DualUse Research Codes of Conduct: Lessons from the Life Sciences

1
Dual-Use Research Codes of ConductLessons from
the Life Sciences

• Michael J. Selgelid, PhD
• Senior Research Fellow
• Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics
• The Australian National University

2
Dual Use is Multiuse

• Dual Use has multiple meanings
• Civilian and military use (two birds, one stone)
• Good and bad use
• Good and bad use, involving weapons (of mass
  destruction). (Intersection of 1 and 2)
• Dual Use Dilemma
• Responsible scientist should I engage in RD
  related to technology X
• Government To what extent should RD of
  technology X be permitted/controlled?

3
Dual Use Dilemma

• An (inherently) ethical dilemma
• ? i.e., given concern with values, benefits,
  harms, duties
• ? Ethicists, however, have played only minor role
  in debates about dual use

4
Heightened Attention to Dual Use and Need for
Codes of Conduct

• Earlier concerns
• Experience with nuclear weapons
• Rotblat called for a Hippocratic Oath for
  Scientists
• Growing attention/concern
• 11 September 2001 and anthrax attacks
• Recent episodes involving biotechnology
• Reviews of BTWC and CWC

5
Lessons from Biomedical Science

• Long history/experience with codes of conduct
• Hippocratic Oath
• Codes of Medical Associations (e.g., AMA and WMA)
• Nuremburg Code
• Declaration of Helsinki
• Extremely influential
• Largely effective guide to action

6
Lessons from Biomedical Science

• Mousepox (2001)
• Polio (2002)
• 1918 Flu (2005)
• ? Whether or not these studies should have been
  published, can we not imagine some that should
  not be? Censorship of nuclear science has been
  norm for decades. Who should make decisions?
  Would reliance on scientists (guided by codes of
  conduct) suffice? Similar questions relate to
  vetting of research.
• Relevance to converging technologies
• Intersection of biology, chemistry, and
  information technology. Synthetic biology
  likewise involves nanotechnology and engineering.
• Majority of debateand policy makingto date has
  focused on life sciences (and these studies in
  particular)

7
Policy Aftermath

• SSS
• Joint Statement of Editors and Authors Group
  (2003)
• NRCs Fink Report (2004), called for
• Voluntary self governance r/e censorship
• Increased education about dual use
• Development of codes of conduct
• Establishment of science advisory board
• NSABB (established 2004)
• Identification of dual use research of
  concernexperiments of concern
• Tools for controlling dissemination of
  information
• Codes of conduct
• Means for international collaboration
• Synthetic biology

8
Codes of Conduct

• Numerous roles to play
• Limitations to keep in mindi.e. they are by no
  means the whole solution.

9
Why codes of conduct are important

• Roles
• Raising awareness (and thus promoting good
  conductand avoidance of bad outcomes)
• Winning trust in science enterprise
• Avoiding over-regulation
• Process benefits

10
Raising Awareness

• About weapons conventions
• About dual use phenomenon, and dual use potential
  of ones own work
• About social responsibilities of scientists

11
Social Responsibility of Scientists

• Common themes
• Science is neutral/apolitical/value free
• Science is impartial pursuit of knowledge and
  knowledge is inherently good, or
• Knowledge is neither good nor bad, applications
  (by others) is what can be good or bad
• There are no bad molecules, only evil human
  beings (Hoffmann)
• ? Those who employ fruits of science in
  malevolent manner are guilty. Well-intentioned
  scientists are innocent.

12
Responsibility for foreseeable outcomes

• Scientists are implicated in bad outcomes that
  result from their work.
• Degree of responsibility depends on extent to
  which (bad) outcomes are
• Foreseen
• Foreseeable
• ? scientists have a responsibility to be aware
  and/or reflect on the ways in which their work
  will be used. The failure to reflector to
  foresee the foreseeablemay be considered
  negligence. In the context of weapons of mass
  destruction, such negligence could cause grave
  harm.

13
AMAs 2005 Guidelines to Prevent the Malevolent
Use of Biomedical Research

• Biomedical research may generate knowledge with
  potential for both beneficial and harmful
  application. Before participating in research,
  physician-researchers should assess foreseeable
  ramifications of their research in an effort to
  balance the promise of benefit from biomedical
  innovation against potential harms from corrupt
  application of the findings.
• In exceptional cases, assessment of the balance
  of future harms and benefits of research may
  preclude participation in the research for
  instance, when the goals of research are
  antithetical to the foundations of the medical
  profession, as with the development of biological
  or chemical weapons.

14
AMAs 2005 Guidelines to Prevent the Malevolent
Use of Biomedical Research

• Why shouldnt similar statement be adopted other
  relevant sciences?
• Note importance of going beyond the weapons
  conventions
• Neither the CWC nor the BTWC was designed to
  address the dual use dilemma. As revealed by
  general provisions clauses, the conventions
  prohibitions largely turn on the intentions of
  researchers and/or research programs.

15
Contra idea that awareness of and adherence to
BTWC and CWC suffice

• No one, so far as I am aware, has argued that the
  mousepox, polio, and flu studies flew in the face
  of the biological weapons conventions. The
  concern was that these were potentially dangerous
  experiments/publicationsnot that they were
  (already) prohibited ones.

16
Roles of Codes

• Winning public trust
• Social contract
• Avoiding over-regulation
• Process benefits (Rappert)

17
Codes of Conduct Limitations

• Universal codes lack substance, too general to
  be action guiding
• Commonsense lists of things (conscientious)
  people would do anyway
• Conflicting principles
• If too specific/detailed, then less wide
  applicability and/or code is more
  controversial/less widely accepted
• Dangers r/e proliferation of codes (that say
  different things)lessons from Helsinki
• Codes not effectivethose who would do what
  codes prohibit are not the kind of people who
  listen to codes in the first place. Need
  enforcement mechanisms.

18
Enforcement

• Sanctions of professional societies r/e
  membership and/or licensing
• Enforcement via denial of grants/withdrawal of
  Federal Funding
• Defacto legal statusstandards of
  practicenegligence (recall Helsinki)
• Formal legislation (perhaps as part of
  governmental oversight process)
• Some elements of code will already have legal
  implicationsi.e., weapons conventions. (Some
  ask why we then need to embody them in
  codesi.e., charge of redundancy. In response
  recall value of awareness raising.)

19
Regulation

• Recall censorship debate (and relevant issues
  regarding of vetting of research).
• Who should decide?
• Government?
• Individual scientists (and/or relevant scientific
  bodies) guided by codes of conducti.e.
  voluntary self-governance)?
• Perhaps neither is satisfactory. There are
  hybrid solutions, for which legally binding codes
  of conduct may play an important role.

20
Final Conclusions

• Much to learn from the life sciences
• Codes of conduct have numerous important roles to
  play
• Codes must go beyond weapons conventions to cover
  dual use research permitted by these conventions
• Codes of conduct have limits
• Codes of conduct should be part of a broader web
  of prevention
• Codes of conduct need not preclude regulation by
  government (but they may help avoid
  over-regulation)
• Codes of conduct may play crucial role in
  regulatory oversight
• At least some elements of codes will/should have
  legal status