OC Operational Intelligence Wing

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Air Warfare Centre
OC Operational Intelligence Wing Wg Cdr Mike
Hart
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Air Power in Unconventional Warfare

• Current Operations.
• Future Environment.
• Implications.

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Intelligence in the Air Environment.

• Defined by Air Power characteristics
• Reach cross theatre dimensions.
• Tempo transience, hours and minutes not weeks
  and days.
• Technology
• Creates particular challenges in the
  Joint/asymmetric context.

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Characteristics of Air Intelligence
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Current Operations Joint context

• J2 engagement compelled by nature of ops
  granularity/tempo.
• Challenges of education/understanding esp tempo
  and technology Lynx loss.
• Air int personnel forward critical to enable
  reachback.

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Key Immediate Int Issues.

• Enemy TTP current and evolving.
• Campaign progress regional dynamics.
• Advanced MANPADS (both theatres).
• Emerging threats tactical and technical.

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Future Context.

• Assumptions for UK
• Challenges do not melt away.
• Current ops steady state.
• Future short term ops with discrete objectives?

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Future Context.

• Driven by nature of conflict
• Asymmetry effective air freedom.
• Asymmetry plus state support increasing
  challenge to air freedom?
• State vs State 2020 high intensity?
• Key points for UK forces relevance and
  useability.

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Contemporary Context.

• Asymmetry
• Proliferation of technology and TTPs

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Contemporary Context.

• Intensity of contemporary asymmetric conflict
• Distance/tempo demand rapid mobility, effective
  air land integration, persistent ISR.
• UK experience Afghanistan and Iraq intense
  small unit conflict
• 396 calls for CAS in MSQ 21 Jul -24 Aug 06, 82
  resulting in kinetic engagement.

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Contemporary Context.

• Israeli experience vs Hizballah highly specific
  circumstances but
• 10000 FJ, 1500 AH sorties.
• SSM threat partially suppressed.
• Moderately successful interdiction.
• Hizballah hurt but substantially intact, and
  since recovered.
• IAF networked and capable.

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Contemporary Context.

• IO Dimension
• Israeli IO aggressive (home consumption/US)
• Hizballah stressed Israeli aggression played
  better in Europe/Middle East.
• Wider implications for useability of kinetic air
  power
• Easy to portray as indiscriminate.
• UK media comments.
• Highlights requirement for precision,
  discrimination also ROE issues.

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Contemporary Context.

• 5-10 year timeframe(?) steady state for UK
  forces.
• Opponents may increase tempo depending on extent
  of external support.
• Translates into continuing (increasing?)
  requirement for Air/Land ops, ISR, mobility.
• Do what we do now better contrast US Air/Land
  integration C Iraq, with UK approach SE Iraq.
• Instinctual approach of US Army USMC to
  airborne ISR use.
• JTAC vs FAC?
• Familiarity ? Resources? Educational and
  cultural?

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Future Context.

• Asymmetric Plus
• Complexity
• Asymmetric actor within antipathetic nation
  state.
• Strategic target within antipathetic nation
  state.
• State sponsor of asymmetric actor.
• Implications
• Requirement for UK force capability to suppress
  (sufficiently) elements of the conventional
  forces of a nation state for a limited time
  period to facilitate entry, action and
  exfiltration.

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Future Context.

• Asymmetric Plus
• Implications across Defence
• ISR long range persistence
• Land intensive small unit() combat
• Maritime littoral ops
• All above have implications for Air.

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Future Context.

• Asymmetric Plus Specific Air implications
• Suppression of elements of air defence system.
• Proliferation of advanced adversary systems and
  technology.
• A la carte fighters/IADS.

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Future Context.

• Asymmetric Plus
• Example Horn of Africa/Yemen
• Ethiopia Su27
• Eritrea Mig29
• Yemen Mig 29 SMT
• Somalia SA-18
• Legacy SAMs/ local IADS

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Future Context.

• Asymmetric Plus
• Conventional proliferation high tech/legacy AD
  system mix to provide complex defence of key
  targets.
• OP Allied Force/SEAD lessons.
• Iran SA-15 purchase.
• Advanced C2 systems supporting local networking.
• Counter PGM.

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Future Context.

• Asymmetric Plus - Iran
• Intellectual proliferation the Hizballah effect
• SSM/UAV/conventional air threats
• Implications ISR and strike.
• Complex mix of conventional and asymmetric
  systems and techniques.

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Future Context so what?

• Challenges of Asymmetric Plus
• Complexity small does not equal easy, nor
  necessarily limited capability.
• Adversary Tempo likely to be high
• C2 HQ size and agility? Componentcy?
• Speed vs mass?
• Precision building the picture quickly?
• The urban environment Baghdad example?

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Historical Precedent.

• Long experience of air power in unconventional
  warfare
• 1920s-30s - Imperial Policing.
• 1944-46 - Greek Civil War.
• 1990s - Op Northern Watch(?)
• 1995 - Krajinas/Bosnia.
• 2001 - Afghanistan.
• Role of local proxies.
• Appropriate model for future?

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State vs State?

• DSDC sees return of state vs state warfare by
  2020.
• Magnifies speed vs mass question.
• Particular UK issues
• Argentina acting within context of Latin American
  arms race.

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State v State Air Sovereignty.

• No new cold war but likely increased activity
• Recovery from 1990s low.
• Imperative created by NMD.
• Air power as political statement.

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State vs State?

• Peer competitors to US?
• China moved beyond Taiwan Straits to wider power
  projection?
• Compel LO route?

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Conclusions

• Unconventional warfare steady state for the
  next 5-10 years.
• Unconventional/small scale does not mean limited
  requirements.
• Complexity is likely to increase Asymmetric
  Plus paradigm.
• Conventional proliferation.
• 10 years plus State vs State?

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Contemporary Context.

• Do what we do now better?
• Do as we used to?

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• QUESTIONS