrough)
- Current models may not allow value to be realized
or captured
4Some History of IT Business Models
- Radio broadcasting needed new model
- Subscription or fee not possible model
- In contrast to newspapers, magazines, movies
- Promising new technology
- Stock bubble (1905-1910)
- Big business by 1920s
- Many broadcasters were manufacturers
- Westinghouse, RCA
- Evolution of national radio networks
- Eventually audience for sponsors/advertisers
- TV broadcasting radio advertising model
- Initial losses absorbed by radio broadcasters
5IT Hardware Manufacturers
- Often explicitly create product need through
content/services
- Radio equipment manufacturers developed
broadcasts to drive demand for radio sets
- Motorola creates businesses to drive demand
- Built early pager and cellular networks
- Exited service businesses once critical mass
- Satellite phone networks (e.g., Iridium) were
costly businesses that never yielded demand
- Intels VC arm invests in applications that
create need for faster microprocessors
- Positive returns generate more value
6Copying Written Information
- Haloid (Xerox) introduced 914 in 1959
- First plain paper copier substitute for existing
technologies that did not produce typed quality
- Prevailing business model razor blades
- Slight markup over cost on equipment
- Typical machine sold for around 300
- Higher markup on consumables (special paper and
supplies)
- On average used for 15-20 copies per day
- Business model a problem for Haloid
- Manufacturing cost of 914 around 2000
- Although per copy costs similar to others
7A (Revolutionary) New Model
- Nobody could see how to make money with this new
technology
- Haloid tried to get Kodak, GE and IBM to help
market the 914 but all thought no business
- AD Little concluded device was highly versatile
but had no future in office copying market
- Joe Wilson bet that there was greater latent
value in the technology
- Leased the device at 95/mo including 2,000
copies, .04 per additional copy
- Without extra copies, about 2 years to reach
profitability on each lease
8Wildly Successful Model
- Once installed, the 914s generated an average of
2,000 copies/day (not month)
- Almost 20x the lease revenue
- Xerox compound growth rates 41/yr for twelve
years
- 2.5 billion revenue and high margins by 1972
- Never would have gotten off the ground without a
new business model leasing
- Unfortunately Xerox had too hard a time getting
past the lease plus click model
- Lost low-end printers to HP razor blades
9Value of Information
- Information often has high value
- Even when it is a component of some other product
or service
- Value may change substantially with new
technology
- Value may not be realizable under some models
- Important to explicitly understand value and how
to get paid for it
- Can be difference between huge business and
nothing
- Information has social value people want to
share it
10Informing the Customer
- Saving money by informing customer more
efficiently
- Customers want access to information, what is it
costing you to provide it
- Better customer loyalty by providing more
information
- Adding value for the customer, such as direct
airline reservations or package tracking
- Learn more from the customer
- Dont let intermediaries become more
knowledgeable than you
11Example IT in Airline Industry
- Mid 1970s larger airlines create computer
reservation systems CRS
- E.g., Apollo (United), Sabre (American)
- Terminals directly in travel agent offices
- Fares and reservations for any airline paying
fee
- Prior discussion among travel agents about
building common reservation system
- Less resources and not as organized
- A common airline system rejected by United
- Prior to CRSs travel agents used printed fare
book, telephoned in reservations
12Airline Reservations Before CRSs
- Manual processing of calls from agents
- Costly call centers to handle growing air travel
volume
13Value of CRSs
- Airline operating savings on call centers
- Major motivator ROIs were 70-100 a year
- More convenient for agent
- No sitting on hold direct access to information
- Enabled differential pricing
- Manual system did not support complex pricing
- Airlines able to de-commoditize their product
- Charge more for business traveler who values
buying at last minute or not staying weekend
- Yield management was born algorithms to obtain
maximal revenue for seats
14Evolution of CRSs
- Each travel agency installed single system
- High fixed costs needed to be distributed over
many ticketed reservations
- Charges were per segment
- Competition and consolidation
- Winners such as Sabre became large profitable
businesses
- Spun out from American, served travel agents
- CRSs and agents had considerable power
- Controlled flow of information and access to
customers
15Industry Structure 1990
- Two layers of intermediary between airline and
customer
- Substantial costs associated with each layer
- Customer value in CRS layer
- Routing and pricing across airlines
- Airline value diminished by in-house systems
- Customer value in agent layer variable
- Airline value if agent drove customers to them
16Rapid Adoption of Internet
- Customers and airlines both motivated to change
benefits to both sides
- Customers wanted more information and control
than getting from agent
- Agent profits tied to airline bonus programs and
not necessarily customer interest
- Airlines wanted to cut costs
- Agent fees were 10 of ticket CRS fees rising
- Airlines rapidly developed direct Web sales and
Orbitz consortium
- Bypassing agents and own reservation centers
which were also costly
17Rapid Adoption of Internet
- New entrants such as Microsoft/Expedia
- Exploited early technology leadership
- Driven by frustration with agents as information
bottlenecks
- Successful online agents keep evolving
- Competing head-on with Priceline model
- Offering wide range of travel products
- Experimenting with revenue models
- E.g., merchant revenues now larger than agency
revenues (re-sellers taking inventory risk)
- Travelocity becomes part of Sabre CRS
18Internet Travel Today
- 60 of Americans research travel online
- Similar to percentage in 2001
- Calls and visits to traditional travel agents
down each year
- 15 decrease in number of agents in 5 years
- Over 39 million people booked travel online
- Up 25 over 2001
- 70 of them booked over half travel online
- 30 of them booked over 2500/yr online
- Southwest books over 1/3 of sales online
- About 2B/yr
19Industry Structure Today
- Web access supports very different models
although may look same to user
- Airline sites
- Travelocity part of a CRS (Sabre)
- Expedia an independent travel agent
- Orbitz a consortium of airlines
- Each arguing other is anti-competitive
20Internet Changed All Players
- CRSs (Sabre/Travelocity)
- Allowed Sabre to bypass agents
- Complicated momdel as Sabre still claims to be in
business of serving agents
- Individual airline web sites and new consortium
(Orbitz)
- Allowed airlines to bypass CRSs and agents who
they view as over priced
- Online agent new entrant
- Expedia started with technology lead, kept
evolving its model
- Traditional agents have been big losers
21Change Waiting for Enabler
- CRSs and travel agents had become information
bottleneck
- Relatively large rents compared to value added
- Due to position in the information chain
- Both consumers and providers (airlines) viewed
them this way
- Warning not all apparent information bottlenecks
are real
- Many viewed broker-dealers on Wall Street as
information bottlenecks
- They turn out to provide substantial value in
many cases
22Two Generations of IT Led Change
- First generation CRSs
- Lowered airline costs through outsourcing
- Increased airline revenue through differential
pricing of business and leisure
- Made travel agents more powerful
- Second generation Internet
- Lowered airline costs by enabling elimination of
commissions
- Killed traditional travel agent business
- Challenging differential pricing through better
access to information
23Example Air Freight
- In 1970s specialized fractured business
- Not readily available to individual consumers
- No clearly defined value proposition over ground
transport (e.g., UPS)
- Fedex started with idea of guaranteed delivery
absolutely, positively overnight
- Focused on building air network that could
provide this
- Introduced hub and spoke system
- Drove de-regulation
- Quickly saw that information systems were
critical as well
24Fedex Information Systems
- As early as 1979 founder Fred Smith said
- The information about a package is as important
as the delivery of the package itself.
- Systems designed to share information with the
customer not just internal use
- Initially technology costs limited this to
customers who did substantial business
- In 1980s Fedex developed and distributed custom
PC based software for package origination
- Gave 100,000 PCs to large customers making
customer base into an electronic network
25Direct Customer Access at Fedex
- Lowered costs because customers prepared
manifests and sent electronically
- Often lower cost for customer too when connected
to their in-house software
- Provided customers with more control, information
and ease of use
- Allowed for more complex billing models
- Value to customer increased by exposing Fedexs
internal information
- Package tracking made available
- Starting in 1986 handheld scanners recorded every
movement of a package
26Internet Enabled Universal Access
- Not a strategy shift for Fedex
- Lowered cost enabled more customers to be
reached
- In 1994 became first Web site to enable customers
to track status of packages
- Rudimentary software scripts to tie site to
mainframe package tracking system
- Rapidly evolved into Internet based access for
large as well as small customers
- Tracking became major value to end consumers
- Retailers began offering order tracking
27Role of IT at Fedex
- Viewed as critical to business both strategically
and operationally
- Enables strategy that information about the
package is as important as the package
- Creates competitive advantage
- Drives excellence (no hiding from customer)
- Arguably has been critical to rapid growth
- Sub-committee of board specifically on IT
- In contrast many companies view IT as operational
but not strategic
- Is package delivery special?
28Fedex and UPS
- UPS is the largest package delivery service in
North America
- About 13.6M versus 3M packages per day avg.
- While Fedex tends to be information technology
leader UPS is aggressive
- Rapidly rolls out new information services,
sometimes ahead of Fedex
- Both companies have air and ground services but
different emphasis
- IT investments increase barriers to entry but not
long-term competitive advantage
29Fedex View Predates Internet
- Information should be made broadly available to
customers
- As valuable as the delivery itself half of what
Fedex is selling its customers
- Opposite of Porters lament about the Internet
- Customers getting too much information
- Fedex was not only ready for this shift they were
looking forward to it
- UPS has been smart enough to follow along and
both have benefited
- How important was this readiness to success of
online commerce?
30IT and Industry Structure
- CRSs and Internet caused large shifts in travel
industry competitive landscape
- Who holds most power over consumer
- Where customer value lies
- What can be charged for, by whom
- Fedex has driven large changes in economy but
less in structure of own industry
- Integrated package delivery key to online
commerce
- Ready competitor UPS has led Fedex growth to come
at expense of other smaller rivals
31Assignment Schedule
- 2/4 individual short paper 1
- 2/13 individual short paper 2
- 2/25 individual short paper 3
- 3/1 group case topic review
- 3/13 group case write-up
- 3/27 individual short paper 4
- 4/1 final project topic review
- 4/8 individual short paper 5
- 4/29 final project paper
- In-class presentation 4/29 or 5/1
32Group Case Assignment Heads Up
- Case write-up
- Pick an industry where information technology has
changed or is changing the competitive landscape
- Describe the changes in terms of Porters five
competitive forces
- Illustrate with changes that have happened or
what companies are doing
- Analyze a specific company, its business model
and its reaction to that change
- Should and shouldnt dos and why
- Review your proposed topic with me as soon as
practical but no later than 3/1
33Group Final Project Heads Up
- What do you believe will be a far-reaching change
brought about by the Internet in the decade
2001-2010
- How can you exploit this change to build a
profitable new business, or how should you
exploit this change to keep a current business
profitable - View this as a pitch to senior managers
- Review your proposed topic with me no later than
4/1