Payment amounts for prescribed assets - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

1 / 8
About This Presentation
Title:

Payment amounts for prescribed assets

Description:

Consumers ultimately pay all of these costs in prices and charges that cover: ... 53/05 is another example of the government's intention to shift risk to consumers. ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:18
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 9
Provided by: bordenladn
Category:

less

Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: Payment amounts for prescribed assets


1
Payment amounts for prescribed assets
  • Presentation to Ontario Energy Board
  • September 15, 2006

2
Summary
  • Prescribed assets are heritage assets
  • Essentially risk-free to operator
  • Support OEB staff proposal
  • Modified cost of service approach
  • Reg. 53/05 as starting point
  • Shareholder has established 5 percent return on
    equity
  • Need to consider role and appropriateness of
    incentives
  • Current incentives embedded in Reg. 53/05
  • Future incentives

3
Regulatory Framework
  • Position
  • Support the Modified Cost-of-Service (CoS)
    process recommended by Board Staff.
  • Examine possible role of incentives focused on
    efficiency improvements incentives should drive
    cost minimization.
  • Rationale
  • Provides continuity in pricing
  • Provides more than adequate returns to OPG
  • Based on procedures that are very familiar to the
    Board
  • Provides an initial set of data that can act as a
    reference point
  • Can be implemented relatively quickly and at
    reasonable cost
  • Can be amended to include incentives as deemed
    appropriate

4
Return to Capital
  • Position
  • ROE established in Reg. 53/05 (5 percent) more
    than adequate
  • Adopt model recommended by the ECSTF namely the
    Heritage Asset model described as Power provided
    from existing Government-owned assets which is
    sold to ratepayers at a price that reflects
    historical costs of the associated assets.
  • Rationale
  • Based on approaches used in B.C. and Quebec
  • In those provinces power at cost conveyed an
    advantage since cost of hydro less than
    replacement cost.
  • In Ontario the historical cost of the assets is
    considerably higher than their market value.

5
Return to Capital
  • Rationale (continued)
  • OEFC has inherited the responsibility for meeting
    the cost of these assets.
  • Consumers ultimately pay all of these costs in
    prices and charges that cover
  • Interest paid to OEFC by OPG and the Province
  • PILs paid by OPG, Hydro One and the LDCs to the
    OEFC
  • The Debt Reduction Charge
  • Dedicated income paid by the Province to the OEFC
  • Risks faced by the Province as owner of OPG are
    not comparable to commercial risk
  • The government has indicated that all costs of
    providing electricity will be covered by
    ratepayers and not by taxpayers and it has the
    authority to ensure this is the case e.g. the
    DRC, special charge for NUG assets
  • The creation of deferral and variance accounts
    under Section 5.(1) of Regulation 53/05 is
    another example of the governments intention to
    shift risk to consumers.

6
Rate Determination Process
  • Position
  • Regulation 53/05 establishes shareholder
    expectations about the basis for rates (5 percent
    ROE) and serves to protect the interests of
    consumers
  • Future rate adjustments should be based on
    appropriate benchmarking considering appropriate
    metrics, comparators and against non-prescribed
    and non-OPG assets
  • Rationale
  • Current prices were based on costs submitted by
    OPG and reviewed by the Ministries of Energy and
    Finance and by an outside advisor.
  • This cost base can provide a starting point and
    should be made available to interested parties
  • Costs should be presented by asset class defined
    in Regulation 53/05 with a separate allocation of
    common assets.

7
Incentives
  • Position
  • The use of incentive regulation should be a long
    term goal and should focus on improving
    operational efficiency incentives should drive
    cost minimization.
  • Rationale
  • The Board staff discussion paper points out that
    CoS regulation provides the perverse incentive to
    exaggerate costs.
  • Incentives should be designed to counteract this
    tendency by providing the applicant with a share
    in cost saving or by encouraging cost savings to
    avoid a reduction in ROE (or both).
  • Incentives designed to encourage increased
    revenues are generally unnecessary and those in
    place should be reviewed for effectiveness.
  • The Board should initially concentrate on the
    establishment of benchmarks and on the types of
    incentives that might be effective rather than on
    the correct formula to be used.

8
Questions
  • Adam White Larry Murphy
  • awhite_at_ampco.org l.jmurphy_at_cogeco.ca
  • 416-260-0225 905-639-7233
Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
About PowerShow.com