As Class Convenes

1
As Class Convenes

• Get your Name Tag, Scantron, Team Folder
• One team member should pick up YOUR TEAM FOLDER
  REMOVE EVERYTHING (Unacceptable Engr. Journals)
• Supply Burning Questions
• Find a seat (space away at least 1 seat from
  neighbors)
• Prepare SCANTRON FORM
• Bubble in your form like last time (Instructions
  will be shown next)

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Instructions for SCANTRON
Ignore this area
3
Turn in SCANTRONS ONLY

• Pass to the aisle
• Hold Engr Journals, Corrections, Makeups until
  end of class
• Return in Team Folders

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Quiz Key
5
Burning Questions
6
Hardware Stores

• Sears Hardware, Kmart, 84 Lumber College Square
• True Value Elkton Road
• Home Depot near Christiana Hospital
• Lowes Route 40, Bear

7
Demonstrations

• Line up in team order
• Take Photo
• Get Ammo
• Explain Launcher (25 words or less) Predict
  Distance
• Shoot Once
• Submit Notebooks Folders
• Shoot More?

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Chapter 7 - Evaluation

• Duration
• Quiz 10 min
• Burning Questions 5 min
• Ethics Checklist 5 min
• An Ethical Problem 30 min

p.151
9
Problem Solving Heuristic

• Define the Problem
• Generate Solutions
• Decide the Course of Action
• Implement the Solution
• Evaluate the Solution
• should be carried out at various points during
  the project to make sure you are still on track
• Evaluation Checklist (p. 151)
• Ethics Check Questions (p. 155)
• The Five Ps (p. 156)

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Ethics Check Questions

• Is it legal?
• Is it balanced? Is it fair
• How will it make me feel about myself? Will it
  make me proud? ...

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Ethical Considerations The Five Ps 1

• PurposeWhat is the objective for which you are
  striving? Are you comfortable with that as your
  purpose? Does your purpose hold up when you look
  at yourself in the mirror?
• PrideCan you take pride in the solution you have
  developed? Is there any false pride or doubt
  involved?
• PatienceHave you taken the time to think through
  all the ramifications of your solution?
• PersistenceAre you sticking to your guns and not
  being dissuaded by other demands? Have you given
  up too soon on finding a solution that is fair
  and balanced to all concerned.
• PerspectiveHave you taken the time to focus
  inside yourself to be sure everything fits with
  your ideals and beliefs? How does the solution
  fit into the Big Picture?

p.156
1 Blanchard and Peale The Power of Ethical
Management
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An Ethics Case Study

• Space Shuttle Challenger

13
Because of his role in evaluation of the Space
Shuttle for Structural Integrity of Composite
Structures, Dr. Wilkins was NASAs guest at the
First Flight of the Space Shuttle (Columbia) on
April 12, 1981, at 70003 a.m. EST
14
An Ethical Problem
The Challenger What Went Wrong
The Story of Roger Boisjoly, Applied Mechanics
Engineer, Morton Thiokol, Inc. (Ref.http//online
ethics.org/moral/boisjoly/RB1-0.html)
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Discovering Leaks in the Primary Seal

• January 1985, post-flight inspection of Flight
  51C revealed
• hot combustion gases compromised primary seals on
  two field joints
• large amounts of blackened grease between two
  seals
• The next shuttle launch is already behind
  schedule, and the leaks in the primary seal on
  Flight 51C occurred during the worst temperature
  change in Florida history (atypical).

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(No Transcript)
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Discovering Leaks in the Primary Seal

• Boisjoly briefed Marshall Space Flight Center
  (MSFC) as part of Flight Readiness Review for
  April launch
• there is a problem with the seals
• lower than usual launch temperature probably
  responsible
• NASA insisted his position be softened
• As a team, what would you do? (3 min)
• Arnie Thompson, Supervisor, Structures Design,
  proposed subscale lab tests be conducted

18
Early Evidence of Temperature Effect

• Resiliency Tests Performed March/April 1985
• 100 F seals did not lose contact
• 75 F seals lost contact for 2.5 seconds
• 50 F seals lost contact more than 10 minutes
• April Launch took place (without incident)
• Boisjolys April Launch Post Flight Inspection
• nozzle joint primary seal had eroded in 3 places,
  secondary seal had eroded in one place
• July 1985, NASA informed of all results

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Early Evidence of Temperature Effect

• The bench tests showed that temperature can
  adversely affect the resiliency, and therefore
  the effectiveness of the O-rings, yet management
  at Thiokol and NASA showed no interest in
  planning a design change.
• As a team, (3 min)
• What general courses of action are reasonable for
  an engineer in this sort of situation?
• What are some of the Adverse Consequences of your
  actions (inactions)?

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Read the memo written by Boisjoly
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Morton Thiokol, Inc. Wasatch Division Interoffice
Memo
TO R.K. Lund, Vice President,
Engineering FROM R.M. Boisjoly, Applied
Mechanics CC B.C. Brinton, A.J.
McDonald, L.H. Sayer, J.R. Kapp DATE 31
July 1985 SUBJECT SRM O-Ring Erosion/Potential
Failure Criticality This letter is written to
insure that management is fully aware of the
seriousness of the current O-ring erosion problem
in the SRM joints from an engineering
standpoint. The mistakenly accepted position on
the joint problem was to fly without fear of
failure and to run a series of design evaluations
which would ultimately lead to a solution or at
least a significant reduction of the erosion
problem. This position is now drastically
changed as a result of the SRM 16A nozzle joint
erosion which eroded a secondary O-ring with the
primary O-ring never sealing. If the same
scenario should occur in a field joint (and it
could), then it is a jump ball as to the success
or failure of the joint because the secondary
O-ring cannot respond to the clevis opening rate
and may not be capable of pressurization. The
result would be a catastrophe of the highest
order - loss of human life. An unofficial team
(a memo defining the team and its purpose was
never published) with leader was formed on 19
July 1985 and was tasked with solving the problem
for both the short and long term. This
unofficial team is essentially nonexistent at
this time. In my opinion, the team must be
officially given the responsibility and the
authority to execute the work that needs to be
done on a non-interference basis (full time
assignment until completed). It is my honest and
very real fear that if we do not take immediate
action to dedicate a team to solve the problem
with the field joint having the number one
priority, then we stand in jeopardy of losing a
flight along with all the launch pad facilities.
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Soften the Urgency of O-Ring Problem

• August 1985, Seal Erosion Team formed
• Marshall Space Flight Center sent team to SAE
  conference to talk to seal experts
• were given strict instructions not to express
  critical urgency of fixing the joints
• were only soliciting potential future joint
  improvements
• If the word leaked that there existed a major
  malfunction in the solid rocket booster, Congress
  would lose even more faith in the Shuttle
  program. No cold weather launches were planned
  in the near future anyway.

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Frustration with Lack of Management Support

• Morton Thiokol doesnt want to appear to be a
  company with a flawed product, so they would
  prefer that Boisjoly play down the O-ring
  problem. While there have been a few cases of
  hot gas blow-by, almost 20 flights have flown
  successfully. Boisjoly has already written memos
  expressing the seriousness of the problem. What
  can he do now?
• As a team, (3 min)
• develop a set of Preventative Actions
• Do your solutions satisfy the Ethics Check
  questions and 5 Ps?

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Frustration with Lack of Management Support

• Potential Actions Boisjoly considered
• write memos farther up the ladder
• inform astronauts of danger
• inform government of danger
• inform the media
• Instead, Thompson wrote a memo

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Morton Thiokol, Inc. Wasatch Division Interoffice
Memo
TO S.R. Stein, Project
Engineer FROM A.R. Thompson, Supervisor,
Structures Design CC J.R. Kapp,
K.M.Sperry, B.G. Russell, R.V. Ebeling, H.H.
McIntosh, R.M. Salita, D.M. Ketner DATE
22 August 1985 SUBJECT SRM Flight Seal
Recommendation The O-ring seal problem has
lately become acute. Solutions, both long and
short term are being sought, in the mean time
flights are continuing. It is my recommendation
that a near term solution be incorporated for
flights following STS-27 which is currently
scheduled for 24 August 1985. The near term
solution uses maximum possible shim thickness and
a 0.292 0.005/-0.003 inch diameter O-ring. The
results of these two changes are shown in Table
1. A great deal of effort will be required to
incorporate these changes. However, as shown in
the Table, the O-ring squeeze is nearly doubled
for the example (STS-27A). A best effort should
be made to include a max shim kit and the
0.292 diameter O-ring as soon as it is practical.
Much of the initial blow-by during O-ring
sealing is controlled by O-ring squeeze. Also
more sacrificial O-ring material is available to
protect the sealed portion of the O-ring. The
added cross-sectional area of the 0.292 diameter
O-ring will help the resilience response by added
pressure from the groove side wall. Several long
term solutions look good but, several years are
required to incorporate some of them. The
simple short term measures should be taken to
reduce flight risks.
26
RESULT?

• None of the suggested measures were implemented!

27
Temperature Forecast for Next Shuttle Launch

• January 27, 1986
• overnight temperature expected to be 18 F
• launch scheduled for tomorrow morning
• Contrary to everyones expectations, it is now
  predicted that the next days temperature will be
  below the record cold experienced the previous
  year. This extreme weather condition presents a
  major threat to the capacity of the O-ring seals
  to perform their function, and thus to the
  survival of the crew.
• Time is short, what Contingency Actions are
  appropriate in such a situation? (3 min)

28
Launch Decision

• Evening Teleconference with Kennedy Space Center
  (KSC) and Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC)
• Boisjoly presented his data and recommended not
  to launch at temperatures below 53 F
• NASA was not pleased
• NASA asked Morton Thiokols V.P. for his launch
  decision
• not recommended based upon the engineers
  position
• KSC asked for MSFCs launch decision
• appalled at Morton Thiokols recommendation
• will not launch over the contractors objection
• KSC insisted the data presented was inconclusive

29
Launch Decision

• Morton Thiokol Managers Argue
• made a pro-launch list of supporting data
• engineers were asked to behave like managers,
  not engineers
• Morton Thiokol V.P. Recommends Launch Proceed!
• NASA promptly accepted!

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The Challenger

• January 28, 1986, the Space Shuttle Challenger
  was launched
• within 1 second, first signs of failure
• puffs of black smoke spewed 3-4 times each second
  from a joint in the right Solid Rocket Booster
  (SRB)
• indicated that 5800F gases were eroding the
  O-rings
• at 1 minute, steady flame was visible
• atmospheric and aerodynamic conditions directed
  the flame plume onto the surface of the External
  Tank (liquid hydrogen and oxygen fuel storage)
• at 73 seconds, the hydrogen and oxygen burst into
  flame -- Challenger and crew were lost

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Message?

• Purpose
• Pride
• Patience
• Persistence
• Perspective

32
Apply Every Day

• To Academic Issues
• To Social Interactions
• To Personal Decisions

33
FORTRAN HELP

• Wednesday, Oct 31, 6-8
• 046 Colburn
• Program Troubleshooting
• Hands-On
• Helpers Invited

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(No Transcript)
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Turn in Team Folders

• Engineering Journals
• Quiz Corrections
• Quiz Makeups