Announcements

1
Announcements

• For Thursdays class read Hume sections 6-8 and
  Goodman, The New Riddle of Induction in Pojman.
• We will try to get through it all however, in
  all likelihood we will get to Goodman and the
  first part of section 7 in Hume
• You will be getting back your midterm in this
  weeks tutorial.

2
Hume Section Two

• What are the contents of mind?
• What are the objects before the mind that we can
  study?
• Perceptions
• Two kinds
• (1) Impressions
• (2) Ideas

3
Impressions

• (1) What does Hume mean by an impression
• By the term impression, then, I mean all our
  more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or
  feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. (10)
• Or as Hume refers to it on p.13, it is all
  sensations either outward or inward

4
Thoughts or Ideas

• Are either copies of such impressions or
  combining impressions into non-existent objects
  i.e, a golden mountain.
• Impressions and ideas can be either simple or
  complex
• Now Hume does not define with any precision his
  notion of simplicity. He states in the
  Treatise that simple impressions are those that
  admit of no distinction nor separation his
  example is that of an apple, itself complex,
  composed of the simple..

5
Thoughts and impressions

• impressions of colour, taste, and smell. A
  sound would also be a simple impression.
• All of this could be debated i.e., a colour is
  actually complex since it combines the
  impressions or a particular hue and specific
  intensity?. i.e., a sound by pitch, duration,
  sharpness (staccato like). However, we get the
  general point.
• Key point there exists a one-to-one correlation
  between a simple impression and a simple idea.

6
Thoughts and impressions

• Even more strongly simple impressions causes
  simple ideas
• And even more strongly simple impressions
  causes simple ideas and nothing else causes
  simple ideas
• Complex ideas either arise from complex
  impressions ( the apple) or the mind welds
  together in an act of creativity various
  impressions the golden mountain again

7
Four Themes

• These points are what is of central importance in
  this section
• What we need to consider is
• (1) What ultimately distinguishes ideas from
  impressions
• (2) The limitations of the understanding
• (3) Supporting arguments for the claims of such
  limitations
• (4)Humes criterion of meaning follows from (1)
  (3)

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(1) What distinguishes ideas from impressions

• Key point this distinctions is to be obtained
  strictly from characteristics of the perceptions
  in-themselves without any consideration given to
  possible sources aside Hume ultimately
  considers it as beyond reason to answer what the
  sources of these impressions, including the
  senses, are.
• We are to distinguished such perceptions through
  introspection alone

9
(1) What distinguishes ideas from impressions

• The distinction force and vivacity
• Impressions are more lively
• When I am angry and then later reflect on my
  anger, form an idea or thought of it, the anger
  itself as an inner sensation is more lively and
  forceful than such a thought
• The thought or idea is a dull copy of the
  impression
• We are aware of a difference between sensing or
  experiencing something and then thinking about..

10
(1) What distinguishes ideas from impressions

• it but that doesnt mean that Hume as succeeded
  in describing this difference. Does this
  criterion of Humes capture the difference? A
  counterexample.
• (2) The limitations of the understanding
• But though out thought seems to possess this
  unbounded liberty, we shall find, upon a nearer
  examination, that it is really confined within
  very narrow limits, and that all this creative
  power of the mind amounts to no more than the
  faculty

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(2) The limitations of the understanding

• of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or
  diminishing the materials afforded us by the
  senses and experience. (11)
• All the materials for thinking must come from
  sense impressions. As mentioned earlier the
  source of those impressions that arise from the
  senses is ultimately unknown however, it is
  still the case that all ideas must arise from
  such impressions.

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(2) The limitations of the understanding

• This includes the idea of God
• The idea of God, as meaning an infinitely
  intelligent, wise, and good being Being, arises
  from reflecting on the operations of our own
  mind, and augmenting, without limit, those
  qualities of goodness and wisdom. (11)
• What would Descartes say here?

13
The limitations of the understanding

• Furthermore what would you think of this as an
  exam question Using Descartes example of the
  sensing of a piece of wax, critique Humes view
  that all ideas come from impressions, the
  senses.
• However, Hume states that there is an exception
  to this view a missing shade of blue
• Let all the different shades of that colour,
  except that single one, be placed before him,
  descending gradually from the deepest to the
  lightest it is plain, that he will perceive a
  blank, where that.

14
An exception

• shade is wanting, and will be sensible, that
  there is a greater distance in that place between
  the contiguous colours than in any other.(12)
• We can form a distinct simple idea of that
  missing shade without having experienced the
  impression.
• What do we do with this counterexample to our
  rule? We sweep it under the rug it is
  scarcely worth our observing, and does not
  merit, that for it alone we should alter our
  general maxim (13)

15
An exception

• Is Hume too cavalier here?
• How devastating is this counterexample? What is
  its scope?
• (3) Supporting arguments for this claim of
  limitation
• (1) A challenge to his objectors
• Come up with a counterexample to this thesis
  except for the trivial one of the shade of blue
  I guess and he will meet it. Have we seen this
  method in this class before?

16
Supporting Arguments

• (2) A blind man forms no notion of colours a
  deaf man of sounds (12)
• Therefore, there are not ideas here without the
  impressions of colours or sounds.
• Or consider this example what does a blahvic
  taste like?

17
Supporting Arguments

• It doesnt taste like anything I made the term
  up.
• But if there was a fruit, vegetable, meat,
  beverage that was a blahvic you wouldnt know
  the answer to the question unless you tried it
  had a sensation. Furthermore, consider the
  operations of your mind when you first considered
  the question. Doesnt the initial puzzlement at
  the question show that you had no experience of
  the term being applied to anything in order to
  form a thought to answer it?

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(4) Humes criterion of meaning

• When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion,
  that a philosophical term is employed without any
  meaning or idea (as is but too frequent) we need
  but enquire, from what impression is that
  supposed idea derived? And if it be impossible
  to assign any, this will serve to confirm our
  suspicion. (13)
• As with every criterion a philosopher throws at
  you a good place to examine it is to apply the
  test of self-reflexivity to it. Any problems?

19
Section Three Of the Association of Ideas

• Resemblance a picture naturally leads our
  thoughts to the original (14)
• Contiguity mention of one apartment in a
  building naturally introduces an enquiry or
  discourse concerning the others(14)
• Causes and effect ..if we think of a wound, we
  can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which
  follows it(14)
• Note the experimental method
• Contrast and Contrariety are alleged to be
  products of these principles of connexion

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21
Section Five Part One

• Basics of Empiricism
• All the objects of human reason or enquiry may
  naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit,
  Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. (15)
• Relations of ideas ( mathematics)
• Distinguishing characteristics (1) no experience
  itself is necessary to be certain of its truths
  (2) to imply the opposite of such certainty
  implies a contradiction i.e., a four-sided
  triangle.
• Reason can here act purely

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Matters of Fact

• The sciences, natural and social, history,
  politics, etc.,
• Distinguishing Characteristics (1) experience
  here is necessary for obtaining truths (2) to
  imply the opposite does not lead to any
  contradiction
• The contrary of every matter of fact is still
  possible because it can never imply a
  contradiction (15)
• Recall our discussion of the ontological argument
  for the existence of God.

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Matters of Fact

• That argument claimed that to deny Gods
  existence was to involve oneself in a logical
  contradiction akin to saying that bachelors are
  married.
• However, for Hume existence claims are
  discoverable empirical fact and imply no
  contradiction i.e., there is no contradiction
  implied in saying a unicorn exists or doesnt.
• Discoverable as empirical fact is a key point.
  How so? With relations of ideas just by
  reflecting.

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Matters of Fact

• on the meanings of the terms employed we can
  state a contradiction A triangle is a
  four-sided figure
• Existence claims and empirical facts are not like
  this. Reflect as hard as you can on the meaning
  of a unicorn, horse, dog, mountain, etc., and you
  will not be able to determine whether such items
  exists or not. You must go out and investigate.
  There is no contradiction involved in saying that
  they dont exist we may have uttered a
  falsehood in .

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Matters of Fact

• saying that a horse doesnt exist, but not a
  contradiction.
• What is the foundation of thinking concerning
  matters of fact?
• All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to
  be founded on the relation of Cause and Effect.
  By means of that relation alone we can go beyond
  the evidence of our memory and senses. (16)
• Humes examples (1) Find a watch or machine on
  a desert island, you are able to infer beyond

26
Foundations

• your memory and senses that a person had been to
  the island (no airplanes in Humes day to dump
  the object but even then I guess one was at the
  island, at least above it)
• (2) voices in the dark
• Can you think of some of your own examples where
  you are inferring something not present to the
  senses or memory?
• What we know through such inferences are
  accomplished through following back a chain of

27
Foundations

• .causes and effects.
• How do we arrive at the knowledge of cause and
  effect? Not in any instance, attained by
  reasonings a priori but arises entirely from
  experience (17)
• For example, Adam just thinking about water, its
  fluidity and transparency, could not determine
  prior to experience that it would suffocate him.
• For example, just by observing the brightness and
  warmth of a fire, we do not know that it will

28
Foundations

• burn us. It is possible that it simply envelope
  us in a similar warmth.
• For example, it could have been the case that
  when one billiard ball hits another on a pool
  table, the other billiard ball remains motionless
  while the impacting ball returns along the path
  prior to hitting the ball, or that it flies up in
  the air or that both remain stationary. We NEED
  EXPERIENCE to find out that such is not the case.

29
Foundations

• Or ask yourself a simple question can you know
  that a scientific hypothesis is true without
  doing any experiments? Why do we need to conduct
  experiments?
• Humes answer The mind can never possibly find
  the effect in the supposed cause, by the most
  accurate scrutiny and examination.(18)
• every effect is a distinct event from its
  cause. (19)

30
Foundations

• If we could by examining the cause and just
  thinking about it find the secret power in it
  that leads to the effect we would not need to do
  any experiments. However, a cause is distinct
  from its effect if there are any such secret
  powers or ultimate causes we cannot know them.
• We tend to forget this. After repeated
  observations of cause-effect relations we come
  naturally to believe that they belong together
  and there is some secret power or necessary.

31
Foundations

• connection between them. As Hume states
• We are apt to imagine, that we could discover
  these effects by the mere operation of our
  reason, without experience. (18)
• However, this is all psychological conditioning
  Such is the influence of custom, that where it
  is strongest, it not only covers our natural
  ignorance, but even conceals itself, and seems
  not to take place, merely because it is found in
  the highest degree. (18)

32
A peculiar statement

• This all helps to explain a rather peculiar
  statement of Humes
• Who will assert, that he can give the ultimate
  reason, why milk or bread is proper nourishment
  for a man, not for a lion or a tiger? (17)
• Does this appear to be a piece of 18th century
  ignorance? We understand metabolism, of how the
  body converts food into energy. Biologists
  understand why some species can metabolize
  vegetables and others cannot. Maybe in Humes...

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A peculiar statement

• .day they didnt understand this.
• Given what was said above can we see why such an
  accusation of ignorance is misplaced?
• What does Hume mean here by the ultimate reason
  or causes?
• From this section it appears to be the following
  (1) what could be discovered by arguments a
  priori (17).
• (2) Why jus these states of affairs had to be
  the case? Remember existence claims do not lead
  to..

34
A peculiar statement

• contradictions.
• (3) How these states of affairs will continue to
  be the case? More on that next section.
• (4) The secret power or metaphysical glue
  from which a cause must lead to an effect.
• (1) (4) are not outdated no matter how much more
  sophisticated our scientific analysis is compared
  to Humes day.
• But what about the laws of nature? Do they
  provide the metaphysical cement we are searching
  for?

35
Laws of Nature ?

• Hume doesnt deny such laws
• Elasticity, gravity, cohesion of parts,
  communication of motion by impulse these are
  probably the ultimate causes and principles which
  we shall ever discover in nature and we may
  esteem ourselves sufficiently happy, if, by
  accurate enquiry and reasoning, we can trace up
  the particular phenomena to, or near to, these
  general principles. The most perfect philosophy
  of the natural kind staves off our ignorance a .

36
Laws of Nature?

• little longer. (19) However, But as to the
  causes of these general causes, we should in vain
  attempt their discovery nor shall we ever be
  able to satisfy ourselves, by any particular
  explication of them (19)
• For example of an ultimate question why did
  there have to be just these laws and not others?
• Furthermore (I) how do we come to know a law?
  (II) what do we mean by law?

37
Laws of Nature?

• Laws are well confirmed by their instances where
  a scientist will often state that there are no
  known exceptions to it. They are not conclusive.
  To wit, Newtonian mechanics were well-confirmed
  by a variety of experiments but by the early 20th
  century there were problems especially with
  objects traveling close to the speed of light.
• We know laws by repeated observations. We
  formulated generalizations laws from such
  observations of regular behaviour.

38
Laws of Nature?

• Therefore, (I) laws are not know a priori (II)
  there is no guarantee that what are today laws
  must be in effect tomorrow. No examination of
  the repeated experiments by which a law is
  confirmed can underwrite such a guarantee. All
  we observe are the regularities that the law does
  indeed state happen of course, the law is
  just such regularities accurately described.
• That leads us to our next section

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Section Two The Problem of Induction

• We have learned that
• (a) all reasoning concerning matters of fact are
  founded upon the relations of cause and effect
• (b) all relations of cause and effect are based
  on experience
• We now dig a little deeper and ask What is the
  foundation of all conclusions from experience?
• Remember from the previous section we have
  learned that all inferences from the observed to
  the unobserved, from a watch on an island to
  people..

40
The Problem of Induction

• .or a person being there, are based on relations
  of cause and effect. And such relations are
  based on experience. So in asking for the
  foundations for experience we are also asking for
  the foundations of cause and effect. We are
  asking for the foundations of all such seemingly
  rational inferences we make.
• Humes negative thesis
• I say then, that, even after we have experience
  of the operations of cause and effect, our
  conclusions

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The negative thesis

• .from that experience are not founded on
  reasoning, or any process of the understanding
  (21)
• This is stunning. Inferring from the observed to
  the unobserved is what is called inductive
  reasoning. Scientific method and practice, not
  to mention our own practices in everyday life,
  are predicated upon such induction. Humes
  negative thesis is that at bottom none of this is
  rational.

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The negative thesis

• The scientific method would seem to be ultimately
  no better than astrology or crystal ball gazing
  since none of that is rational either.
• How does Hume set up the problem?
• The basis of inferring the unobserved from the
  observed, the basis of cause-effect reasoning
  relies on a crucial assumption that the future
  will conform to the past. We assume that the
  past will continue in its regular behaviour into
  the future.

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The negative thesis

• We assume that nature is uniform and regular.
  Now we have to question this assumption.
• We have two propositions
• (1) I have found that such an object has always
  been attended with such an effect (22)
• (2) I forsee, that other objects, which are, in
  appearance, similar, will be attended with
  similar effects. (22)
• Notice the gap between these propositions, how
  they are not saying the same thing. We need

44
The negative thesis

• to fill in the gap, find the missing link.
• There is required a medium, which may enable the
  mind to draw such an inference, if indeed it be
  drawn by reasoning and argument (22)
• So how do we go about filling in the gap?
• We want the inference to be rational and have a
  rational foundation. So a good place to begin is
  to consider the resources that reason has to
  offer us. Hume describes such resources at the
  beginning of section IV relations of ideas and
  matters of fact.

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Relations of ideas

• And this is how Hume proceeds.
• Demonstrative reasoning, relations of ideas
  remember Humes maxim that existence claims
  involves no contradiction.
• Thus, it implies no contradiction, that the
  course of nature may change. (22)
• There is no logical reason why nature must remain
  uniform. There is no mathematical proof that all
  scientific laws must continue to hold in the
  future.

46
Relations of Ideas

• Furthermore, we have found that causes are
  distinct from their effects therefore, there is
  no logical reason why causes may be attended
  with different or contrary effects. (22)
• So how about Matters of Fact then? Can we find
  what we are looking for there?
• We have said, that all arguments concerning
  existence are founded on the relation of cause
  and effectthat the future will be conformable to
  the past. To endeavour, therefore, the proof of
  this.

47
Matters of Fact

• last supposition by probable arguments, or
  arguments regarding existence, must be evidently
  going in a circle, and taking that for granted,
  which is the very point in question. (23)
• To say that we know that the future will conform
  to the past because in the past the future has
  conformed to the past is arguing in a circle,
  begging the question. That is what we want to
  show we cannot assume induction in order to
  justify it.

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Matters of Fact

• To say that it is probable that the future will
  conform to the past or that the scientific method
  is, though not conclusive, the most probable is
  similarly arguing in a circle.
• Can you see why?
• How do we state that something is probable? By
  taking the frequency of its occurrences in the
  past and extending it to the future i.e., 90
  chance of rain. This just assumes what needs to
  be proven. When what we are asking is if the
  future will.

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Matters of Fact

• conform to the past we cant assume it in
  stating what will be probably the case.
• What about experiments?
• To say it is experimental, is begging the
  question. For all inferences from experience
  suppose, as their foundation, that the future
  will resemble the pastIt is impossible,
  therefore, that any arguments from experience can
  prove this resemblancesince all these arguments
  are founded on the supposition of that
  resemblance. (24)

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Matters of Fact

• But what about our laws of nature?
• Should it be said, that, from a number of
  uniform experiments, we infer a connexion between
  the sensible qualities and the secret powers
  this, I must confess seems the same difficulty,
  couched in different terms. The question still
  recurs, on what process of argument this
  inference is founded? (23)
• When we form a law based on observations all that
  one can claim is that the law has been known

51
Matters of Fact

• to hold up till the present. We observe certain
  regularities such as gravity and make testable
  predictions that have so far been successful.
  None of this guarantees that the law will hold in
  the future.
• In future trials, we expect the law to hold. We
  expect certain observations. However, in none of
  these observations not even with a super
  microscope do we detect an additional factor, a
  secret power or necessary connection, that will

52
Matters of Fact

• guarantee that such laws could never change and
  will always remain in place. Can we prove that
  the world will not switch from one set of laws to
  another? No. For example, the fact that
  momentum was conserved in the past in our
  experiments does not guarantee that it will be
  conserved in the future. Laws are also
  predicated upon the uniformity of nature and thus
  they do not ground or explain such uniformity.

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Conclusion of negative thesis

• Therefore, neither demonstrative reasoning nor
  reasoning concerning matters of fact can
  establish this inference.
• Therefore, relations between causes and effects
  do not have a rational foundation we just
  experience them that way.
• Is all lost?

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Section Five Part One. The Positive Thesis

• The negative thesis our belief in the
  uniformity of nature and in inductive reasoning
  does not have a rational foundation.
• Yet all our reasonings concerning matters of fact
  needed for our survival and pursuits are based on
  cause-effect relations which are based upon the
  uniformity of nature.
• Oh my goodness?! How are we to cope?! Are we
  doomed?! No to all these questions.

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The Positive Thesis

• Nature will always maintain her rights, and
  prevail in the end over any abstract reasoning
  whatsoever. Though we should conclude, for
  instance, as in the foregoing section, that, in
  all reasonings from experience, there is a step
  taken by the mind, which is not supported by any
  argument or process of the understanding (27)
• But if it is not a rational belief, justified by
  reason, then what is the foundation of our
  cause-effect inferences?

56
The positive thesis

• Nothing more than psychological conditioning. It
  is simply custom or habit.
• A propensity of the mind when it has experienced
  over enough instances similar objects or events
  conjoined to expect the other.
• That is what inference consists in like
  Pavlovs dog conditioned to expect food at the
  sound of a bell.
• And it is certain we here advance a very
  intelligible proposition at least, if not a true
  one,

57
The positive thesis

• when we assert, that, after the constant
  conjunction of two objects, heat and flame, for
  instance, weight and solidity, we are determined
  by custom alone to expect the one from the
  appearance of the other. (28)
• All these operations are a species of natural
  instincts, which no reasoning or process of the
  thought and understanding is able, either to
  produce, or to prevent. (30)

58
The positive thesis

• It is instinctual for us to make such inferences.
  That is their ultimate status and foundation.
• Now one could state that some inferences are more
  rational than others as when we consider what is
  most likely the cause of an event think of
  talking to someone who has become paranoid and
  the stories they tell of why certain events have
  happened to them.
• I dont think Hume would disagree. However, note
  here that reason is derivative, not primary.

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The positive thesis

• Reason is dependent upon this natural instinct of
  custom or habit.
• Is it that the extent of our belief in the
  scientific method a propensity to believe based
  on custom?
• Nothing, absolutely nothing, more rational than
  that?
• To the first question yes
• To the second question no
• What do you think? How would you argue for or
  against Hume here?

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Section Five Part Two

• Two basic theses
• (1) The difference between belief and fiction.
• (2) a pre-established harmony
• (1) As we saw in section 2 Hume defined the
  difference between an impression and an idea
  which is a dull copy of such an impression in
  terms of vivacity and force purely
  psychological criteria.
• Therefore, it is of little surprise that the
  difference between belief and fiction will also
  be defined.

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Fiction and Belief

• .similarly.
• It follows, therefore, that the difference
  between fiction and belief lies in some sentiment
  or feeling, which is annexed to the latter, not
  to the former, and which depends not on the will,
  nor can be commanded at pleasure. (31)
• I say then, that belief is nothing but a more
  vivid,lively, forcible, firm, steady conception
  of an object, than what the imagination alone is
  ever able to attain. (32)

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Fiction and Belief

• Do we agree?
• We saw in section 2 some problems the detective
  story with such a criteria. Can we detect
  problems here as well?
• Consider
• (1) When you read The Brothers Karamozov and
  then listen to me describe my dull day yesterday,
  your ideas concerning the former is going to be a
  lot more vivid and forceful than those of the
  latter. Now this may open some.

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Fiction and Belief

• .interesting debates on the manner that
  literature discloses reality and is true.
  Nevertheless, there is an element of fiction in
  your reading that is not there with respect to my
  description and this element does not appear to
  be captured via forcefulness and vivacity.
• (2)Cant we have vivid, lively ideas of things we
  dont believe?
• (3) Dont we believe what the quantum physicist
  tells us though we may not be able to form a

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Fiction and Belief

• .conception of it especially if we havent
  done the math?
• (4) We often have degrees of belief. I am
  pretty confident that the bus will arrive at a
  certain time though I am not certain of this.
  Does it make sense to construe such degrees of
  belief and confidence in terms of intensity of
  feeling?
• The moral should we define the difference
  purely psychologically? Hume appears
  unconvincing here.

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Pre-established harmony

• Think of the theory of evolution, of how we are
  adapted to our environment. We have a similar
  idea here though there are problems with this
  analogy
• Here, then, is a kind of per-established harmony
  between the course of nature and the succession
  of our ideas and through the powers and forces,
  by which the former is governed, be wholly
  unknown to us yet our thoughts and conceptions
  have still, we find, gone on in the same train
  with the other..

66
Pre-established Harmony

• works of nature. Custom is that principle, by
  which this correspondence has been
  effected.(36)
• We are lucky in this regard since reason cannot
  do the job.