Monday, April 3, 2006 PHL105Y

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Monday, April 3, 2006PHL105Y

• For Wednesday, read Margarita Levins Defense of
  Objectivity (549-559 in the Pojman)
• There are no study questions for this Friday.
  This Friday discussion sections will review
  material for the final exam (including the Rorty
  and Levin). Study questions for the final exam
  are posted to the course website
• http//www.erin.utoronto.ca/jnagel/intro105.htm

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Richard RortyDismantling Truth Solidarity
vs. Objectivity

• From Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979)
• and Science and Solidarity (1987)

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Two approaches to rationality

• What is it to be rational?
• Rorty distinguishes two types of answer to this
  question
• (1) Rational thoughts are objectively different
  in character from irrational ones
• (2) Rational thoughts are thoughts that have a
  different social status

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Two approaches to rationality

• What is it to be rational?
• (1) Rational thought mirrors the objective nature
  of reality rational thoughts have a special
  organization or structure (example Russells
  view, in which thoughts about the world are
  anchored in acquaintance with sense data and
  universals, according to a set of logical and
  rational rules)

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Two approaches to rationality

• What is it to be rational?
• (2) Rational thoughts are thoughts that have a
  special social status. What is special about
  some statements (I see blue I am in pain) is
  not that we are more closely in touch with inner
  reality there (and then have to understand the
  outer world on that basis) but that we have a
  social practice of accepting these claims without
  further evidence.

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A social conception of rationality

• Rorty wants to explain rationality and epistemic
  authority by reference to what society lets us
  say.
• Notice that the objective approach also connects
  social patterns and rationality, but in the other
  direction society lets you say things because
  they are rational

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A social conception of rationality

• Rorty thinks that studying human knowledge is
  just fundamentally studying the way human beings
  actually interact when we say that someone knows
  something, what we are really saying is that he
  is seen a certain way by the members of his
  community

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A social conception of rationality

• For Rorty, the notion of warranted
  assertibility what our peers will let us get
  away with saying is deeper and more basic than
  the notion of truth.
• Rorty disparages the philosophical project of
  coming up with an ontological account of how
  our minds are supposed to have contact with
  reality.

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Rorty on science

• As Rorty sees it, science is in our society often
  seen as having a monopoly on the truth science
  gives us hard, objective facts
• Scientific rationality is seen as a matter of
  following a precise method, of hitting goals (of
  prediction and control) laid down in advance

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Rorty on science

• As Rorty sees it, the modern scientist in our
  society has the status of a priest the
  scientist is responsible for getting us in touch
  with something beyond (or above) humanity, in
  touch with ultimate reality
• The scientists results are supposed to be
  objective.

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Where does this leave the humanities?

• The more our culture valorizes science, the more
  awkward things become for the thinker in the
  humanities. What is the philosopher or artist
  supposed to do?
• One possibility for the humanities is to pretend
  to be part of science another is to say that the
  humanities are concerned with soft values rather
  than hard facts.

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Where does this leave the humanities?

• Saying that humanities are concerned with soft
  values rather than hard facts suggests that their
  role will be to provide a certain kind of
  entertainment or pleasure
• One might wonder whether the humanities are even
  doing something legitimate at all

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Defending the humanities

• As Rorty sees it, scientific rationality follows
  a procedure laid down in advance (Can you clone a
  dog? Its pretty clear in advance what counts as
  success or failure.) The criteria or ends are
  clear.
• The rationality of the humanities and arts, on
  the other hand, involves the invention and
  defense of new criteria, the search for the right
  ends to pursue.

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Defending the humanities

• If we already knew what criteria we wanted to
  satisfy, we would not worry about whether we were
  pursuing the right ends. If we thought we knew
  the goals of culture and society in advance, we
  would have no use for the humanities as
  totalitarian societies in fact do not. (544)

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Defending the humanities

• It is characteristic of democratic and
  pluralistic societies to redefine their goals
  continually. But if to be rational means to
  satisfy criteria, then this process of
  redefinition will be bound to be nonrational. So
  if the humanities are to be thought of as
  rational activities, rationality will have to be
  thought of as something other than the
  satisfaction of criteria which are statable in
  advance. (544)

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The spirit of rationality

• If rationality isnt following pre-existing
  rules, what is it?

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The spirit of rationality

• If rationality isnt following pre-existing
  rules, what is it?
• To discuss issues in a way that avoids
  dogmatism, defensiveness and righteous
  indignation
• (Is that a helpful thing to say?)

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Defending the humanities

• Rorty argues against the notion that there is
  something special about knowing in advance what
  criteria your thoughts are going to satisfy, or
  exactly what rules your thinking is going to
  follow

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Attacking objectivity

• Rorty argues, the notion of objectivity is
  overrated there is no special characteristic of
  scientific judgments that puts them above other
  sorts of judgments
• Rorty wants to replace the idea of objectivity
  with the idea of unforced agreement

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Objectivity and agreement

• Rather than a perfect ultimate truth, Rorty
  argues, the best thing one could hope for in
  science is intersubjective agreement
• Rorty thinks that scientists should not see
  themselves as capturing the ultimate single
  nature of reality, but as advancing theories
  cooperatively, in solidarity with team members
  who share their goals

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Rorty on solidarity (over objectivity)

• As partisans of solidarity, our account of the
  value of cooperative human enquiry has only an
  ethical base, not an epistemological or
  metaphysical one. (545)
• For Rorty this emphasis on solidarity is the
  central idea of pragmatism.

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What Rorty opposes

• The ideal of attaining a metaphysical description
  of knowledge (why might he oppose that?)
• The ideal of attaining a story about the value of
  truth grounded in objective facts about human
  nature

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Rortys ultimate goal

• Rorty thinks that the good society would serve
  no higher end than its own preservation and
  self-improvement, the preservation and
  enhancement of civilization. It would identify
  rationality with that effort, rather than with
  the desire for objectivity. So it would feel no
  need for a foundation more solid than reciprocal
  loyalty. (548)

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(No Transcript)