European Neighbourhood Policy and the Conflict in Transnistria

1
European Neighbourhood Policy and the Conflict in
Transnistria

• By Professor Adrian Pop, Ph.D.
• Faculty of Political Sciences
• Dimitrie Cantemir University
• Bucharest, Romania

2
THE TRANSNISTRIAN CONFLICT

• Ethno political conflict with a strong
  ideological component gt armed conflict
  (1991-1992) gt geopolitical frozen conflict
  (1992-2006)
• Its beginning coincided with the beginning of
  Moldovan statehood
• Has got the Wests attention only from 2003 on,
  against the background of NATO and EU enlargement
  to the East
• From a post-Soviet conflict to a European one

3
GEOPOLITICAL AND GEO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS RUSSIA

• Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabach, South Ossetia,
  Abkhazia and Adjaria frozen conflicts materialize
  Russias near abroad concept
• Transnistria Russias most advanced stronghold
  to the West, near the common NATO-EU eastern
  border of Romania
• Russias involvement in the conflict
• The 14th Army support in the armed conflict
• The signing of the ceasefire agreement (1992)
• Peacekeeping role
• Mediator role

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GEOPOLITICAL AND GEO-ECONOMIC ASPECTSDNESTR
MOLDOVAN REPUBLIC (DMR)

• Mafia-type illicit activities a generator and
  facilitator of asymmetrical risks and threats
• Part of a criminal network within CIS the
  alliance between DMR, Abkhazia and South Ossetia
  (2004)
• Catalyst for secessionist movements arms
  producer for conflict areas
• Important electric energy producer and transfer
  node RMs energy dependence on DMRs Cuciurgani
  electric plant (now in Russian hands)

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THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT

• Hits RM economy by re-export activities,
  depriving RM of taxes and hampering investments
• Magnifies the economic dependence of RM
• Prevents control over the whole RM territory and
  RM borders
• Prevents RM government to guarantee social
  security
• Blocks RM governments decisions
• Hampers security sector reform in RM
• Prevents RM to define its own identity
• Bars the European road of RM

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CONFLICT RESOLUTION PLANSOSCE

• Initial mandate securing the territorial
  integrity of the state along with a special
  status for Transnistria
• Reduction of Russian armaments and the 14th Army
  troops but not their full withdrawal, despite
  commitments taken at the OSCE Summits in Istanbul
  (1999) and Porto (2002)
• The OSCE Plan (2002) a federation of state
  entities - Transnistria and Gagauz-Yeri - with
  their own constitutions and laws and a federal
  parliament with two chambers it meant the
  breaching of the Moldovan Constitution, of the
  OSCE mandate and of the ruling partys programme
  
• The OSCE Washington summit resolution (2005) it
  was agreed upon to combine the Russian and
  Ukrainian plans into a single framework document

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CONFLICT RESOLUTION PLANS RUSSIA

• Kozak Memorandum (2003) recipe for the
  transnistrianization of RM
• - a federal state with 2 entities, DMR and the
  Gagauz-Yeri
• - a bicameral Parliament, the federal entities
  having an a priori 50 per cent of votes and the
  Senate having the right to veto any piece of
  legislation regarding the federation
• - official languages Moldovan and Russian
• - the withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping troops
  sometime around the year 2030
• - rejected by President Voronin and the
  Maastricht OSCE Summit (2003)
• Belkovski Plan (2004 2006) Bessarabia vs.
  Transnistria
• - DMRs de jure independence and future
  unification with Russia in exchange for
  Bessarabias reunification with Romania
• - partly legitimized by the recent
  Transnistrian referendum (2006)

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CONFLICT RESOLUTION PLANSUKRAINE

• Yuschenko Plan (2005)
• - DMR authorities would have got an implicit
  recognition as part of the negotiation process
• - the Supreme Soviet, would have got its
  legitimacy, as mandatory and urgent elections for
  it were called upon, supervised by OSCE
• - DMR a republic within the Republic of
  Moldova with its own constitution, symbols and
  official languages (Moldovan, Russian and
  Ukrainian)
• - the representation in the Conciliation
  Committee would have favoured the blocking of
  OSCE decisions
• - rejected by Russia but positively received in
  the West

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CONFLICT RESOLUTION PLANSREPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

• Civil societys 3-D Strategy (2003)
• - demilitarization
• - decriminalization
• - democratization
• The Status Law (2005)
• - Transnistria got a special juridical status
  as a territorial administrative unit in form of
  a republic
• - well received by OSCE, rejected by Russia,
  Ukraine and DMR

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CONFLICT RESOLUTION PLANSROMANIA

• Initially a part of the mediation process, soon
  after excluded from it
• Throughout the acting Romanian presidency of OSCE
  (2001) it decided to transfer the Transnistrian
  issue on the agenda of the incoming Portuguese
  presidency
• Civil societys recommendations (2005) for a
  Cyprus scenario for RM letting out Transnistria
  and focus on EU accession
• President Traian Basescu (2006)
  Romanian-Moldovan reunification will be made
  within EU

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CONFLICT RESOLUTION NEW OPPORTUNITIESENP

• ENPs primary goal to create a ring of friendly
  states at the EU periphery
• The incorporation into the ENP of a soft
  conditionality principle
• ENPs focus on forging a common market not only
  economic, but also security benefits
• ENPs emphasis on transborder cooperation
  forging the interaction with neighbours
• The role or regional cooperation getting closer
  to the EU RMs accession to the SEECP
• Romania as RMs natural partner on its road to
  the EU
• The EU-Moldova Action Plan (till 2008)
• Priorities set forth in the Action Plans
  transport, energy, justice and home affairs
• The Transnistrian conflict gets a special
  attention
• The EU monitoring mission at the
  Moldovan-Ukrainian border, (2005-2007) the first
  display of the ENP security dimension in the
  Black Sea region

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CONFLICT RESOLUTION NEW OPPORTUNITIESESDP

• A possible future civilian EU-led police
  monitoring mission which would have Transnistria
  as its first implementation ground in the former
  Soviet area
• Following the Bosnian model, the cooperation of
  non-EU states, including Russia and Ukraine, is
  desirable and feasible

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CONFLICT RESOLUTION NEW OPPORTUNITIESROMANIAS
ROLE

• Optimizing the management of the future EU
  eastern border
• Producing a multidimensional strategy on
  Romanias relations with RM and Ukraine
• A possible 22 format of know how transfer from
  Romania and Poland to RM and Ukraine in the areas
  of democratization and security sector reform
• Supporting diplomatically the goal of upgrading
  the status of the EU and US (currently observers)
  in the current pentagonal framework of
  negotiations on Transnistria

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CONFLICT RESOLUTION NEW OPPORTUNITIESROMANIAS
ROLE

• Participating, after EU accession, to the EU
  monitoring mission of the Moldovan-Ukrainian
  border and also to a possible future EU
  Petersberg mission in Transnistria
• Making good use of Romanias triple status as
  NATO member, future EU member, and future US
  military bases host, to facilitate the forging of
  a consensus on the international communitys
  strategy for the Black Sea region
• Securing a follow-up for the Black Sea Forum
• Launching, after the EU accession, an EU Black
  Sea Dimension following the model instituted by
  Finland with its Northern Dimension.

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Conclusions

• The need to avoid transforming Transnistria into
  a Black Sea Kaliningrad
• Political will for a decisive action is crucial
• The opportunities presented by ENP and ESDP
  should be used at their full potential
• A sustainable solution for Transnistria is a
  precondition for RMs becoming a democratic and
  prosperous EU neigbouring country