Wolfgang Renzsch, European Integration 3

1
Wolfgang Renzsch, European Integration 3

• The way to the European Atomic Community
  (EURATOM/EAG/EAC) and the European Economic
  Community (EEC/ EWG)

2

• Failure of European Defence Community 1954 gt
  setback for European Integration (despite NATO)
• 1955 Jean Monnet created the Action Committee
  for the Unites States of Europe high ranking
  members of European parties and unions (except
  Communists and nationalists.
• (1888 1979, 1920-23 Secretary of the League of
  Nations, 1923-38 in international finance, 1945
  commissariat du plan, 1950 author of
  Schumann-plan, until 1954 first president of High
  Commission of ECSC, 1955 Action Committee)

3

• Monnet proposal of 1955
• Support of non-military use of nuclear power on
  European level
• Europeanization of further parts of the economy
  beyond coal and steel
• Not to insist on supranational structure of
  European institutions
• 1 and 2 conceptual, 3 procedural proposal
• was useful extension of ECSC on gas,
  electricity, nuclear energy
• Sensible to combine other energies with coal
  transport costs are sensitive when coal and steel
  are concerned

4

• Italian foreign minister Gaetano Martino invited
  his five ECSC colleagues and the British foreign
  minister to a conference at Messina, 1 3 June
  1955
• GB refused to take part despite invitation
• Two objectives Economic community and atomic
  community
• Controversy about priorities
• European nuclear research to gain independence
  from the US
• or European Common Market

5

• France gave priority to nuclear policy
• Cheap energy in order to gain independence from
  expensive oil imports
• Base for nuclear weapons under French control
  independent from the US French monopoly within
  the Community since GB stayed outside (force de
  frappe)
• Control over Germany which would have access go
  nuclear energy after the end of the occupation

6

• Opposition against French approach expressed by
  other partners
• Problem of technical equipment to produce uranium
  for nuclear power plants US monopoly President
  Eisenhower (Feb. 1956) reduced the price for
  nuclear fuel in order to make independent
  European production economically less attractive
• The Benelux-countries and Germany were open for
  nuclear energy, however they gave priority to a
  Common Market gt considered as more than a limited
  integration of branches (energy and steel
  extension of ECSC) Industries of West Germany
  and Benelux were more efficient than the others.

7

• Limited French and Italian interest in a Common
  Market
• French industries were comparatively old, wages
  were high and social benefits costly.
• French prime economic interest in agriculture
• Italy was not competitive either but was
  interested in the free movement of labour in
  order to reduce unemployment in Italy and she
  expected support for the development of Southern
  Italy.
• In the negotiations France and Italy favoured
  high tariffs for outsiders and little liberation
  internally. French industry and unions protested
  against open markets

8

• German position
• no enthusiasm for any of the proposed projects!
• Minister of Economics (Ludwig Erhard) considered
  European Common Market as a hurdle against a
  global free trade system (favoured by German
  industry and himself. Erhard was much closer to
  the British concept of a free trade association gt
  EFTA)

9

• Federal Minister without portfolio, Franz-Josef
  Strauß, would have preferred a nuclear
  cooperation with GB and USA. He understood that
  EURATOM primarily served French interests
• Chancellor Adenauer wanted a political
  integration however conflicting economic
  interests between Germany and France seemed to be
  an obstacle.

10

• Conflict resolution by Monnet
• Each member got at least considerable parts of
  what it wanted.
• Agreements Economic Community, Atomic Community
  and deepening of ECSC
• Common Market for Dutch and German industries
  (and Italian migrant workers)
• Atomic Community for France
• EEC with prospect of political integration
• Advantages were more important and disadvantages

11

• Common declaration of the Six Messina April
  1955
• ECSC new areas of integration transport,
  energy, nuclear energy
• EEC General economic integration with
  transitional regulations, social and development
  (regional, infrastructure) funds
• Proposal became the base for a compromise

12

• Messina Conference (1-3 June 1955), however,
  closed disappointing
• compromise on the smallest common denominator no
  dates, nothing about a institutional structure gt
  to be developed by an expert group
• Expert group veiled disagreement about essential
  issues, however avoided failure
• Advantage conceptualization by a committee made
  political process easier
• Convincing concept created political pressure
  legitimation was turned around the question
  would not be why?, but why not?.
• Henri Spaak (Belgium) became chairman of the
  committee

13

• The (Spaak) committee proposed
• a common market, sheltered by tariffs against
  non-members,
• regulations for fair competitions and subsidies
  for modernization,
• objectives should be achieves in three steps of
  four years
• Common market should be regulated by majority
  voting, in some cases by unanimous decisions of
  the Council of Ministers
• Commission should supervise the implementation of
  rules independently.

14

• Opposition against Spaaks proposal came from
  France
• priority of Atomic Community hardly acceptable
  for the others provide for the danger of
  deadlock
• Breakthrough 1956 organized by Adenauer advised
  the German delegation to come to an agreement
• New French government January 1956 (PM Guy
  Mollet) also gave priority to agreement.
• February 1956 conference of six foreign
  ministers v. Brentano (Germany) accepted Atomic
  Community
• Pineau (France) accepted Economic Community
• 20 March 1956 Report of Spaak Committee accepted
  

15

• Agreement needed to be ratified by national
  parliaments.
• France opposition against common market
• Germany opposition against nuclear policies
• Solution simultaneous acceptance of both.
• French conditions
• Overseas territories in common market in order to
  get subsidies for them and to keep them French
• Harmonization of taxes and social benefits in
  order to avoid distortion of competition
• Second step of integration not automatically but
  political decision after first period of
  integration

16

• For Germany, hardly acceptable conditions. Little
  inclination to allow France a double role as
  nuclear and colonial power
• Erhard Free Trade Area of all OEEC-countries
• When French-German negotiations were short of a
  deadlock the British government proposed a large
  free trade area (3 Oct. 1956)
• Erhard was immediately in favour of British
  proposal, Adenauer wanted political integration
  of the six MUST not fail because of
  French-German reconciliation

17

• Solution by an unexpected incident the military
  intervention of British and French forces in
  Egypt!
• Egypt president Nasser nationalized the Suez
  Canal (British and French property) in July 1956
• 5 Nov 1956 British and French troops attacked
  Egypt combined American and Soviet pressure
  forced them to retreat as early as in the night
  of 6/7 Nov 1956.
• The Suez-advantage made clear what the real
  power relations were A semi-colonial state could
  ignore the property rights of two (former)
  colonial powers
• Even worse the two big powers were able to
  prevent the two others from realizing their
  interest by military means.

18

• Lessons from Suez
• The French dream of being an independent big
  power was hardly realistic an integration of the
  Europeans seemed to be necessary in order to
  achieve (or protect) an independent role from the
  super powers.
• Germans were reliable partners Adenauer visited
  Paris on 6 Nov for negotiations despite the Suez
  disaster in French perspective signal of
  solidarity
• Nov 1956 break through concerning economic and
  atomic community French conditions became vague
  declarations of intent (social benefits), other
  dissents were solved by protective clauses,
  transformation regulations and compensation
  payments.

19

• Now, treaties were agreed upon swiftly.
• Common market was to be realized stepwise in a
  period of 12 15 years (in 4-year steps)
• Passing from one step to the step dependent on
  reaching of the objectives of earlier step
• Further steps towards economic unity should be
  kept in mind
• Final goal political integration
• From the German point of view, all objectives
  were addressed, from the French point of view
  there was not automatism further steps of
  integration needed to be accepted by all member
  states.

20

• Having reached a French-German agreement the
  negotiations with the other nations were
  comparatively simple.
• Even the problems of agricultural were solved
  (due to growing American grain exports)
• Regulated markets, minimum prices fixed by the
  governments etc. gt European protectionism for
  agriculture on medium level, combined with
  support for modernization

21

• Agreement of Atomic Community (EURATOM)
• No control for community in military matters
  (accepted by Germany)
• Access for member states to international markets
  (e.g. USA) if there were not enough nuclear fuel,
  or to be bought at unacceptable conditions only gt
  way for Germans to international markets remained
  open accepted by France

22

• Institutional structure for EEC
• in principle not changed until today, except
  European Council gt heads of states and
  governments
• Comparatively weak, dependent from the individual
  member states
• Council of Ministers legislative body,
  intergovernmental institution representing the
  interest of member states. In Council the
  departmental ministers meet presidency changes
  every six months according to a agreed upon rule

23

• Legislative acts of Council of Ministers
• Regulation (Verordnung) laws having supremacy
  over national law, which are directly in force
  without any transformation of national parliament
• Directive (Richtlinie) laws giving general
  objectives for the MS which need to be
  transformed into national law
• Decisions (Entscheidungen) regulate individual
  cases, applicable in a single MS or for a certain
  group only
• Recommendations and statements (Empfehlungen und
  Stellungnahmen) not obliging advises.

24

• All kinds of legislative acts should originally
  be taken by majority vote as a general rule.
• However, treaty requested qualified majorities or
  unanimous votes in certain cases (Art. 148 para 1
  EEC/EWGV)
• Unanimity necessary for the directives concerning
  the harmonization of national laws (Art. 100 EEC)
  or for new powers of the Community (Art. 235 EEC)
  
• Attention Since Amsterdam the counting of
  article has been changed.

25

• Commission supranational (federal) body
• Originally conceptualized as the nucleus of a
  federal government, but this stage has not been
  reached yet.
• Originally 9 Commissioners, until 1 May 2004 20
  members, 2 members for any of the 5 big MS
• from 1 May 2004 onwards 25 members gt one member
  for each MS
• Change necessary due to the enlargement!
• Commissioners independent from their national
  governments, do not take order from home
  however, national governments often consider them
  as their representatives
• Commission is in charge to initiate legislative
  processes, to implement European law, and of the
  control of the loyalties to the treaties.

26

• Parliamentary Assembly gt forerunner of European
  Parliament lt indirectly elected by national
  parliament first direct election 1979.
  Originally hardly any worth mentioning powers
• Economic and Social Committee Representation of
  important groups (entrepreneurs and unions) of
  civil society, no powers, just advising
  institution
• So Committee of Regions, created by Maastricht
  Treaty (1992)
• European Court of Justice (ECJ/EuGH) European
  constitutional and administrative court
  decisions which are binding in and for the MS,
  accepted by BVerfG.

27

• Powers in the EEC reside with the
  intergovernmental Council of Ministers, not
  with the federal Commission gt EEC remained
  dependent on the political will of the MS
• The EEC (and later the EC and EU) was a creation
  of national executives, they wanted to protect
  their influence on European decision making
  Therefore the MS are still the Masters of the
  Treaties
• The parliaments of the MS were mostly not
  involved in the negotiations, therefore they
  could not request a stronger position
• It changed since the late 1980s especially since
  firstly the Bundesrat threatened to reject the
  European Single Act, later the Maastricht Treaty
  (later more)

28

• The institutional structure also influenced by a
  combination of French and German interests
• The Germans did not pay much attention gt Federal
  ministry of economic (which was in charge of the
  EEC negotiations) was euro sceptic, therefore
  hardly interested in a strong institutional
  structure
• France was interested in intergovernmental
  structure because of domestic politics no (or as
  few as possible) majority decision making, weak
  parliamentary assembly.

29

• Both treaties (EEC and EAC) were signed in Rome
  25 March 1957 gt Roman Treties
• In France ratification was no problem.
• In Germany the SPD was divided
• As early as in 1925 it had proposed a united
  Europe, now West European integration seemed to
  deepen the German division.
• Additionally the SPD did not want to allow
  Adenauer an international success briefly before
  national elections in fall 1957.
• Talks between Adenauer (CDU), Ollenhauer and
  Wehner (SPD) opened the way for the SPD to accept
  the treaties. The Bundestag ratified them on 6
  July 1957 three days later the French Assemblée
  Nationale.
• First big step was achieved.

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• What has been reached, what not?
• Results were disappointing for those who were in
  favour of a European federation.
• Pragmatic integration on executive level,
• However, hardly any democratic legitimation
  (democratic deficit)
• Mixture of different concepts of integration,
  intergovernmental and supranational (federal)
• Until today the Union has never decided about the
  kind the kind of integration, about the finality.
  
• Therefore a unique/crude mixture of different
  approaches

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• But there was now an institutionalized nucleus
  for the further development which remained stable
  even during period of setbacks.
• Within the Basic structure it was possible to
  integrate further MS 25 and to deepen the
  integration process
• Additionally EEC, later EC and EU, became
  (except Japan) the economically most successful
  region in the world gt highest improvement of
  living conditions for the citizens.
• Least favoured regions (Southern Italy, Ireland
  ) fared better than average.
• Most important though West European Peace Order
  for more than fifty years, now extended to
  Central and Eastern Europe unknown in European
  history hitherto.