Local network governance: lessons and further questions

1
Local network governancelessons and further
questions

• Jacob Torfing
• Center for Democratic Network Governance
• June 22, 2006

2
Lessons from the pilot study

• Governance networks are important at the local
  level
• Existence of formal network structures ESG, PLIE
  and LCC supports the theoretical claim that
  networks arise when actors are interdependent
• Yet there are important differences in terms of
• Context
• The underlying rationality
• Operational frame
• Function

3
Context

• Common
• Increased devolution
• Focus on weak unemployed gt new actors
• UK Hollowing out the state
• NPM
• Contracting out (EZ)
• Absence of national policy coordination
• FR Increased accept of local solutions
• Rtatist system yields (slowly) to local
  governance
• DK Strong local government and strong
  corporatist tradition
• Adoption of corporate structures to social policy

4
Rationality of formation

• Networks serve different purposes
• UK facilitate coordination between
  quasi-autonomous public agencies and private
  contractors)
• FR facilitate coordination among deconcentrated
  and decentralized agencies within highly
  fragmented public sector
• DK bring together public and private interests
  in order to enhance input legitimacy
  (participation) and output legitimacy
• Rationality has implications for composition and
  function

5
Composition

• Key actors
• UK local, public agencies private contractors
  ( NGOs)
• FR different public agencies
• DK local government social partners

6
Function

• Local governance networks cannot escape the
  rationality behind their creation
• UK FR Politicians not involved
• UK Sufficient accountability through local
  government administrators and reference to city
  wide partnership
• FR Technical discussions prevail gt increasingly
  politized gt accountability problem?
• DK Large political involvement
• Yet formal network is dominated by informal
  network gt fail to meet legitimizing purpose

7
Multilevel metagovernance

• EU Structural Fund Money plays a role in all
  three countries
• Central government
• UK Voluntary networks, but strong fiscal
  incentives (NRF)
• (no legislation)
• Public agencies have each their own targets
• FR Voluntary networks, but if created obliged
  to comply with legislation
• No targets
• DK Legally mandated networks (law stipulates
  members, agenda, budget, link to municipality,
  reporting)
• No targets
• Local government
• UK FR weak local government
• DK strong local government
• Multilevel metagovernance frames the local
  interactions, but leaves considerable room for
  unfolding of local traditions and struggles

8
New research
9
The role of actors in networks

• How do the network actors understand and
  articulate norms of good governance? How are
  nrratives of the actors affected by foundational
  myths, the political context and the
  socio-economic conditions (MZ)
• Comparative study of France and Denmark
• Which capacities and resources must actors hold
  and develop in order to be involved and gain
  influence in local governance networks? How is
  the distribution of capacities and resources
  affecting democracy and effectiveness? (BD)
• Case study in Denmark (involves national local
  level)

10
Multi-level metagovernance

• Effects of EU, national and local metagovernance
  on (national and) local policy networks (PT)
• Identification and description of different
  techniques of metagovernance
• Power and resistance produced by these techniques
• Evaluation of the techniques impact on
  efficiency and democracy
• On local level case study of DK case

11
Institutional differences and output of local
networks

• The effects of new institutional set-ups on the
  local network governance (JT, BD)
• the motivation of the network actors
• the interactive governance of local employment
  policy
• the effectiveness and democratic performance of
  the governance network
• the development over time of local governance
  networks
• Comparative study of local Danish cases