Transforming National Security

1
Transforming National Security
The Logic
The Dynamic
The Opportunity

• Vision Broad and Sustained Competitive
  Advantage
• Strategic Imperative
• Capabilities
• New Logic and Metrics
• Opportunities

Terry J. Pudas Acting Director, Force
Transformation 12 July, 2006
2
Transforming Defense
The Concept

• Elements of Transformation
• Continuing process
• Creating/anticipating the future
• Co-evolution of concepts, processes,
  organizations, and technology
• New competitive areas/competenciesrevalued
  attributes
• Fundamental shifts in underlying principles
• New sources of power
• Culture - attitudes, values, beliefs

3
Transforming Defense
Compelling Need

• New strategic context
• New Theory of War based on information age
  principles and phenomena
• New relationship between operations abroad and
  homeland security
• New concept/sense of security in the American
  citizen
• Broadened threat context
• State/Non-State
• Symmetric/Asymmetric
• Traditional/Unrestricted
• New technological threats facilitated by the
  falling barriers to competitive entry
• Immediate accessibility to highly capable low
  cost IT
• Opens key operational domains to competition
  space, sea, cyberspace

To the extent we do not transform, we are at risk
4
Transforming Defense
Elements of Strategy

• Transform from Industrial Age to the Information
  Age
• Implement Network Centric Operations
• Ensure sustained competitive advantage
• Assure Allies
• Dissuade competitive entry
• Underwrite deterrence
• Implement countervailing strategies
• Broaden the capabilities base
• Operational, Technical, Industrial
• Create new competitive areas
• Revalue competitive attributes for the
  information age
• Decrease capabilities cycle time
• Leverage advantages and opportunities
• Manage the devolution of sunset capabilities
  and processes

Achieve Speed and Agility vice Optimization
5
Global Trends
6
Globalization III
The Core
7
Shifting Strategic Imperatives
SecurityDefenseAll Else
Competency
Connectedness
Relevancy
SecurityDefense
8
Security Environment
Four Challenges
Catastrophic Those seeking to paralyze
Americanleadership power by employing WMDor
WMD-like effects in unwarned attackson symbolic,
critical or other high-valuetargets
Irregular Those seeking to erode
Americaninfluence and power by
employingunconventional or irregular methods
Traditional Those seeking to challenge American
power by instigating traditional military
operations with legacy and advanced military
capabilities
Disruptive Those seeking to usurp American
powerand influence by acquiring
breakthroughcapabilities
No hard boundaries distinguishing one category
from another
9
Disruptive Security Challenges
An Approach
Improve Responses to Disruptive Challenge with
more Force Flexibility
Narrow Range of Disruptive Challenge with
Improved Intelligence
10
Transformation Rate
Increasing Expenditure
Increasingly Persuasive
11
Transforming Defense
Characteristics of the Future Joint Force
This is the age of the small, the fast, and the
many. Small Power and size are
uncoupled Fast A shorter response with a
faster rise time more precisely placed in
time and space Many The power
of the collective at lower cost over a larger
area Rebalance for the information
age Demassification through increased
information fractions Networked components vice
integrated systems Operations based on assured
access, information superiority, control of
initial conditions and rates of change A priori
access to the domains of conflict Secure a
superior information position and convert it to a
competitive advantage Leverage the path
dependency of conflict Corporate change based on
co-evolution and continuous adaptive
acquisition
12
Top Level Issues
Culture Attitudes, Values, Beliefs
13
The Stabilization Mission Gap
Traditional Model
14
The Stabilization Mission Gap
New Challenges
SR Gap
Intensity
Nation Building Mission
Major Combat Mission
Duration
Planning For Combat
Short War
Fast Buildup
Long Term (Civilian Lead)
Few Forces Available For SR
15
The Stabilization Mission Gap
Transformed SR Capability
Intensity
Nation Building Mission
Major Combat Mission
SR Mission
Duration
Planning For Combat And SR
Short War
Fast Concurrent Buildup
Long Term (Civilian Lead)
Prompt SR Operations
16
Stability operations are a core U.S. military
missionThey shall be given priority comparable
to combat operationsand incorporated into all
phases of planning. DoD Directive 3000.05, 28
November, 2005
17
Informing Transformation
Transactions vs. Resources
T R A N S A C T I O N S
R E S O U R C E S
Anticipating Perfectly Predictable Surprises
t1
t2
t3
18
Global Trends and Implications

• Policy Choices
• Engagement Policy
• Substitution of Capital for Labor
• Civil Component of National Security
• Allied / International Component

19
The Collection Analysis Gap
Managing the Inevitable
Policy Choices

• Automate Triage
• Automate Analysis
• We all become analysts

20
Network Centric Warfare?
21
Network Centric Operations

Capstone Concept for Joint Operations
August 2005
2005

• A knowledge empowered force, capable of
  effective information sharing across all agencies
  and partners, will be able to make better
  decisions quicker, increasing joint force
  effectiveness.

We will conduct network-centric operations with
compatible information and communications
systems, usable data, and flexible operational
constructs.
22
Military Response to Information AgeNetwork
Centric Warfare

• Characterized by
• Information sharing
• Shared situational awareness
• Knowledge of commanders intent
• Warfighting Advantage - exploits behavioral
  change and new doctrine to enable
• Self-synchronization
• Speed of command
• Increased combat power

Translates an Information Advantage into a
decisive Warfighting Advantage
Information Advantage - enabled by the robust
networking of well informed geographically
dispersed forces
23
Competitive Advantage
New Sources of Power
Timeliness
Accuracy
Information Superiority
Relevance
We need a force which is designed and capable of
fighting first for information superiority.

24
Learning Rate
Information Richness

• Content
• Accuracy
• Timeliness
• Relevance

InformationReach
25
Competing in the Information-Age
The Power of Network-Centric
Operations
Social Domain Cultural Awareness
Cognitive Domain Cognitive Advantage Process
Advantage
Conveyed Commanders Intent
Plan, Organize, Deploy, Employ and Sustain Cycle
Compressed Operations
Shared Awareness
Network Centric Operations
Physical Domain Force Advantage Position
Advantage
Information Domain Information Advantage
Precision Force
Speed and Access
26
Shared Awareness
The new competitive advantage
Source New York Times Television The Perfect
War, 2004
27
Stryker Brigade Case Study
Scenario
Area of Focus

• SBCT attack on Shughart-Gordon
• Certification Exercise (CERTEX) at Joint
  Readiness Training Center, May 2003

Hypotheses
Findings

• Friendly Enemy casualty ratio decreased from
  101 to 11
• Increase in Individual/shared information
  quality from about 10 to 80
• Acceleration of speed of command from 24 to 3
  hours in key engagement
• Bottom line result allowed commander ability to
  control the speed of command

• Stryker Bde NCO capabilities provide
  significant information and decision
  superiority and increase force effectiveness
  and are a source of combat power

28
Identify Issues of Regret
Candidates for Action Now

• Warfare Elements
• Fire non-lethals, directed energy, redirected
  energy
• Maneuver seabasing, vertical battlefield, lift
  for operational maneuver
• Protection urban operations, biomedical
  countermeasures cycle time
• C2C joint interdependency vs. interoperability
• ISR demand-centered intelligence, tactically
  responsive space
• Logistics joint demand-centered logistics
• Risk Management (creating on-ramps)
• Joint concept development experimentation
  short cycle time / rapid iteration, concept-based
  / technology-enabled
• Joint training live / virtual / constructive /
  distributed
• People culture and organizations

29
Project Stiletto

• Distributed Adaptive Operations
• Mass effects without massing forces
• Influence actions broadly
• Exploit the network
• Create high transaction rates
• Self-organize decision-making
• Generate organic intelligence
• Adapt rapidly
• Execute either distributed or concentrated
  operations
• Create overmatching complexity

LOA 80-0 Beam 40-0 Tunnel Width (4)
5-0 Draft (static) 2-4 Displacement 67
MT Payload 15 MT Fuel Load 10
MT Classification ABS Main Engines 4 x
1650HP C-30 Caterpillars Surface Piercing
Propellers 4 Speed Max _at_
full load 50-55 knots Range _at_ full load max
speed 500 NM HP Required (total) 6200hp Clear
Height 15-0 Payloads 43 of Displacement
30
Project Stiletto
31
Operationally Responsive Space

• Warfighting Advantage Space tiered with
  Theater Systems
• Low Cost
• Tailored on Operational Needs
• Operational Experimentation
• UAV Components in Space
• Space/Terrestrial Horizontal Integration
• Tailored Payloads SIGINT, Imagery,
  Communication,

TacSat-1
Relevant Capability on Orbit within the Planning
Time Constraints of a Major Contingency
32
Re-Directed Energy
Concept Description

• Warfighting Advantage
• Decrease Engagement Timeline
• Reduce Collateral Damage
• Revalue LOS Only Lasers

33
Project Sheriff
Controlling the Engagement Timelines

• The Technology
• Compact Active-Denial Technology
• Phraselator High-Power Direction Hailer
• Vector-Beam High-Power White/IR Spot
  Light
• Counter Improvised Explosive Device
  (IED)
• Active Protection
• Counter Sniper
• Rapid-Fire Kinetic Weapon
• Multi-Spectral Sensor Suite
• Armor Protection
• Integrated Electronic Warfare Suite
• Net-Centric Technology

• The Capabilities
• Speed-of-light Sensing
• Networked
• Lethal/Non-Lethal Options
• Active/Passive Options
• Kinetic/Non-Kinetic Options
• Survivability

34
Full-Spectrum Effects Platform
Sheriffnon-lethal enablers of
lethal force
Lethal Force
Countermeasures
Gunslinger
MMBJ LRAD Laser Dazzler APS ADT
Sensing
Acoustic IR Radar (APS) Optics ELINT/ADT
Hailing Warning
LRAD / Phrasealator BWL Laser Dazzler ADT
Scalable Combat Effects

• Concurrent protection

• Avoiding irrevocable unintentional

• Precision categorization

• Discriminate before commit.

• Transformational fire and maneuver

35
Full-Spectrum Effects Platform

36
Strategic Approach to Cost
Key Elements

• Decrease operational costs
• Achieve better ROI for less
• Broaden the capabilities base
• Create and preserve future options
• Manage divestiture
• Transform non-discretionary areas
• Impose cost to adversary
• Develop counter-cost imposing strategies

New metrics create opportunities for new cost
dynamics
37
Technology Trends and Cycles
20-40 years
Primary Structural Materials
Propulsion
15-25 years
Weapons
8-15 years
3-8 years
Sensors
3-5 years
Stealth Concepts
1-3 years
Communications
1.5-2 years
IT Software

• Globally available technology
• Our technological advantage comes from speed
  of systemization

.5-1 year
IT Components
38
Alternative Architectures
Characteristics

• Focus in designing alternative architectures
• Low unit cost
• Modularity
• Numbers
• Speed
• Networking
• Sensing
• Innovative designs
• Mass Customization

System (Modules)
Integration
Platforms
39
Alternative Architectures
Characteristics

• Focus in designing alternative architectures
• Low unit cost
• Modularity
• Numbers
• Speed
• Networking
• Sensing
• Innovative designs
• Mass Customization

System (Modules)
Platforms
40
New Logic and Metrics

• Achieve higher learning rates
• Co-evolve concepts,
  capabilities and processes
• Continuous adaptive
  acquisition and experimentation
• Employ higher transaction rates
• Faster cycle times
• Speed of information and
  operational mobility
• Create and preserve options
  Technology on-ramps
• Broaden capabilities base
• Mass customization
• Create overmatching complexity
• Scalable
• The small the fast and the
  many

41
Transformation

• Down at the grange theyre teachin a new way of
  plowin Ya goin?

• Nope!
• I already dont plow as good as I know how ...

www.oft.osd.mil
42
BACK-UP
43
Effects-Based Operations
Network-Centric Warfare High Rates of
Change Closely Coupled Events Lock in/Out Speed
of Command Self Synchronization
Findings From Combat Land Maneuver
60 Attrition 10 Air Lack of Knowledge/SA
80 Surprise 80 Sea Lack of
Scouting 80 Surveillance 80
Whats Valued Maneuver Sensing Speed /
Endurance Numbers Risk Tolerance Staying Power
Cognitive Domain Cognitive Advantage Process
Advantage
Compressed Operations
Shared Awareness
Network Centric Operations
Physical Domain Force Advantage Position
Advantage
Information Domain Information Advantage
Precision Force
44
Change?
We dont need it. and We dont want it.
45
Aircraft Program Trends
XP-5Y
XFY
A-2D
F-8U
XC-120
F-6M
F-4D
U-2
Decreasing capabilities base
F-3H
XY-3
A-6
B-52
F-105
SR-71
Standard
A-3D
X-13
SC-4A
F-14
Broaden the base
X-3
C-133
X-21
S-8
S-2F
F-107
X-19
YA-9
X-2
B-58
C-141
A-10
F-117
F-10F
F-106
B-70
F-15
F-20
System (Modules)
F-2Y
F-5D
XC-142
F-18
X-29
YF-22
Platforms
Interfaces
UCAV
F-100
X-14
F-111
YF-17
T-46
YF-23
B-3??
B-57
C-140
A-7
B-1A
T-45
JSF
F-102
T-2
OV-10
YC-15
B-2
C-17
R-3Y1
F-4
X-22
YC-14
V-22
F-104
A-5
X-26B
AV-8B
A-4D
T-39
X-5A
F/A-18
Manage the risk
B-66
T-38
X-24
Increasing defense risk
Flexible
F-11F
AQ-1
C-130
X-15
F-101
F-5A
T-37
X-1B
2010s
2020s
1950s
1960s
1970s
1980s
1990s
2000s
Source / Rand Aviation Week Space Technology
000-2000/Lynch
46
Navy Program Trends
DDG 37
CV 63
CVN 65
SSN 671
AO 149
FFG 1
LSD 36
Decreasing capabilities base
SS 572
CG 26
AE 26
CGN 36
Broaden the base
SSN 575
AOE 1
AOR
AOT 168
Standard
MSO 519
DL 1
AFS 1
LPH 2
DD 963
SS 576
SSK 1
FF 1052
SSN 593
SSN 685
CG 47
LST 1171
DD 927
CGN 35
SSN 594
LHA 1
LSD 41
SSG 574
SS 204
AS 33
SSN 597
SSN 688
SSN 719
AOE 6
SSG 577
DE 1006
SSBN 640
SSBN 608
PHM 1
MCM 1
MHC 51
LPD 17
System (Modules)
Platforms
Interfaces
SSN 578
AO 143
LPD 4
CG 16
CGN 38
AO 187
PC 1
SSN 774
AE 23
AGSS 569
PG 84
CGN 25
FFG 7
SSN 751
SSN 21
SS 580
CV 59
AGDE-1
AS 31
AS 39
LHD 1
SSN 585
SSN 571
SSN 637
FF 1037
AO 177
DDG 51
SSRN-586
MSO 508
AD 37
LPD 1
DDG 993
CGN 9
MSO 421
PGH-2
SSAG 555
SSBN 726
Manage the risk
CVN 68
Increasing defense risk
SSBN 598
AE 21
CV 67
PGH 1
Flexible
SSGN 587
DD 931
AS 36
PG 92
DDG 2
SSBN 616
LCC 19
LST 1156
SSBN 627
LST 1179
MSO 422
FF 1040
2010s
2020s
2000s
1970s
1980s
1990s
1950s
1960s
Based on date first ship in class was launched
47
Key Barriers to Transformation
Challenges

• Cultural barriers
• Speed of understanding vs speed of doctrine
• Values, attitudes and beliefs
• Physical barriers
• Speed of mass (lift and mobility)
• Speed of information (connectivity
  interoperability)
• Fiscal barriers
• Willingness and ability to devalue and
  devolve
• Strategic approach to cost
• Process barriers
• Transformation of the management of defense

48
Changing the Force and its Culture
Through Sharing of New Knowledge
Harnessing Education to Create
A Culture that is supportive of innovation and
experimentation New collaborative Relationships
among DoD Educational Institutions The most
Critical Component of Our Security Capabilities
(Our People and Future Senior Leaders) New
Knowledge that can catalyze and accelerate
transformation A Learning Organization capable
of adapting and changing The Future by Developing
Leaders Capable of Doing So.
Changing culture and behavior, while neither
quick nor foolproof, can produce dramatic returns
49
Changing the Force and its Culture
Education for Transformation Initiative

• Transformation Chairs Program
• Diffusion of emerging knowledge at DoD Schools
• An Open Network Inclusive of Allies
• Transformation Research Program (TRP)
• Creation of new knowledge
• Transformation Short Courses Executive Type
  Education
• Network Centric Operations
• Innovation Experimentation
• Others TBD

50
Transforming Defense
Corporate Strategy

• Part I Continuous small steps
• Sustaining
• Evolutionary changes
• Stay on the local maximum
• Part II Many medium jumps
• Explore and expand the local region
• New doctrine / organization / systems
• Part III A few big bets
• Could change DoD
• Change the world
• Create a new game with new rules

• If you are not making any big bets you are a
  fixed strategic target and at risk.

51
Global Spread of SARS
...The Impact of Reduced
Transparency
Apr. 14th WHO The WHO team in Beijing fails
to secure permission to visit military hospitals.
Jul. 5th WHO HQ WHO announces that the
global SARS outbreak has been contained.
Mar. 17th WHO HQ China provides a first
brief report to WHO about the Guandong outbreak.
The outbreak is said to have tapered off.
Feb. 23rd China A team of WHO experts,
including CDC staff, arrive in Beijing but are
given limited access to information (at the
central level only) and Chinese authorities deny
WHOs repeated requests for permission to travel
to Guandong Province.
Number of Countries with SARS Outbreak
Jan. 23rd Guandong Province Guandong
provincial health authorities produce report on
outbreak detailing nature of transmission,
clinical features, and suggested. preventative
measures which is circulated to hospitals in the
province but not shared with WHO or Hong Kong.
Mid-December WHO Headquarters, Geneva - WHO
requests further info. on the influenza
outbreak. Chinese gov. says influenza activity
is normal and no unusual strains of the virus
detected by surv. system.
Feb. 11th- WHO / Guandong Province Chinese
Ministry of Health officials and Guandong health
officials report to WHO a total of 305 cases and
5 deaths of acute respiratory syndrome, however,
they were getting 40-50 cases a day, yet said
outbreaks had stopped.
SARS becomes global and spreads to 5 countries in
24 hrs, Feb. 24th-25th
Nov. 16th First known case of SARS occurs in
Guandong Province, China, but is not identified
as SARS until much later
SARS Outbreaks
SARS Becomes a Global Outbreak
May.
Apr.
Mar.
Feb.
Jan.
Dec.
Nov.
52
New Logic and Metrics
Competency

• Access
• The ability to use military assets, both
  information and physical, at the best points of
  effect in hard-to-reach locations even when
  denial strategies are employed by the enemy
• Speed
• Minimization of response time from deliberate
  operational (or strategic) maneuver to stunning
  tactical swiftness
• Distribution
• The extent to which firepower, sensors, and
  other systems are spread over a diverse and
  geographically dispersed set of assets/platforms
• Sensing
• The ability to provide information with
  accuracy, timeliness and relevance, and
  especially to locate and track fleeting targets
• Mobility
• The ease and promptness by which military assets
  can be shifted from one physical location to
  another and
• Networking
• The extent to which military assets are
  connected together through information technology
  that assures shared awareness and information
  access.

53
Western Iraq Case Study
Key Findings to Date

• Western Iraq was the most networked theater of
  operations, operationally and tactically, in the
  history of warfare.
• Largest conventional coalition SOF operation in
  the history of warfare.
• Largest scale use of tactical data-links in
  history of warfare.
• Only area of operation in Iraq where Blue Force
  Tracking information on SOF conventional ground
  forces was provided via data link to fixed wing
  combat aircraft.
• Zero Fratricide Only area of operations in Iraq
  where air-to-ground fratricide was eliminated

54
New Design Principles

• Capabilities are decoupled from platform
• Power and survivability have been decoupled
  from size
• Information has been substituted for mass
• Mass customization delivers greater value than
  mass production
• Networked components outperform integrated
  systems

55
Technology
Opportunities and Payoff
Increased
Composites Materials
Speed Survivability Sea keeping Payload
fraction Dispersion Shared awareness Lethality Tac
tical stability
Innovative designs
Networking
Information for mass
Distributed capabilities
Decreased
Life cycle cost Procurement cost Vulnerability Man
ning Structural mass Infrastructure
Proximate netted sensors
Directed and redirected energy
Robotics
56
Transforming Defense
General Observations

• The Emerging American Military
• More expeditionary (including lighter, more
  lethal)
• More networked (more interoperability at the JTF
  level)
• Designed to leverage the exterior positions
  (precision from distance as sensors move in)
• Leverages increasingly persistent ISR
• Tighter sensor-shooter timelines (sensing, C2,
  fly-out)
• Values Information Superiority (information
  operations)
• Expanded unmanned capabilities (UAV, UCAV, UUV,
  robotics)

57
The Nelson Touch
New Means NCW Robustly networked force improves
info sharing. Info sharing enhances quality of
info and situational awareness. Shared SA enables
collaboration and self-synchronization, and
enhances sustainability and speed of
command. These in turn increase
mission-effectiveness.
England expects every man to do his duty.
58
Effects-Based Operations

• A way of thinking or a methodology for planning,
  executing and assessing operations designed to
  attain specific effects that are required to
  achieve desired national security outcomes.
• A set of actions directed at shaping the behavior
  of friends, neutrals and foes in peace, crisis,
  and war.
• Includes all elements of national power. (Full
  spectrum operations)
• Targets the cognitive domain--the essential moral
  and mental forces that are so hard to calculate.
  
• A means to empower subordinates and flatten
  organizations.

59
Operational Art

• An open systems approach to planning
• Napoleon
• Maneuver Warfare
• Center of Gravity, Critical Capability, Critical
  Vulnerability
• Operation Desert Storm
• Complex, Irregular Warfare
• A systemic view provides sound operational logic
  and the basis for creative operational art.
• Commanders intent, a purpose for every task, and
  mission tactics provide framework for
  opportunistic, decentralized action.
• The alternative is attrition warfare.

60
Stiletto
61
The Power of Purpose

• The art of war is simple enough. Find out where
  your enemy is. Get at him as soon as you can.
  Strike him as hard as you can and keep moving.
• I shall take no backwards steps
• When in doubt fight.

62
Why Effects-Based Operations?

• The nature of war is unchanging
• Violent struggle between hostile, independent and
  competitive wills.
• Open systems that are complex, interactive,
  non-linear and dynamic.
• The cognitive domain, the mind and will of the
  warfighter, is more important than the physical
  domain.
• The character of war has changed dramatically
• New security environment, sources of power
  battle space
• New means, network centric operations, that focus
  knowledge, speed, agility and overmatching
  complexity to degrade enemys ability to make
  decisions.
• The requirement and opportunity to more closely
  couple actions to the cognitive domain.

63
Effects-Based Operations
EBO is primarily about focusing knowledge,
precision, speed and agility on the enemy
decision makers to degrade their ability to take
coherent action rather than conducting combat
operations on more efficient destruction of the
enemy.
It is the creation of a psychological or
cognitive effect that is the primary focus of the
effects-based approach.
Military Transformation A Strategic Approach
64
Risk, Uncertainty and Friction

• EBO is not an engineering problem, targeting
  problem, or centralized approach to command and
  control.
• EBO, enabled by network-centric warfare, is a
  method to deal with risk, uncertainty, friction
  and the fog of war.

Many of the latest military theories and
doctrines assume tacitly or explicitly that the
wars of the future will be waged with perfect or
nearly perfect information and intelligence
(information dominance).This vision is a
chimera because it implies that friction in war
will be greatly reduced if not eliminated.
Michael Handel
65
Purposes of Planning
1. Predicting the future 2. Preparing for the
unforeseen

Time and Complexity
In armed conflict no success is possibleor even
conceivablewhich is not grounded in an ability
to tolerate uncertainty, cope with it, and make
use of it. Martin Van Creveld
Uncertainty
66
Transforming National Security
War is more than combat and Combat is more than
shooting
67
Transforming National Security
The Logic
The Dynamic
The Opportunity

• Vision Broad and Sustained Competitive
  Advantage
• Strategic Imperative
• Capabilities
• New Logic and Metrics
• Opportunities

Terry J. Pudas Acting Director, Force
Transformation 27 February, 2006
68
Capabilities-Based Planning
Threat
Technology
Strategic Context
Compelling Need
Irregular
Catastrophic
Security Challenges
Security Challenges
Experimentation
Real World Operations
Disruptive
Traditional
Organization
People
Technology
Processes
69
Technology Trends and Cycles
New Opportunities
Primary Structural Materials
Propulsion
Weapons
Sensors
Stealth Concepts
3-5 years
Communications
1-3 years
IT Software
1.5-2 years

• Historical Opportunity
• Time and Cost Compression

IT Components
.5-1 year
70
The Challenge

• Greater logistics agility which enables greater
  operational agility
• Support combat units with the same degree
  of quality
• Increase options available to the
  operational commander
• Greater logistics network survivability
• Withstand greater ranges of failures of
  communications and security nodes
• Better support for the full range of military
  operations
• Support non-combat missions with a higher
  degree of effectiveness, e.g., Peacekeeping,
  Foreign Consequence Management, Natural
  Disasters, etc.

71
Transforming National Security
A Future Worth Creating

• Vision Broad and Sustained Competitive
  Advantage
• Strategy
• Capabilities
• Cost/Metrics

Terry J. Pudas Acting Director, Force
Transformation 14 March, 2006
72
Operationally Responsive Space
TACSAT 1

• Responsive
• lt 2 Yr concept to on-orbit capability
• Low Cost
• Total cost of experiment less than 15M
• including launch
• Experiment
• UAV Components in Space
• Space/Air Horizontal Integration
• Designer Payloads
• TCP/IP Based SIPR Net Accessed
• New commercial launch vehicle
• Operationally relevant capability
• Integrated into Combatant Commanders
• Exercises/Experiments
• Time / Capability Trade Off

Falcon
A capability on orbit within the planning time
constraints of a major contingency
73
Capabilities Balance
Competent and Relevant
Winning / Maintaining the Peace All Sources of
Power
InterventionDecisive Operations LandLittoralsL
ow Altitude
Strategic AdvantageThe Commons High Seas Air
AboveSpaceCyberspace
Winning the Battle / Combat Combat Power
74
High Speed at Sea?
75
The Advance to Baghdad

• Rate of Advance outruns logistics Communications
• 2. Logisticians shift to push system use
  models, Sitreps, to sense supply needs
• 3. Tactical Units shift to cross supply to fill
  gaps

76
Approaches to Logistics
Mass-Based
Sense and Respond
Just-in-Time

• More is better
• Mountains of stuff measured in days of supply
• Uses massive inventory to hedge against
  uncertainty in demand and supply
• Mass begets mass and slows everything down
• Prime Metric Days of supply

• On-time is better
• Inventory is reduced to a minimum and kept moving
• Uses precise demand prediction and static
  optimization to purge uncertainty
• Works great except when it doesnt
• Prime Metric Flow Time

• Agile is better
• Inventory is dynamically positioned throughout
• Uses transportation flexibility and robust IT to
  handle uncertainty
• Initial SR models look promising
• Prime Metric Speed Quality of Effects

77
Non-Lethal and Directed Energy
(CNN) Law enforcement officers were
questioning a Parsippany, New Jersey, man who
they say may have pointed a laser beam at an
airborne police helicopter Friday night and a
Cessna aircraft two nights before, said a
spokesman for the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey. 12/31/04
MAHE, Seychelles (AP) The crew of a cruise
ship attacked by pirates off the coast of Somalia
used a sonic weapon to help ward off the
attackers, the Miami-based Seabourn Cruise Line
said Monday. 11/8/05
More than 400 incidents involving the dangerous
practice of shinning laser light into aircraft
have been reported since 1990, U.S. Department of
Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta said at a
January 2005 press conference in Oklahoma City.
1/5/06
78
Ability to Adapt
Learning rate
Empowered Self-Synchronization
Planned Synchronization
Execution
Lost combat power
Time
79
Transforming Defense

• The Role of Defense in National Security
• The Management of Defense
• The Force

As National Strategy As Corporate Strategy As
Risk Management Strategy
Vision Broad and Sustained Competitive Advantage
80
Strategic Balance
Broad Direction

• More than responsive and punitive
  preventative
• More than stopping something keeping
  the world system up and running
• More than the big one the whole
  spectrum of military competition
• Homeland security defense in depth
• Increasing globalization and national security
  transaction rates compel increased
  internationalization and civilianization of
  defense
• National Security is more than defense

81
National Strategy for Pandemic
National Security Council Strategy Document
82
Potential Impact of a Viral Outbreak
An Infected Chinese Medical Professor checks into
hotel Super-spreader
Over 8,000 people infected, 774 killed
First outbreak of SARS in Guangdong Province,
China
SARS Spreads to Taiwan, Singapore, Canada,
Ireland, and Germany
Operation Iraqi Freedom
China acknowledges SARS outbreak
SARS Outbreaks
SARS Becomes a Global Outbreak
24 Hours
87 days
6 Months
SARS Spreads to 5 Different Countries
of SARS Outbreaks and Silence from the Chinese
Government
SARS Spreads to 29 different Countries
(Jul 5 SARS outbreak ends contained)
(Feb. 24,25)
83
Network-Centric Warfare
Its all about information access and speed. .
. . . . not information management
84
Within the next 10 years, some adversaries will
likely have the ability to use long-range
precision strike weapons such as ballistic and
cruise missiles to deny our use of fixed
military infrastructure, such as ports,
airfields, and logistical sites.
30
25
20
15
Percent of Resondants
10
5
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Unsure
Strongly Agree
Thomas G. Mahnken and James FitzSimonds, Officer
Attitudes Toward Innovation, Naval War College,
2002
2000
85
Within the next 10 years, some adversaries will
likely have the ability to use long-range
precision strike weapons such as ballistic and
cruise missiles to deny our use of fixed
military infrastructure, such as ports,
airfields, and logistical sites.
30
25
20
15
Percent of Resondants
10
5
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree
Unsure
Strongly Agree
The Limits of Transformation Officer Attitudes
toward the RMA, Tom Mahnken and James
Fitzsimmons NWC, 2003
2002
2000
86
Security System Balance?
Major
Movements
Strategic Posture/Balance Forces forward Deploy
from home Allies Operational
Maneuver From forward garrison
From the sea From strategic distances Deter
Forward Dissuasion force Sustaining
force Constabulary/Nation-building force
87
Transforming Defense
2nd derivative force
Intensity
ASSURE, DISUADE, DETER
RESTORE
DEFEAT
Duration
88
Operational Maneuver
From the sea
89
Trends in Security Competition
90
Global TrendsThreats
Strategic
Response

• Strategic Capabilities
• More preventative - less punitive
• Achieve unambiguous warning earlier
• More Special Operations like characteristics
• Operate with speed
• An intel / surveillance-based force
• Interoperability/interdependence
• Coping with Systems Perturbations

Information Age
Globalization III
Globalization II
Industrial Age
Super-Empowered Individual
91
Transforming Defense

• Networked Forces
• Outfight
• Non-Networked Forces

it allowed us to make decisions and execute
those decisions faster than any opponent.

Lt. Gen. David D. McKiernan

Coalition Forces Land Component

Commander, OIF
23 April 03
92
Co-Evolution of Capability
93
(No Transcript)
94
Trends in Transformation
95
Trends in Transformation
96
The Stabilization Mission Gap
Transformed SR Capability
Department of Defense DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 3000.05 November 28, 2005
SUBJECT Military Support for Stability,
Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR)
Operations

• 1. PURPOSE
• This Directive
• 1.1. Provides guidance on stability
  operations that will evolve over time as joint
  operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons
  learned develop. Future DoD policy will address
  these areas and provide guidance on the security,
  transition, and reconstruction operations
  components of SSTR operations and DoDs role in
  each.
• 2. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE
• This Directive applies to the Office of the
  secretary of Defense, the Military Departments,
  the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
  Combatant commands, the Office of the Inspector
  General of the Department of Defense, the Defense
  Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other
  organizational entities in the Department of
  Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as
  the DoD Components).
• 3. DEFINITION
• 3.1. Stability Operations. Military and
  civilian activities conducted across the spectrum
  from peace to conflict to establish or maintain
  order in States and regions.
• POLICY
• It is DoD policy that
• 4.1. Stability operations are a core U.S.
  military mission that the Department of Defense
  shall be prepared to conduct and support. They
  shall be given priority comparable to combat
  operations and be explicitly addressed and
  integrated across all DoD activities including
  doctrine, organizations, training, education,
  exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel,
  facilities, and planning.