OOTP 101906

1
Strategies for Rail Hazmat Routing Risk
Assessment ManagementWashington, DCOctober
13, 2008
2
DOT Hazmat Route Risk Analysis Requirements
Outline

• Overview of DOT HM232E requirements
• Industry approach developing risk-assessment
  model
• Data Compilation
• Challenges compiling data to fulfill requirements
• GIS challenges of geography and data
  acquisitions
• Traffic Flow Analyzer Model role in historical
  commodity data requirements

3
DOT Hazmat Route Risk Analysis Requirements
Outline (contd)

• Alternate route analysis
• ACT Planning Model role in generating alternate
  routes
• Cross-functional integration
• Implementation challenges
• Superfields and Class Tracking
• Conclusion

4
Timing and Key MilestonesInitial implementation
begins June 1, 2008, with full implementation by
January 1, 2010 for railroads and shippers.

• Collect Retain Data

Jan 1, 2010
Sept 1, 2009
Jan 1, 2009
June 1, 2008

• Rail carriers must compile information on the
  commodities they transport and the routes used
  for the previous calendar year.
• Route assessments and selections must be
  completed by the end of the calendar year.

• Interim rule becomes effective.
• Rail carriers must implement plans to enhance
  security during en route storage and delays in
  transit.
• Rail carriers must implement enhanced hazmat car
  security.

• Rail carriers must complete the safety and
  security analyses of routes currently used and
  for all available alternatives.
• Railroads must select the safest, most secure
  routes for transporting the specified explosive,
  PIH, and radioactive materials.

• Rail carriers must compile information on the
  commodities they transported and the routes they
  used for the six-month period from July 1, 2008
  to December 31, 2008.
• Data collection must be completed by March 31,
  2009.

5
Developing a Common ApproachEfforts underway to
establish a common approach to the
risk-assessment through an industry-wide approach
with the RRF.

• Railroad Research Foundation
• Industry wide initiative
• Common approach to analysis methodology
• Risk model currently under development
• Risk Model Inputs
• Railroads required to feed data into the model
• Shipment or aggregated level by commodity and
  route
• Historical routes and primary/alternate routes
• Batch upload in HTML format
• Challenges of input data

6
DOT HM232E Interim Final RuleNew Safety
Security Planning Requirements

• Route Analysis Requirements
• Evaluate 27 risk analysis factors
• Volume of hazardous material transported
• Rail traffic density
• Trip length for route
• Presence and characteristics of railroad
  facilities
• Track type, class, and maintenance schedule
• Track grade and curvature
• Presence or absence of signals and train control
  systems along the route ("dark versus signaled
  territory)
• Presence or absence of wayside hazard detectors
• Number and types of grade crossings
• Single versus double track territory
• Frequency and location of track turnouts
• Proximity to iconic targets
• Environmentally sensitive or significant areas
• 14. Population density along the route

7
DOT HM232E Interim Final RuleNew Safety
Security Planning Requirements

• Route Analysis Requirements (continued)
• Risk factors continued
• 15. Venues along the route (stations, events,
  places of congregation)
• 16. Emergency response capability along the
  route
• 17. Areas of high consequence along the route
• Presence of passenger traffic along route (shared
  track)
• Speed of train operations
• Proximity to en-route storage or repair
  facilities
• Known threats (TSA and FRA will provide nonpublic
  threat scenarios for carrier use in the
  development of the route assessment)
• Measures in place to address apparent safety and
  security risks
• 23. Availability of alternative routes
• Past incidents
• Overall times in transit
• Training and skill level of crews
• Impact on rail network traffic and congestion

8
Challenges compiling data to fulfill requirements

• Inaccurate data reporting and resolution
• Challenges capturing the 27 risk-factors
• Proximity to iconic targets
• Venues along the route
• Emergency response capability along the route
• Known threats (TSA/FRA will provide nonpublic
  threat scenarios for carriers to use in the
  development of the route assessment)
• Applying the data to each line segment of the
  network

9
GIS - challenges of geography and data
acquisition

• Building an internal GIS network is an ongoing
  process
• Time involved identifying assets are accurately
  located on the network
• 20,000 miles of operating track
• 3 years to survey network with track geometry car
• 1 year to interpret and apply data to the GIS
  network
• Required for use in risk-assessment model
• Accurate GIS network is the foundation of the
  assessment

10
Traffic Flow Analyzer ModelSource for historical
data and routes

• Traffic Flow Analyzer Overview
• Create a system that can work with an O-D based
  traffic file as input
• Assign or route each traffic record over a
  network
• Accumulate the resulting statistics for each
  link or line segment in the network
• Provide statistical outputs in the form of maps
  and reports detailing the network densities and
  associated mileage statistics (car-miles,
  gross-ton-miles, etc.)
• Reports at a system-wide level and by link level
• Extract traffic movements from datawarehouse
  reporting system
• Challenge Software designed to fill-in gaps in
  train reportings
• Generates historical movement data fed into ACT
  and RCRMS

11
Traffic Flow Analyzer ModelSource for historical
data and routes

• Line width is proportional to volume
• Directionality based on which side of line
  (right hand rule)
• Layers represent different commodities or other
  attributes
• Key provides scaling
• Optional link labels detail specific values
• Optional location labels also supported
• Traffic assignment or flow process determines
  data to be displayed

Flow1
Flow2
12
Traffic Flow Analyzer ModelAdditional
Functionalities
- Delta Flowmaps
- Pie Charts
Flow
Orig/Interm/Term Cars
13
Alternate Route Analysis

• Determine/Establish our Primary Route
• Historic Traffic from TFA sequenced with current
  plan in MREE
• Alternate Route Module
• Development with Oliver Wyman to expand MREE
• Algorithm based
• Integrated component of MREE
• What is a good alternate route?
• Must be commercially practicable
• Circuity
• Excessive Handling
• Transit Time
• Customer Commitments
• Should be geographically distinct

14
Alternate Route Analysis
15
The Challenge of Finding GOOD Alternate Routes
16
How it All Fits Together
Annual Reporting
TFA traffic
RCRMS
ACT/MREE
Risk Assessment
Alternate Route Generator
RCRMS
Internal Review Results
17
Challenges of Implementing Route Changes
18
Challenges of Implementing Route Changes

• CSX utilizes table based routing system
• 465,000 rows in our routing table
• Distinguishing Hazmat from Merchandise (STCC)
• Large scale table changes would be required
• Ongoing maintenance difficult
• Developing a Logic Branch Concept SUPERFIELDS
• Definition in one location
• Reference to definition where needed
• Save thousands of table entries
• Easy definition changes

19
Quick Review Conclusion

• TFA
• Source of historical traffic route
• ACT/MREE
• Generate current operating route
• Generate a series of alternate routes
• Marshal data between CSX and RCRMS
• Superfields
• Concept to reduce impact on routing tables
• Allow easier implementation

20
Questions?

• Michael Swain michael_swain_at_csx.com
• Suneil Kuthiala suneil_kuthiala_at_csx.com
• Dhamra Acharya dharma_acharya_at_csx.com