Title: By Anand Prakash Jangid ACA,CISA,DISA,CISM,ACP
1Lessons to be learnt from the World Biggest
Fraud- Societe Generale
- By Anand Prakash Jangid ACA,CISA,DISA,CISM,ACP
2Agenda
- Introduction
- The fraud
- The Man
- Event Chronology
- Controls
- Summary
3The Fraud
- January 2008 Société Générale announced that it
lost approximately 4.9 billion( 7.2 Billion)
due to unauthorized trading - The bank was founded in 1984
- Operates in 82 countries and employs 151,000
people worldwide
4The Man
Jérôme Kerviel (born January 11, 1977) Started
his career in 2000 in the complaince dept of
SG 2005 Promoted as JUNIOR trader in the Delta
one Product team
5What so special about the fraud !!!!
- Magnitude of the event - 7 billion in losses,
surpassing any other example of unauthorized
trading incidents in history. - Singly perputed by a JUNIOR trader
6How it happned
- A Junior trader(Jérôme) in SocGens Delta One
business entered in to significant long positions
in Eurostoxx,DAX FTSE index futures. - In the normal course of business these long
positions would be hedged however the trader did
not take out genuine hedging trades
7How it Happened..cont
- The trader offset the reported market risk by
entering in to fictitious hedge transactions. - To avoid controls he Chose transactions with
no cash movements or margin call which didnt
require immediate confirmation
8How it Happened..cont
- Used other individuals passwords to cancel
certain transaction - Falsified documents to justify the transactions
- Ensured that the fictitious transactions were of
a different instrument than the ones he cancelled
9Discovery of the fraud
- The fraud was discovered when an abnormally large
counterparty risk was detected with a large bank
. - When contacted the counterparty bank did not
recognize the transactions booked against it.
10Total Exposure
- On discovery , SocGens total exposure was
approximately 50 billion - ( 80 billion ).
- On closing this position SocGen realised a loss
of 4.9 billion ( 7.2 billion)
11How it happened Fictitious OTC Hedges
Fictitious OTC Hedges
Fictitious OTC Hedges
Listed
Futures Trades Matched with exchange /
clearing house
Soc Gen pays Margin on futures positions
Trader Books Genuine Index Future trades
Futures Exchange / Clearing house
12How it happened Fictitious OTC Hedges
Soc Gen pays Margin on futures positions
OTC
Traders books fictitious OTC Hedges to flatten
risk
Confirmation Generated to agree fictitious OTCs
with counterparty
Soc Gen calculates Collateral due from OTC
counterparty
Traders Creates Fraudulent documents emails to
justify trades
Large Bank counterparty for fictitious OTC
hedges
13Event Chronology-1
- From late 2005
- Trader starts to book fictitious hedge trades to
disguise overall risk on his trading book - Each time one of his trades was questioned he
would describe it as a - mistake cancel it then replace that
trade with another transaction using a different
instrument .
14Event Chronology-2
- Nov 2007
- SocGen receives a call from Eurex alerting them
to some of this traders positions - Questioned by the bank, he produced a fake
document to justify the risk
15Event Chronology-3
- Early Jan 2008
- Traders being building up large index futures
positions in DAX. - Eurosroxx FTSE hedged by fictitious OTCs that
will ultimately lead to this loss
16Event Chronology-4
- Jan 17, 2008
- Abnormal counterparty risk identified on a
large bank raised to trader. - Jan 18, 2008
- Counterparty risk concerns raised to traders
superiors - Confirmation email raises suspicions
- Investigation Begins
17Event Chronology-5
- Jan 19 20, 2008 ( weekend )
- Large bank does not recognize trade
- Trader admits unauthorized acts
- Full exposure calculated
- BoF informed
- Jan 21 23, 2008
- Position unwound in unfavorable markets
18Finally
- Jan 24 ,2008
- Announcement made
- World biggest fraud perpetuated by a single
trader.
19Cause/contributory factorcont
- Trader used his experience of working in middle
office roles to circumvent control processes - Used other individuals passwords to cancel
certain transactions - Traders chose transactions with no cash
movements or margin call which didnt require
immediate Confirmation
20Cause/contributory factor
- Falsified electronic documents to justify the
transactions - Ensured that the fictitious transactions were of
a different instrument than the ones he cancelled
21Impact cont
- Risk position accumulated was approximately 50
billion ( 18 billion exposure to the DAX , 30
billion to the DJ - Euro Stoxx 50 2 billion to the FTSE 100 )
- On discovery position was down 1.5 billion
22Impact
- In the three days it took to close the position ,
the loss had grown to 4.9 billion due to
unfavorable market conditions - Significant reputational impact
23Controls points reqd
- Environment
- User entitlement access controls enforcing
segregation of duties - Including policies requiring the business owner
of systems to be responsible for access changes
when user changes department - Authorisation monitoring to monitor access
control - Required absence policy
-
24Controls points reqd
- Trade Date
- Real time risk reports for trading management
- Monitoring of open interest at exchange
- Operations would escalate to trading management
if open interest became higher than expected
25Controls points reqd
- Post Trade Date
- OTC trade confirmations ( written verbal
electronics confirmations ) - Though industry problems with large number of
unconfirmed trades - Margin calls on OTC counterparties
- Even if fraudulent OTC trades booked to high
quality counterparties, variation margin would be
called which the counterparty may dispute
26 And
- Making everyone a Risk Manager
27Risk Management - traditional silos
Strategic Risk
Business Risk
Financial Risk
Operational Risk
Who
- Business Managers
- Project Managers
- Internal Audit
- Compliance
- IT
- Product plans
- Business reviews
- Project management
- Strategic planning
- EVA
- Balanced scorecard
- Country and credit limits
- Trading and ALM Limits
- Financial derivatives
- Controls
- Audits
- Contingency planning
- Insurance
How
28Risks faced today are highly interdependent
Enterprise-Wide Risks
FinancialRisk
OperationalRisk
Business Risk
29What is Mr. Jerome doing now ?
- Kerviel is now two weeks into a new job at
information technology security consulting firm
Lemaire Consultants Associates
30Questions ?????? Anand Prakash
Jangid Anandjangid_at_gmail.com 91-9845467835