BMA505: The Political Frame Class

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BMA505 The Political Frame (Class 5 )

• BMA 505
• Spring, 2007

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Tonights agenda

• Introduction to Political Frame
• West Point
• 9/11
• Team Reflection

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A Political View

• Metaphor jungle
• Leader advocate, negotiator
• Change strategy map terrain, create agenda,
  network, attract allies, defuse opposition,
  negotiate
• Focus build a power base, get access, influence
  key players

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West Point
5
Framing Terrorist Threat

• History of airline hijacks before 9/11 almost
  always ended by landing somewhere and
  negotiations over hijackers demands
• February, 1993 WTC is bombed, but doesnt
  collapse as terrorists had hoped
• 1993 Expert panel appointed by D.O.D. suggests
  terrorists might use planes as missiles to attack
  national landmarks
• September, 1994 Suicidal man attempts to crash
  small plane into White House (skids into wall
  below presidents bedroom, but no significant
  damage)

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Framing Terrorist Threat

• February, 1997 Vice President Gores Aviation
  Security Report we believe that terrorist
  attacks on civil aviation are directed at the
  United States, and that there should be an
  ongoing federal commitment to reducing the
  threats that they pose. (Recommended safety
  changes mostly not implemented due to
  bureaucratic and political resistance)

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Framing Terrorist Threat

• 1998 Training Exercise Held at the White House,
  Based Around Militants Using a Plane as a Weapon
• Spring, 1998 Terrorism experts warn of possible
  attacks in which hijackers commandeer Federal
  Express cargo planes and simultaneously crash
  them into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon,
  the White House, the Capitol, the Sears Tower,
  and the Golden Gate Bridge.
• May, 1998 FBI agent in Oklahoma warns of
  middle-eastern males getting flight training
• 1999 British intelligence warns U.S. that
  Al-Quaeda plans to use commerical aircraft in
  unconventional ways, possibly as flying
  bombs.

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Framing Terrorist Threat

• September, 1999 National Intelligence Council
  predicts some kind of spectacular attack by
  bin-Laden in the U.S. One scenario Suicide
  bomber(s) belonging to al-Qaedas Martyrdom
  Battalion could crash-land an aircraft packed
  with high explosives (C-4 and Semtex) into the
  Pentagon, the headquarters of the Central
  Intelligence Agency (CIA), or the White House.
• April 2000 Would-be hijacker turns self in in
  NJ. Says he was to be in plot to fly airplanes
  into buildings. FBI Agent says later, We were
  incredulous. Flying a plane into a building
  sounded crazy but we polygraphed him and he
  passed. FBI HQ says send him back to England.

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9/11A System Under Challenge
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9/11 Commission

• The North American Aerospace Defense Command and
  the Federal Aviation Administration "struggled,
  under difficult circumstances, to improvise a
  homeland defense against an unprecedented
  challenge they had never encountered and had
  never trained to meet."

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9/11 Timeline Hijacked Flights

• American 11 departs Boston 8 a.m., hijacked
  around 815 a.m., hits World Trade Center 846
  a.m.
• United 175 departs Boston 15 minutes late at 814
  a.m., hits World Trace Center 905 a.m.
• American 77 departs Washington/Dulles 820,
  crashes into Pentagon 937 a.m.
• United 93 delayed on ground at Newark, departs
  842 a.m., forced down in Pennsylvania 1006 a.m.

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Primary sites in film

• FAA National Command Center (Herndon, VA),
  receives notification from Boston Air Traffic
  Control at 828 a.m. that AA 11 is believed
  hijacked
• Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), located in
  Rome, New York, regional HQ for the North
  American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD),
  receives notification of hijack from Boston
  Center at about 837 a.m.

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Key People

• Ben Sliney, National Operations Manager, FAA
  command center (hed been greeted with applause
  when he arrived that morning for his first day in
  the job)
• Colonel Bob Marr, Battle Commander, Northeast Air
  Defense Sector
• Major Kevin Nasypany, Mission Crew Commander
  (MCC), NEADS

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(No Transcript)
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(959 a.m.) Conversation between
counterterrorism tsar Richard Clarke and Dale
Watson, head of counterterrorism, FBI

• Watson We got the passenger manifests from the
  airlines. We recognize some names, Dick. Theyre
  al-Qaeda.
• Clarke How the f_ck did they get on board
  then?
• Watson Hey, dont shoot the messenger, friend.
  CIA forgot to tell us about them.

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Team Reflection
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Team Data on 1st Assessment
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(No Transcript)