Title: 4: Theory of Mind
14 Theory of Mind
- Outline
- What is theory of mind?
- The development of theory of mind evidence from
false belief tasks - Traditional explanation representational deficit
theory - Empirical challenges to the false belief tasks
and representational deficit theory - Non-stage theories
- Theory of Mind module
- Reality Bias
- The response of representational deficit
theorists - Summary and learning outcomes
2What is theory of mind (ToM)?
- The ability to make inferences about others
representational states and to predict behaviour
accordingly (Lewis Mitchell, 1994) - Term theory of mind coined by Premack
Woodruff, 1978 - Allows us to understand that what we believe to
be true and what is true may be different
3Alternative labels for, and Concepts about,
Mindreading (Whiten, 1994) Folk Psychology
(Wundt, 1916) Consciousness of the feeling of
their fellows (Thorndike, 1911) Imputation to
others of first hand experience (Lloyd Morgan,
1930) Naïve psychology (Heider, 1958) Second
order intentionality (Dennett, 1971) Intersubjecti
vity (Trevarthen, 1977) Theory of mind (Premack
Woodruff, 1978) Metarepresentation (Pylyshyn,
1978) Belief-desire reasoning (Davidson,
1980) Natural psychology (Humphrey, 1980) Social
referencing (Feinman, 1982) Mindreading (Krebs
Dawkins, 1984) Mental simulation (Gordon,
1986) Mentalising (Morton, 1989) Perception of
intentionality (Dasser et al., 1989) (Mental)
attribution (Cheney Seyfarth, 1990) Mentalistic
theory of behaviour (Perner, 1991) Representationa
l theory of mind (Perner, 1991)
4What about ToM in children?
- Traditional answer children below about 4 years
do not have theory of mind - How do we know?
- False belief tests
- Unexpected transfer test (Wimmer Perner, 1983)
- Deceptive box test (Perner, Leekam Wimmer,
1987 Gopnik Astington, 1988) - Appearance-reality tests
- Rock-sponge test (Flavell, Flavell Green, 1983)
5From Mitchell, 1997
6Representational deficit theory
- AKA theory-theory theory-shift conceptual
change etc. - Perner, Gopnik, Wellman
- ToM develops at age 4 when there is a radical
shift in childrens thought processes - Young children have representational deficit
- Evidence
- false belief tasks
- cross-cultural research (Avis Harris, 1991)
- Baka community, Cameroon
- ToM at 5 yrs
7Challenges to rep. deficit theory (1)
- 1. Over-reliance on false belief tasks - false
belief tasks flawed - children can misunderstand the question (Lewis
Osborne, 1990) - children fail to understand and integrate key
elements of the story (Lewis, Freeman, Hagestadt
Douglas, 1994) - children do not know that seeing is believing
(Wimmer, Hogrefe Sodian, 1988) - children are not able to articulate false belief
(Freeman, Lewis Doherty, 1991)
8Challenges to rep. deficit theory (2)
- 2. Evidence for early ToM (before 4 years)
- Children perform better in naturalistic settings
(Dunn, 1988) - early abilities indicate proto-ToM
- deception (Lewis, Stanger Sullivan, 1989
Chandler, Fritz Hala, 1989) - communicative abilities (Butterworth Jarrett,
1991) - pretence (Leslie, 1987)
9Challenges to rep. deficit theory (3)
- children can recognise lots of mental states at
earlier ages than 4 years - Knowledge (vs ignorance, Leslie Frith, 1988)
- Intention (Astington Gopnik, 1991)
- Wanting (Wellman, 1991)
- Emotions like happy/sad (Harris, 1989, 1991)
- Seeing (Baron-Cohen, 1991)
- Belief just one of the developmental
transitions leading up to full ToM?
10Challenges to rep. deficit theory (4)
- 3. Evidence for later development (post-4 years)
- Second order belief attribution (Perner Wimmer,
1985) - 4. Evidence that can vary the onset of ToM by
varying task - can manipulate older children and adults to fail
ToM tasks - Older children Steverson, 1996 variant of
deceptive box study - Adults Mitchell, Robinson, Isaacs Nye, 1996
adult false belief task
11From Mitchell, 1997
12From Mitchell, 1997
13Theory or Module?
- ToMM (Theory of Mind Module/Mechanism)
- Domain specific learning device
- Leslie (1987), Baron-Cohen (1995), Fodor (1992)
- Development of ToM is continuous process
- Early task failure is a result of performance
limitations - Evidence from autism (see lecture 5)
- ToMM/SP (Scholl Leslie, 1999, 2001)
- ToM module innate conception of belief and
mental states - Selection Processing used to inhibit default
responses - i.e. that someones belief is true
14Mitchells reality bias
- ToM is product of evolution -gt must be innate
- therefore, must be present from birth
- young children fail ToM tasks because are guided
by reality criterion - older children reality criterion -gt less
prominent -gt can make false belief judgements - Evidence? E.g. modification of deceptive box test
(Mitchell Lacohee, 1991) - standard version - 23 of 3 to 4 year olds
correct - modified version - 63 of 3 to 4 year olds correct
15From Mitchell, 1997
16Challenges to the challengers (1)
- False belief tasks not flawed
- manipulations are artificially boosting
childrens performance by social scaffolding - Even with manipulations, lots of children under 4
years still fail
17Challenges to the challengers (2)
- No evidence for early theory of mind as such
- showing pretence, deception, early communicative
ability etc irrelevant - ToM defined as ability to understand other's
belief - doesnt occur until age 4 (Perner, 1991) - pretence, deception etc may be over interpreted
(Perner, 1991) - communicative abilities
- pretence
18Challenges to the challengers (3)
- Early abilities may be precursors to real ToM but
they dont mean that the shift at age 4 doesnt
exist - Gopnik, Slaughter Meltzoff, 1994 - 4 conceptual
changes in development of ToM - Before 30 months foundational egocentric
non-representational understanding of perception - At 30 months development of a form of
understanding of perception and desire - Three years development of more complex
understanding of desires and perspective - 4 years realise can generalise notion of
misrepresentation from perspective context to
belief - formation of ToM
19Challenges to the challengers (4)
- Evidence for later development (post-4 years)
irrelevant - c.f. puberty
- Evidence that can vary the onset of ToM by
varying task irrelevant - Fact remains that children under 4 fail the false
belief tasks (Leslie, 1987, 1991 Scholl
Leslie, 1999) - Some studies not replicable (Sodian, Taylor,
Harris Perner, 1991) - The available results support the claim that the
same theory of mind emerges universally in the
young child with approximately the same
timetable (Harris, 1990).
20Wellman et als (2001) meta-analysis
- 77 articles, 178 studies, 591 conditions.
- 6 factors influence FB task performance.
- Better performance if
- 1) deception as motive for change
- 2) children carry out transformation themselves
- 3) target object not present when FB question
asked - 4) protagonists belief is explicitly stated
- 5) country of origin
- 6) emphasis of time frame (for 4 yr olds) -
where will he look first? - But basic development trend still observed
21Learning Outcomes
- Be able to describe and evaluate research on ToM
development - Be able to describe and evaluate theories of ToM
development - Be able to compare and contrast theories of ToM
development - Be aware that the issue of stage-like vs
continuous development is relevant
22Reading
- Essential Reading (on Digital Resources)
- Wellman, H.M. (2002). Understanding the
psychological world developing a theory of mind.
In U. Goswami (Ed.) The Blackwell handbook of
childhood cognitive development. Oxford
Blackwell. pp.167-187. (on Digital Resources) - Lee, K. Homer, B. (1999). Children as folk
psychologists The developing understanding of
the mind. In A. Slater D. Muir (Eds), The
Blackwell Reader in Developmental Psychology
Book on restricted loan - Further Reading
- See pdf handout
23Questions to ask
- Is the development of ToM continuous or
discontinuous? - What are the different theories of the
development of ToM? - What does the research into ToM tell us?
- Does the research support the theories?