Moral Responsibility

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Moral Responsibility

• From the point of view which makes
  responsibility dependent on control, this all
  seems absurd. How is it possible to be more or
  less culpable depending on whether a child gets
  into the path of ones car, or a bird into the
  path of ones bullet?
• Thomas Nagel, "Moral Luck,"
• in Mortal Questions (1979), p. 31.

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Intro to the Issue
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What Is Moral Responsibility?

• Moral Responsibility (MR) being responsible for
  something that has moral significance.
• 2 Kinds of MR
• Retroactive MR (e.g. you were morally responsible
  for teasing your sibling)
• Prospective MR (e.g. you are morally responsible
  for making sure your child is not neglected).
• Positive vs. Negative Evaluation
• Positive eval. (e.g. praise)
• Negative eval. (e.g. blame)

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Frankfurt on Alternate Possibilities

• Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) a
  person is morally responsible for what he has
  done only if he could have done otherwise.
• Frankfurt PAP is false.
• Counter-example same as icy road case except MR
  replaces FW

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So What Now?

• A Moral to Draw MR is more about control than
  alternate possibilities.
• But what kind of control?
• Q Can we really control our actions in a way
  that renders us morally responsible for them (at
  least sometimes to some degree)?

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Moral Luck
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Kants Conception of MR

• Ones will (intentions) are all that matter for
  MR
• Suppose you intend to save someone but fail
• Your good intentions are all that matter
• You shouldnt be praised or blamed for things
  that are beyond your direct control (beyond
  your will)

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The Control Principle (CP)

• CP people cannot accurately, appropriately,
  or correctly be morally assessed for what is not
  their fault, or for what is due to factors beyond
  their control (p. 25).
• a.k.a. the condition of control

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What Is Moral Luck?

• Moral Luck (ML) the phenomenon of factors
  beyond ones control making a difference in how
  we evaluate the moral status of that person or
  her action.
• Where a significant aspect of what someone does
  depends on factors beyond his control, yet we
  continue to treat him in that respect as an
  object of moral judgment, it can be called moral
  luck (p. 26).

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Consider 2 Cases

• The Fortunate Driver Omar is driving home while
  very drunk. He swerves such that if Kima were on
  the side of the road, he would have hit her.
  Kima wasnt in the road, though, so he didnt hit
  her.
• The Unfortunate Driver Omar is driving home
  while very drunk. He swerves such that he hits
  Kima, who is on the side of the road, and kills
  her.

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2 Kinds of Moral Luck

• Resultant Luck luck involved in the way one's
  actions and projects turn out. e.g. Drunk
  driver case.
• Constitutive Luck luck involved in what
  inclinations, capacities and temperament that
  one has. e.g. Conceit case.

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2 More Kinds of Moral Luck

• Circumstantial Luck luck involved in the kind
  of problems and situations one faces. e.g.
  Nazi case.
• Causal Luck luck involved in how one is
  determined by antecedent circumstances. e.g.
  problem of determinism.

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A Claim about Moral Luck

• Moral Luck Claim (MLC)
• there are cases of moral luck
• that is, our moral judgments of people are
  sometimes affected by factors beyond their
  control
• and were sometimes right to have our moral
  judgments affected by such factors.
• that is, such judgments are sometimes correct

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The Problem of Moral Luck

• CP MLC both seem true
• But they seem incompatible (cant both be true)
• CP says luck shouldntever matter
• MLC says it should (at least sometimes)

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Nagels Take on the Problem

• I believe that in a sense the problem has no
  solution (p. 37)
• The inclusion of consequences in the conception
  of what we have done is an acknowledgement that
  we are parts of the world, but the paradoxical
  character of moral luck which emerges from this
  acknowledgement shows that we are unable to
  operate with such a view, for it leaves us with
  no one to be.

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Agents Agency

• Agency the ability to control ones actions in
  a fairly direct way.
• Agent something with agency.
• Nagel There are two ways we tend to think of
  ourselves, two conceptions of agency

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Internal Conception of Agency (ICA)

• ICA the view of an agent
• as fundamentally different from other things,
• as a subject not a mere object,
• as a proper object of MR, and
• whose actions are not mere events.

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External Conception of Agency (ECA)

• ECA the view of an agent
• as fundamentally the same as other things,
• as a mere object, not so much a subject,
• as an improper object of MR, and
• whose actions are mere events.

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Nagels Take on the Problem (cont.)

• Once we see an aspect of what we or someone else
  does as something that happens, we lose our grip
  on the idea that it has been done and that we can
  judge the doer and not just the happening.
• The external view of agency forces itself on
  us at the same time that we resist it. One way
  this occurs is through the gradual erosion of
  what we do by the subtraction of what happens.
  (p. 38)

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Questions / Worries

• How can Nagel be content with this being an
  insoluble problem?
• Shouldnt we just reject or revise CP or MLC?
• Perhaps Nagel was being a bit hyperbolic in
  saying theres no solution
• He does only say theres no solution in a
  sense

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Conclusion?

• Like FW, we probably need to look for the proper
  conception of agents and the distinctive control
  they have over their own actions
• The problem of moral luck cannot be understood
  solved?! without an account of the internal
  conception of agency. I do not have such an
  account. (p. 38)