Title: Title Slide
1Title Slide
EVOLVING CRITERIA FOR INFORMATION SECURITY
PRODUCTS Ravi Sandhu George Mason
University Fairfax, Virginia USA
2SECURITY OBJECTIVES
SECRECY (CONFIDENTIALITY)
AVAILABILITY (DENIAL OF SERVICE)
INTEGRITY
3SECURITY TECHNIQUES
- Prevention access control
- Detection auditing
- Tolerance practicality
good prevention and detection both require good
authentication as a foundation
4SECURITY TRADEOFFS
SECURITY
COST
FUNCTIONALITY
EASE OF USE
5ACHIEVING SECURITY
- Policy what?
- Mechanism how?
- Assurance how well?
6EVALUATION CRITERIA
SECURITY TARGET
Policy Assurance
PRODUCT
Mechanism
??
7CRITERIA DATES
USAORANGE BOOK
3.0
1.0
2.0
Canadian CTCPEC
UK, Germany
France
1.0
1.2
European Community ITSEC
1.0
US Federal Criteria
Common Criteria
8CRITERIA RELATIONSHIPS
9DRIVING FACTORS
INTERNATIONAL COMPUTER MARKET TRENDS
COMPATIBILITY WITH EXISTING CRITERIA
COMMON CRITERIA PRODUCT EVALUATION
SYSTEM SECURITY CHALLENGES OF THE 90'S
MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF EVALUATIONS
10ORANGE BOOK
USA ORANGE BOOK
UK
Germany
France
Canada
European Community ITSEC
Federal Criteria DRAFT
Common Criteria PROPOSED
11ORANGE BOOK CLASSES
HIGH SECURITY
- A1 Verified Design
- B3 Security Domains
- B2 Structured Protection
- B1 Labeled Security Protection
- C2 Controlled Access Protection
- C1 Discretionary Security Protection
- D Minimal Protection
NO SECURITY
12ORANGE BOOK CLASSESUNOFFICIAL VIEW
- C1, C2 Simple enhancement of existing systems.
No breakage of applications - B1 Relatively simple enhancement of existing
systems. Will break some applications. - B2 Relatively major enhancement of existing
systems. Will break many applications. - B3 Failed A1
- A1 Top down design and implementation of a new
system from scratch
13ORANGE BOOK CRITERIA
SECURITY POLICY ACCOUNTABILITY ASSURANCE DOCUMENTA
TION
14SECURITY POLICY
- C1 C2 B1 B2 B3 A1
- Discretionary Access Control
- Object Reuse
- Labels
- Label Integrity
- Exportation of Labeled Information
- Labeling Human-Readable Output
- Mandatory Access Control
- Subject Sensitivity Labels
- Device Labels
15ACCOUNTABILITY
- C1 C2 B1 B2 B3 A1
- Identification and Authentication
- Audit
- Trusted Path
16ASSURANCE
- C1 C2 B1 B2 B3 A1
- System Architecture
- System Integrity
- Security Testing
- Design Specification and Verification
- Covert Channel Analysis
- Trusted Facility Management
- Configuration Management
- Trusted Recovery
- Trusted Distribution
17DOCUMENTATION
- C1 C2 B1 B2 B3 A1
- Security Features User's Guide
- Trusted Facility Manual
- Test Documentation
- DesignDocumentation
18ORANGE BOOK CRITICISMS
- Does not address integrity or availability
- Combines policy and assurance in a single linear
rating scale - Mixes policy and mechanism
- Mixes policy and assurance
19POLICY VS ASSURANCE
20EUROPEAN ITSEC
USA ORANGE BOOK
UK
Germany
France
Canada
European Community ITSEC
Federal Criteria DRAFT
Common Criteria PROPOSED
21POLICY ASSURANCE UNBUNDLING
22POLICY IN ITSEC
- Open ended
- Orange Book classes are grand-fathered in
- Some new classes are identified
23ORANGE BOOK POLICYGRAND-FATHERING
- ITSEC ORANGE BOOK
- F-C1 C1
- F-C2 C2
- F-B1 B1
- F-B2 B2
- F-B3 B3
24ITSEC NEW POLICIES
- ITSEC OBJECTIVE
- F-IN High Integrity Requirements
- F-AV High Availability Requirements
- F-DI High Data Integrity during Data Exchange
- F-DC High Data Confidentiality during Data
Exchange - F-DX Networks with High Confidentiality and
Integrity
others can be defined as needed
25ASSURANCE EFFECTIVENESS
- CONSTRUCTION
- Suitability Analysis
- Binding Analysis
- Strength of Mechanism Analysis
- List of Known Vulnerabilities in Construction
- OPERATION
- Ease of Use Analysis
- List of Known Vulnerabilities in Operational Use
26ASSURANCE CORRECTNESS
- ITSEC ORANGE BOOK (very roughly)
- E0 D
- E1 C1
- E2 C2
- E3 B1
- E4 B2
- E5 B3
- E6 A1
27US DRAFT FEDERAL CRITERIA
USA ORANGE BOOK
UK
Germany
France
Canada
European Community ITSEC
Federal Criteria DRAFT
Common Criteria PROPOSED
28INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL CRITERIA
29ITSEC EVALUATION
SECURITY TARGET
Policy Assurance
PRODUCT
Mechanism
??
30FEDERAL CRITERIA EVALUATION
Policy Assurance
PROTECTION PROFILE
SECURITY TARGET
??
Policy Assurance
Customer Supplied
PRODUCT
Mechanism
??
Vendor Supplied
31PROTECTION PROFILE STRUCTURE
PROTECTION PROFILE
Descriptive Elements Section
Product Rationale Section
Functional Requirements Section
Development Assurance Requirements Section
Evaluation Assurance Requirements Section
32FROM PROFILE TO PRODUCT
33TOWARDS A COMMON CRITERIA
USA ORANGE BOOK
UK
Germany
France
Canada
Federal Criteria DRAFT
European Community ITSEC
Common Criteria PROPOSED
34COMMON CRITERIA PLAN
ITSEC 1.2
Usage Reviews
1994 initial target 1996 more likely
EC-NA Alignment ----- Common Criteria
Canada CTCPEC 3.0
CC Editorial Board
Usage Reviews
Orange Book Usage
FedCrit 1.0
Joint Technical Groups
ISO SC27 WG3
Public Comment
35CHALLENGES THAT REMAIN
- Complexities of the open distributed computing
and management environments (including use of
crypto in conjunction with COMPUSEC) - Systems and composability Problems
- Trusted applications development and evaluation
methods, including high integrity and high
availability systems - Guidance on using IT security capabilities cost
effectively in commercial environments - Speedy but meaningful product and system
evaluations, and evaluation rating maintenance