Philosophy of the Sciences, Lecture 5

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Philosophy of the Sciences, Lecture 5

• Troubles with Falsificationism and Thagards
  Answer to the Demarcation Problem
• maxdeutsch_at_hkusua.hku.hk

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• Review, Lecture 3
• Were trying to arrive at an answer to the
  question of what marks science off from
  non-sciencean answer to the demarcation
  problem.
• The question is intrinsically interesting, of
  practical importance (Who gets the money?) and
  crucial to understanding the value of science
  (Why is science particularly valuable?).

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• The answers to the demarcation problem that
  initially come to mind seem to characterize
  science but not define it.
• Poppers view is that science isnt science
  because its theories are confirmedconfirming
  instances of a theory are too easy to come by.
  Instead, science is science because its theories
  are falsifiable. Theyre inconsistent with some
  possible occurrences they make risky
  predictions.
• Einsteins theory of relativity is falsifiable,
  but Marxs theory of history and Freuds and
  Adlers psychological theories are not. (acc. to
  Popper)

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• Being true is irrelevant to being science
  (according to the falsificationist criterion).

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• Review, Lecture 3
• Some consequences and corollaries of Poppers
  solution to the demarcation problem
• Theories not falsifiable by any conceivable event
  are not scientific. (Thus, the naïve view that
  science strives for irrefutability gets things
  exactly the wrong way around.)
• Every good scientific theory is a prohibition--it
  denies that certain things may happen.

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• A test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it.
• Some genuinely falsifiable theories, when
  falsified, are maintained by their admirers
  either by re-casting the theory or adding
  auxilliary assumptions. Such a procedure is
  always possible, but it rescues the theory only
  by destroying or reducing the theorys claim to
  scientific status. (Popper calls such rescue
  operations conventionalist twists.)
• End review, begin Lecture 4
• Popper on induction

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Many would say that science is distinguished from
non-science by its reliance on the scientific
methoda method that involves observation,
experiment, and, crucially, a certain kind of
inference or reasoning Inductive inference. It
is a scientific law that water boils at 100
degrees. How is the law established? Standard
answer By observation. Given a sufficient
number of observations and we take the law to
hold.
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But there is a problem with this standard answer
and a related problem with taking the inductive
method as a solution to the demarcation
problem. It is possible that the law is false
even given the numerous observations. The law
transcends experienceit has consequences with
respect to the way unobserved water would behave
if heated to 100 degrees. So, the observational
evidence cannot on its own justify the law.
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If we add to this the facts that (ii) Science
depends on the establishment of scientific
laws (iii) In science, only observation and
experiment may decide upon the acceptance or
rejection of scientific claims, including claims
about laws we have what appears to be a very
vexing problem. Poppers solution There is no
conflict. Laws are not inferred from
observational evidence. They are simply
conjectures.
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The Troubles with Falsificationism (Trouble 1) A
counterintuitive consequence of falsificationism
is that it puts no methodological constraints on
theory-construction in science. A theory is
scientific just in case it is falsifiable,
nothing more, nothing less. It follows that if
I have a vivid dream in which a falsifiable
theory occurs to me (about, say, the origin of
the species) that theory is scientific, despite
the fact that I merely dreamed it up.
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I neednt run any experiments, nor make even a
single observation of the empirical world!
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Troubles with Falsificationism (cont.) (Trouble
2) As Popper himself notes, even theories that
are falsifiable, and look, at first, to be
falsified, can be saved by a conventionalist
twist. Popper describes such twists as ad
hoc, as maneuvers that have no rationale except
to save the theory. And, surely some of them
are.
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But, equally surely, some of them arent. There
are cases in which a risky prediction is the
result of an inessential part of the theorya
part that can simply be dropped without giving up
on the core. Lamarkian vs. Darwinian Selection
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(Trouble 2 cont.) And there are cases in which
auxiliary assumptions whose addition will help a
theory avoid falsification should be added to the
theory, perhaps because the theory, so modified,
fits smoothly with other going theories, or
because the theory, unmodified, fails take
account of certain phenomena relevant to the
domain that the theory covers. Is trouble 2
really all that worrisome?
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A modified falsificationism A theory is
scientific just in case it is falsifiable and
capable of being rescued from falsification only
by a well-motivated conventionalist twist. New
troubles? (Trouble 3) Some theories that are
pretty clearly unscientific, astrology e.g.,
appear to be falsifiable! Popper claims that the
predictions of the astrologist are so vague that
no conceivable course of experience would refute
them.
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But, as Thagard points out, these vague
predictions are vaguely testable. Astrologists
claim, for example, that people born under
certain signs or planets are more likely to adopt
certain occupations rather than
others. Gauquelins finding No statistically
significant correllation between careers and
either sun sign, moon sign, or ascendant sign.
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Whats interesting about Gauquelins finding is
not that it falsified astrology. That was to be
expected. Whats interesting is that astrology
is falsifiable. Since its falsifiable, its
science, acc. to Poppers criterion.
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Boks criticisms (1) Astrology arose from a
magical world-view. (2) Planets too distant for
there to be a physical foundation to
astrology (3) People believe in it out of a
longing for comfort Re (1) chemistry sprang
from alchemy mystical influences in Newton and
Einstein.
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Re (2) Other scientific views without physical
foundations the theory of continental drift.
Link btw. smoking and cancer. Re (3) Why people
believe even the best scientific theories ought
to be irrelevant to their status as
science. Thagards proposal A solution to the
demarcation problem requires looking to social
and historical context.
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The social factors--consider the community of
practitioners Do they agree upon the principles
and problem-solving strategies of the theory? Do
they care about anomalies? Do they compare theirs
to other competitor theories? Do they actively
attempt confirmation or disconfirmation?
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The historical factors Consider the past life of
the theory Has it tried to explain new facts and
deal with anomalies? Has it fared well in
competition with other theories?
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Thagards socio-historical solution to the
demarcation problem A theory is
pseudoscientific if and only if (a) it has been
less progressive than other theories and faces
unsolved problems and (b) its practitioners dont
develop the theory, they show no concern for how
the theory fares in relation to others, and they
are selective in considering confirmations and
disconfirmations.
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• Why astrology fails the test
• Its dramatically unprogressive.
• There are outstanding problems.
• There are alternative theories of behavior.
• Its practitioners are generally unconcerned with
  solving its problems and dealing with competitor
  theories.

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• A consequence of Thagards solution
• Whether something counts as science or
  pseudoscience is socially and historically
  relative.
• On the historical side, as Thagard points out,
  according to his criterion, what once was science
  can become pseudoscience. In fact, this is
  precisely what happened to astrologyor so
  Thagard says. He defends this claimed historical
  relativity by claiming that rationality itself is
  historically relative.

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On the social side, do isolated astrologists
count as scientists is astrology science for
them? And what exactly is the scope of
alternative theories? Should we be worried that
our best theories are in fact pseudoscientific
since they match up poorly with the best Martian
theories?