The Counterinsurgency Campaign in Iraq

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The Counterinsurgency Campaign in Iraq
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The Counterinsurgency Campaign in Iraq

• Like other counterinsurgencies . . .
• Post-invasion Iraq is a political contest that
  manifests itself in violence
• The Iraqi population must be the focus of
  civil-military effort
• Political progress is essential
• Presence is key to achieving security in a
  decentralized, intelligence driven fight
• Time is a key variable . . .. . . Time cannot be
  manipulated in the same fashion as in maneuver
  warfare
• Patience is required
• To win the Coalition and the Iraqi government and
  forces must . . .
• Protect and control the population
• Deny insurgents sanctuary
• Meet popular expectations

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The Counterinsurgency Campaign in Iraq

• The Coalitions campaign is inherently a
  counterinsurgency campaign
• Civil and military elements
• Build Iraqi capability, fight the insurgency,
  transition the lead
• Focus on the Iraqi population while protecting
  other centers of gravity
• Simultaneous implementation (it cannot be
  sequential)
• Each component has its own timing based on
  resources, realities on the ground and external
  influences

Security
Governance
Economic Development
Communicating
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The Counterinsurgency Campaign in Iraq

• Requirements
• Protect the population
• Control the population
• Deny insurgents sanctuary
• Meet popular expectations

• Metrics
• Character of insurgent violence
• Information from the population
• Popular response to insurgent propaganda
• Ability of insurgents to control their casualties

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The Counterinsurgency Campaign in Iraq

• Since fall 2004 insurgent and terrorist groups
  have failed to meaningfully
• Regain safehaven after the loss of Fallujah
• Stop or impact the 30 January election
• Impact formation of the Transitional National
  Assembly
• Impact formation of the Iraqi Transitional
  Government
• Undermine development of Iraqi Security Forces
• Create a wider insurgent movement within Iraq
• Expand external support for the insurgency
• Foment sectarian violence
• Stop the drafting and passing of the constitution
  
• Political progress, growing government legitimacy
  and increasingly capable Iraqi forces are the
  greatest long term threats to the insurgency
• Patience, sustained security investment and
  increased investment in Iraqi government and
  economic capacity will enable progress