Thoughts on the use of General Purpose Forces

1
Thoughts on the use of General Purpose Forces
versus Special Operations Forces and Special
Forces in current and future conflicts
A presentation by Douglas Macgregor, PhD Colonel
(ret) US Army Lead Partner Potomac League LLC 2
April 2009 National Defense University
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Bottom line up front Understand what it is you
are trying to accomplish with military
power! Whats the purpose, appropriate method and
desired, attainable end state?
The first, the supreme, the most
far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman
and commander have to make is to establish by
that test the kind of war on which they are
embarking neither mistaking it for, nor trying
to turn it into, something that is alien to its
nature. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book 1,
Chap. 1, Sect 27, page 100. The political
objective and the military objective are not the
same, and are never the same. The military
strategic objective is achieved by military force
while the political objective is achieved as a
result of the military success. General Sir
Rupert Smith (ret), The Utility of Force The Art
of War in the Modern World, page 217.
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What has changed in land warfare?

• Mobile dispersed warfare is the dominant form of
  combat. Defined, continuous fronts on the WW II
  model ceased to exist years ago.
• Ubiquitous strike capabilities and the
  proliferation of WMD make the concentration of
  large ground forces whether conventional or
  unconventional increasingly dangerous. (Air and
  missile defense become more and more critical to
  operational effectiveness and success).
• Future conflicts will not resemble Iraq. They are
  far more likely to resemble the Balkan Wars of
  the early 20th Century, except that fights for
  regional power and influence will overlap with
  the competition for energy, water, food, mineral
  resources and the wealth they create.
• Directed Energy, robotics, hafnium, nuclear
  weapons and other technologies will continue to
  alter land warfare over the next ten years.
• Centralized, single-service, top-down controlled,
  stove-piped maneuver forces on the WW II model
  will not defeat decentralized conventional or
  unconventional forces organized for mobile
  dispersed warfare. (SOCOM is effectively a
  separate service now too).

How do we translate this understanding into
future military action that makes sense?
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Why does the U.S. maintain general purpose forces?

• The United States maintains conventional military
  power as a hedge against uncertainty, as
  insurance against the possibility the United
  States could be drawn into a war it would
  otherwise choose not to fight.
• General purpose forces exist to prevent any one
  power or bloc of powers from dominating the
  eastern hemisphere or intruding into the western
  hemisphere.
• In the event of war, American conventional forces
  are designed to deliver a strategic decision that
  favors the United States.
• General Purpose or Conventional military power is
  also strategic leverage in the event the United
  States Government sees an opportunity to
  influence an ongoing conflict or crisis in a way
  that favors American interests and promotes a
  return to peace.  
• The United States should maintain enough general
  purpose military power to secure its vital
  interests without making the rest of the world
  feel less secure.
• The United States does not maintain general
  purpose forces to conquer, occupy and transform
  other peoples' societies into reflections of our
  own. We cannot afford it, the world does not want
  it and it is not in our vital strategic interest
  to do it.

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Why does the U.S. maintain both Special Forces
and Special Operations Forces?

• Special Forces and Special Operations Forces (SF
  and SOF) exert American strategic influence where
  it is required regardless of the conditions,
  peacetime or wartime.
• SF and SOF are economical military means to deny
  strategic dominance to opposing political,
  economic and military forces in regions or
  countries of interest to U.S. national security
  strategy. (Example El Salvador)
• When supported by conventional forces, strategic
  ISR and communications in the air, space and at
  sea, the strategic influence of SF and SOF is
  disproportionate to their size and numbers.
• In wars of decision, American SF and SOF
  integrate with, augment and extend the strategic
  reach and impact of Americas General Purpose
  Forces.

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What can we say about the use of these forces in
the near-term?

• The use of general purpose ground forces to
  occupy parts of Iraq and Afghanistan imposed
  severe human and economic costs on the United
  States, its allies, and even our friends inside
  these states. This approach is economically
  ruinous and politically unsustainable.
• The winning construct as it equates to the
  establishment of Western-style government and
  free market economies is not relevant. In the
  Middle East, as well as in most of Africa, Latin
  America, Central and Southwest Asia damage
  control, not total victory, is the most
  realistic goal for U.S. national military
  strategy.
• For Afghanistan to become a unitary state ruled
  from Kabul, and to develop into a modern,
  prosperous, poppy-free and democratic country
  would be a worthy and desirable outcome. But it
  is not vital for American interests The problem
  in Pakistan is more pressing and direct. (Graham
  Allison and John Deutsch, The Real Afghan Issue
  Is Pakistan, Opinion, 30 March 2009)
• In Afghanistan the U.S. is repeating mistakes we
  made in Vietnam in 1965 we misconstrued a
  region of temporary, tactical importance as being
  of enduring strategic value. The LBJ government
  had unfounded, naive, and unrealistic
  expectations of Vietnams near-term potential to
  evolve into a modern social democratic
  constitutional republic if the US put the "right
  people" in charge and provided a pile of cash and
  some "military assistance." 
• If the large-scale commitment of general purpose
  ground forces is not the answer, what is the
  answer?

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What is to be done?

• What we know
• The Muslim world does not want the United States
  to be its savior or to Westernize through
  military occupation regardless of the material
  benefits American-led Westernization offers. For
  that matter, no one in Asia, Africa, the Middle
  East or Latin America wants American troops to
  police and govern their country, even if American
  troops are smarter, more honest, and provide
  better capabilities than their own soldiers and
  police.
• Next Steps
• Economy of Force (damage control) is the
  principle that must shape future U.S. military
  engagement in Africa, the Middle East, Central
  Asia and Latin America.
• Limit American involvement in Afghanistan to
  modest, low-profile SOF and covert operations
  backed by air and naval power to eliminate
  al-Qaeda elements/camps and any Taliban members
  that support them. Work with those who will work
  with us. Emulate this approach in other areas
  where appropriate.
• As Mike Vickers points out the American
  experience in El Salvador is illuminating. It is
  easy to imagine combinations of small SF advisory
  teams and special operations elements operating
  ashore in tandem with off-shore air and naval
  forces.
• However, even here, Americans must scale back
  expectations. Misapplying old solutions is
  hazardous. More important, countries and peoples
  tend to revert to the regional mean for culture
  and governance when Western influence weakens or
  withdraws.

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Final Thoughts for Consideration

• The objective in conflict or crisis is not to
  spend lots of American blood and treasure, but to
  spend as little as possible! The goal is to make
  the irregular bleed for his tribe / religion /
  country while we expend as little blood and
  treasure as possible to secure critical and vital
  US interests democratizing the Islamic World and
  eradicating poppy production are "nice to
  have/nice to do," but not critical.
• An Indo-Pakistani War involving even the limited
  use of nuclear weapons would render much of the
  current focus on fourth generation warfare and
  counter-insurgency irrelevant.
• When General MacArthur was Army Chief of Staff in
  1930, he did not conclude on the basis of
  American military interventions in Nicaragua,
  Haiti and China that wars of decision in the
  Clausewitzian sense would no longer occur.
  Instead, he prepared the Army as best he could to
  fight in a future war of decision without knowing
  precisely what it looked like.
• The United States can and should avoid direct
  involvement in most 21st Century conflicts.
  (Off-shore pre-1914 UK Model) When conflicts or
  crises involve U.S. forces, the use of American
  military power should be limited or terminated
  before the cumulative human and political costs
  defeat the original purpose of U.S. military
  action.
• The principal strategic purpose for which the
  U.S. Armed Forces will fight in the 21st Century
  involves securing American prosperity, and where
  necessary, extending American security to
  geographical areas vital to U.S. and allied
  prosperity.
• Homeland defense U.S. land borders and coastal
  waters will demand more and more military
  resources to cope with criminality and terrorism
  emanating from the Caribbean Basin and Latin
  America.