Human Factors and Aviation Security

1
Human Factors and Aviation Security

• Sandra G. Hart
• NASA-Ames Research Center
• Moffett Field, CA

2
Overview
Human factors is a common element across past
failures and future solutions

• Magnitude of the problem
• Underlying differences between safety and
  security
  
• Use of human factors tools to identify
  vulnerabilities
  
• Ensure that the humans responsible for each layer
  of defenses against future threats are part of
  the solution, not the problem
  
• Baggage screeners
• Monitoring/maintaining secure areas
• Air/ground and cockpit/cabin interactions
• Assess the human and system impact of technology
  and procedural solutions
  
• Human Factors in Aviation Security Act

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US Aviation at the Turn of the Century
Worldwide, there are more than 800 airlines
employing more than 150,000 pilots and 16,000
airplanes, flying into more than 1,350 major
airports in more than 200 countries

• Safety
• 1 hull loss/1 million P-121 departures
• Capacity
• 14,000 a/c in US civil fleet
• 2M airline passengers/day
• 77M tons of cargo carried each day
• 60,000 GA flights/day
• 4000-5000 aircraft aloft at any time
• 66 flights concentrated at 31 hub airports
• Reliability
• 1 flight in 4 delayed
• Infrastructure
• 325 air traffic control facilities

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Aviation Security at the Turn of the Century

• Baggage screeners
• Numbers There are 30,000 baggage screeners,
  many of whom are not citizens (60-80 in some
  major airports) and all of whom are underpaid
  
• Training Baggage screeners receive as little as
  12 hr of classroom training
  
• Tenure Turnover at 19 largest airports averages
  126/year (the worst situation was at St Louis at
  425)
  
• Baggage screening equipment
• 47 out of 420 airports have explosive detection
  systems
  
• It will cost 2B to fully equip airports with CT
  scanners
  
• Currently,
• Baggage screener performance
• Screeners detect about 2000 firearms each year
• In GAO test, 20 of the test weapons were not
  detected
  
• Access to secure areas
• 1M people have access to airport secure areas (
  9 badges are in wrong hands)
  
• 750, 000 airport airline personnel will require
  back- ground checks, access to secure areas
  
• In DoT test, security was breached 117 tries out
  of 173 (68)

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Safety vs SecurityParallel, Independent
Redundancies Ensure Safety
Automation Redundant hardware Redundant softwar
e
Manual reversion modes
Pre-flight Wx forecast Inflight Wx/PiReps Wx rad
ar, Pilots eyes
GPWS, MSAW, TCAS
Instrument scan Alerts warnings
Mutual Monitoring
Flight plans Mutual Monitoring
Procedures Checklists Crosscheck Training CRM
Back-up systems Alerts warnings Readbacks SoP
s
against threats to safety that are neither
deliberatenor the result of intelligence and
planning
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Safety vs Security The security net is
vulnerable because lacks redundancy
Threat Vectors
Nodes in the Security Net
against threats to security that are
ill-defined, evolving andthe result of
deliberate and intentional actions
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Threat Introduction Vectors

• Transmitted information
• Verbal communications
• Other aircraft

• Paying pax
• Non-revenue pax
• Carry-on luggage
• Checked baggage
• Unaccompanied cargo
• Security personnel
• Maintainers
• Gate personnel
• Cleaning crews
• Food service
• Flight attendants
• Pilots

• Airways facilities personnel
• Air traffic managers
• Security personnel
• Suppliers

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Specific Human Factors Targets
Analyze risks, vulnerabilities In existing system
Predict system impact of proposed changes
Voluntary reporting system
Traffic flow baseline, flight-path conformance
monitoring anomaly detection
National aviation security survey
Data compression algorithms to transmit
airborne/ground surveillance video
Pros, cons of transferring a/c control to ground,
automation
ATM lessons learned from 9/11
Consistent, integrated air/ground cockpit/cabin
procedures, training
Model, simulate, evaluate impact of technologies
and procedures on humans in system
Alertness monitoring, shift-scheduler for
security personnel
Support formation of effective security teams
Positive ID to enter any secure areas
Task design, aiding, training to improve
check-point screening
Data base mining to identify threat patterns,
profiles

Machine vision systems to screen baggage alert
humans
Decision support system for ticket agents to ID
potential security risks
Detection algorithms/alerts/user interface for
baggage screening
Support formation of a security culture
Visualization tools to convey important, time
critical info, depict alternative courses of a
ction
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False Promises of Technology

• Scope Infuse the rush toward technology
  acquisition with a bit of (human factors) common
  sense. Mitigate against unintended consequences
  and rigid, single-point barriers
• Potential Applications
• Independent, redundant layers of security at each
  node
  
• Coordinate between sequential nodes in system - -
  growth of evidence
  
• Be careful of wasting time, money and public
  confidence with high-cost, high-tech solutions

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System Monitoring Information Sharing

• Scope Develop system-wide baseline and trend
  information to identify gaps and vulnerabilities
  in the security system
  
• Potential Applications
• Acquire, manage analyze traffic flow data to
  develop baselines, track system performance
  
• Security-related incident reporting system,
  surveys
  
• Analyze risk and vulnerabilities in the current
  aviation system
  
• Identify patterns and trends in passenger
  profiles
  
• Improve air and ground detection of flight-path
  deviations using traffic displays
  
• Adapt visualization tools to convey key security
  information clearly and unambiguously
  
• Scrutinize the safe and successful diversion and
  landing of thousands of aircraft for lessons
  learned and implications for the evolutionof the
  air traffic system

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Apply Fundamental Knowledge

• Scope Apply fundamental knowledge of human
  vision, cognition, attention to enhance aviation
  security systems
  
• Potential Applications
• Apply vision science to automated pattern
  recognition of threats, face recognition
  algorithms to alert human monitors to potential
  threats, biometric identification of personnel to
  control access to restricted areas
• Video-data-compression techniques to support
  real-time analysis of down-linked cockpit/cabin
  images
  
• Mitigate the pitfalls of sustained attention,
  visual search and monitoring tasks
  

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Performance Evaluation and Support

• Scope The field of Human Factors is based upon
  its expertise in assessing human and system
  performance in simulated and operational
  environments. Use this expertise to assess the
  impact of security solutions.
• Potential Applications
• Impact of changes in aircraft cockpit/cabin
  configuration on crew coordination
  
• Pros and cons of proposals to remove aircraft
  control authority from the flight deck
  
• Real-time monitoring of alertness of personnel
  responsible for passenger and baggage screening,
  security cameras, etc
  
• Air traffic control response to perceived
  hijacking
  
• Improving the quality of simulated threats used
  for training and testing baggage screeners (TIP)

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Task Analysis, Modeling Simulation

• Scope Human Factors expertise in task analysis,
  modeling, and simulation offer insights into the
  skills required to perform crucial tasks,
  identify functions that are candidates for
  automation, and predict the human and system
  impacts of conceptual and prototype designs
• Potential Applications
• Selection of more effective screeners
• Identify technologies to support inspection and
  screening functions for which humans are
  particularly ill-suited
  
• Computational man-in-the-loop analyses of new
  technologies, procedures
  
• Computational modeling tools to enable
  incorporation of human factors in design of
  security technologies and procedures
  

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Procedure Policy Development

• Scope Assess the impact of new regulations and
  counter- terrorism philosophies on aircrew
  procedures, controller procedures, and air/ground
  interactions. Effectively integrate new
  technologies and changes in procedures into
  flight and ground operations.
• Potential Applications
• Consistent and coordinated flight and cabin crew
  threat response procedures using existing and
  future technologies
  
• Consistent and coordinated air/ground responses
  to threats
  
• Develop a formal model of the security system,
  modeling characteristics of human and machine
  detectors to identify vulnerabilities. Estimate
  the impact of security measures on passenger
  throughput, and of changes in passenger load on
  effectiveness

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Training

• Scope Apply expertise in forming effective teams
  to improve security personnels job satisfaction
  and performance. Avoid proliferation of ad hoc
  responses by pilots and controllers in response
  to perceived threats and the introduction of new
  technologies with inadequate training.
• Potential Applications
• Selection of qualified personnel for screening
  people, baggage, and cargo.
  
• Training to support new procedures and
  technologies for cabin crew, flight deck crew,
  and air traffic managers
  
• Adaptation of new training technologies, such as
  virtual reality
  
• Incorporate security into safety culture
• Mitigate impact of fatigue on screeners

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Summary of Topics
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Human Factors Issues in Aviation Security Act

• Flight deck door reinforcement/ Flight deck
  access
  
• Determine seriousness of occurrences
• Crew communication and coordination
• Warning devices
• Cabin surveillance cameras
• Cabin and flight deck defense/protective devices
• Psychology of terror (passenger behavior)
• Security training/Common strategy
• Cabin search procedures
• Transponders
• Aircraft defensive procedures/maneuvers
• Security workforce selection/background checks
• One level of security
• Universal access card/smart ID cards with
  biometrics
  
• Universal baggage screening/ID matching/photo
  manifest
  
• Trusted passengers/pre-identified volunteers
  with special skills