Worst-case%20Equilibria%20Elias%20Koutsoupias%20and%20Christos%20Papadimitriou - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Worst-case%20Equilibria%20Elias%20Koutsoupias%20and%20Christos%20Papadimitriou

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very selfish and spontaneous behavior, No one is thinking to achieve ... Both contribute to social cost only if they collide: qi qk 1 t(i,k) Upper bound proof ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Worst-case%20Equilibria%20Elias%20Koutsoupias%20and%20Christos%20Papadimitriou


1
Worst-case Equilibria Elias Koutsoupias and
Christos Papadimitriou
Tight Bounds for Worst-case Equilibria Artur
Czumaj and Berthold Vocking
  • Presenter Yishay Mansour

2
Outline
  • Motivation
  • Model
  • Unit speed links
  • Weighted speed links

3
Motivation
  • Internet users
  • very selfish and spontaneous behavior,
  • No one is thinking to achieve the social
    optimum.
  • Game theory as an analysis tool
  • rational behavior and Nash Equilibrium.
  • Nash equilibrium
  • no optimization of overall system performance.
  • design mechanisms that encourage behaviors close
    to the social optimum.

4
Motivation
  • Nash Equilibrium versus global optimum
  • Many cases best Nash Equilibrium is global
    (social) optimal
  • Worse case analysis
  • Compare worse Nash to optimum
  • How bad can things get

5
Current Work
  • Coordination ratio - the ratio between
  • the worst possible Nash equilibrium and
  • social (global) optimum
  • This works
  • Very simple network model.
  • Derive upper and lower bounds.
  • Evaluate the price due to lack of coordination.

6
Model
  • Simple routing model
  • Two nodes
  • m parallel links with speeds si
  • n jobs/connection weights wj
  • Load model
  • The delay of a connection is proportional to load
    on link

7
Cost Measure
  • Each job selects a link
  • Jobs(j) jobs assigned to link j
  • Cost of jobs assigned to link j
  • Lj ?j in Jobs(i) wj /sj
  • Total cost of a configuration
  • Maxj Lj
  • Social optimum
  • Min Maxj Lj

8
Nash Equilibria
  • Each job i assigns a probability p(i,j) to link j
  • Support(i) j p(i,j) gt 0
  • Deterministic one p(i,j) 1 other p(i,j)0
  • Expected link j load
  • ELj ?i p(i,j) wi / sj
  • Job i view of link j
  • Cost(i,j) wi /sj ?k?i p(k,j) wk / sj ELj
    (1-p(i,j))wi
  • Cost after job i moves to link j

9
Nash Equilibria
  • For every job i
  • Min_cost(i) MINj cost(i,j)
  • For every link j
  • IF cost(i,j) gt min_cost(i) THEN p(i,j)0

10
Example
  • Two links, unit speed
  • s1 s2 1
  • Social optimum is hard
  • Problem is NP-complete
  • Partition
  • Two trivial lower bounds
  • Max weight job wmax MAXi wi
  • Average over machines ?i wi /m

11
Example I
  • Deterministic Example
  • 2 jobs of weight 2
  • 2 jobs of weight one
  • Optimum 3
  • Nash 4
  • Coordination ratio ? 4/3

12
Example
  • Stochastic Example
  • 2 jobs of weight 2
  • Optimum 2
  • Nash
  • P(i,j) ½
  • Expected Cost 3
  • Coordination ratio ? 3/2

13
Upper bound Deterministic
  • Load L1 and L2 L1 gt L2
  • Difference at most wmax L1 L2 v ? wmax
  • Nash_Cost L1
  • IF L2 gt v/2 THEN
  • OPT_cost ? L2 v/2
  • Nash cost L2 v
  • Coordination ratio ? 3/2
  • Otherwise
  • opt_cost ? wmax L1 ? (3/2 )wmax
  • Coordination ratio ? 3/2

14
Upper Bound Stochastic
  • Contribution probability qi of job i
  • Probability that it is in the unique max load
    link (assume tie breaker)
  • Cost ?i qi wi
  • Collision probability t(i,k) of jobs i and k
  • Probability they select the same link
  • Both contribute to social cost only if they
    collide
  • qi qk ? 1t(i,k)

15
Upper bound proof
  • Lemma ?i?k t(i,k) wk min_cost(i) wi
  • Claim
  • Theorem The coordination ratio for two unit
    speed links is 3/2

16
Unit speed many links DET.
  • Lmax MAX Lj Lmin MIN Lj
  • Lmax Lmin ? wmax
  • IF Lmin ? wmax THEN
  • OPT cost ? wmax Lmax ?2 wmax
  • OTHERWISE
  • OPT cost ? Lmin Lmax ? 2 Lmin
  • Coordination ratio ? 2

17
Unit speed many links STOCH.
  • Lower bound
  • m links m jobs
  • p(i,j) 1/m
  • m balls in to m buckets.
  • Probability of k balls approx. 1/ kk
  • Need probability of 1/m
  • Max load ?( log m / log log m)

18
Unit speed many links STOCH.
  • Upper bound
  • Nash load ? 2 OPT
  • Large deviation bound.
  • bound a by log m / log log m

19
Multiple speeds
  • Each link i has speed si
  • Assume s1 ... sm

20
Multiple speeds Lower bound
  • Let K log m /log log m
  • K1 groups of links
  • Nj links in group j
  • Nk ?m
  • Nj (j1) Nj1
  • N0 K! ?m
  • Group k has speed 2k
  • Assignment
  • Each Link in group k has k jobs of weight 2k

21
Multiple speeds Lower bound
  • Configuration load K
  • OPT load lt 2
  • System in Nash
  • Lower bound for deterministic NASH

22
Multiple speeds Upper bound
  • c MAX ELj
  • LEMMA

23
Multiple speeds Upper bound
  • C E MAXLj
  • LEMMA

24
Expected Load I
  • Let Jk r if the least index link with load
  • less than kOPT is r1
  • Every link j ? Jk has load at least kOPT
  • Link Jk1 has load less than kOPT
  • Let c ?(c-OPT)/OPT?
  • Target show that J1 gt c!
  • Since J1 ? m then a log m /log log m bound.

25
Expected Load I
  • Claim EL1 ? c OPT
  • Proof By contradiction
  • consider the most loaded link
  • Any job J from it can move to link 1
  • Its running time of link 1 is at most OPT
  • Job J improves its load.
  • Corollary Jc ? 1

26
Expected Load I
  • Lemma Jk ? (k1) Jk1
  • Proof T are jobs in links 1 to Jk1
  • Claim OPT can not allocate job from T to link
    rgtJk
  • Jobs in T observe load at least (k1)OPT
  • Link Jk1 has load less than kOPT.
  • No job from T wants to move to link Jk1u
  • Minimum weight in T at least suOPT
  • On any link rgtu any job from T will run more than
    OPT

27
Expected Load I
  • Claim IF OPT allocates jobs from T to links 1 to
    Jk
  • THEN Jk ? (k1) Jk1
  • W sum of weights of jobs in T
  • W ? ?j sj ELj ? (k1) OPT ?j ?J(k1) sj
  • Since OPT allocate jobs in T in links 1 to Jk
  • W ? OPT ?j ?J(k) sj
  • ?j ?J(k) sj ? (k1)?j ?J(k1) sj
  • Since link speeds are decreasing claim follows.

28
Expected Load II
  • cO( log (s1 / sm) )
  • CLAIM for 1 ? k? c-3
  • Corollary sm ? 2-(c-5)/2 s1
  • Or c ? 2 log (s1 /sm) O(1)

29
Proof
  • OPT schedule some job i
  • Nash in j in 1 .. Jk2
  • cost(i,j) ? (k2)OPT
  • OPT in j in Jk21 , ... m
  • wi ? SJ(k2)1OPT
  • cost(i,Jk1) ? kOPT wi/ sJ(k)1
  • Nash implies
  • cost(i,j) ? cost(i,Jk1)

30
Expected Maximum Load
  • Large deviation result
  • Each link near its expectation.
  • Separates small and large jobs
  • Large jobs contribution proportional to weight.
  • Small jobs use Hoeffding relative bound.
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