Liberalism

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Liberalism Neo-Liberalism

• Liberalism O, S, T, I
• Critique of Realism
• Liberal Institutionalism Neo-Liberal
  Institutionalism
• Resolution of Cooperation Problem Game Theory

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Liberalism (O)

• Economic Liberalism (Smith, Ricardo)
• Political Liberalism (Locke)
• Perpetual Peace (Kant, Wilson)
• New critique of realism interwar era critique
  (idealism), warfare unnecessary and outmoded way
  of settling disputes

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John Locke (1632-1704)

• Two Treaties of Government (1690)
• Political theory which would reconcile liberty of
  citizen with political order
• Against Hobbes, societies emerge from a state of
  nature as a result of a contract made among
  individuals to submit themselves to a rule
• Right to life, liberty and property

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Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)

• Enlightenment moralist
• Critique of Pure Reason (1781,1787)
• Addresses relationship between practical
  political behavior and morality

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Critique of Pure Reason

• Reminder Hobbes Machiavelli pay no attention
  to moral qualities of sovereign
• Kant acknowledges amorality and self-interest of
  politics (political prudence)
• But moral guiding must form a part of political
  action

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Kants Perpetual Peace

• Call for universal peace among nations as an
  end-goal and rational idea, instead of
  considering warfare as a given fact
• Deterministic argument inexorable recognition
  of a commitment to a universal rational moral
  duty will lead to cosmopolitan world federation
  and permanent peace rational moral progress

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Reminder Realism

• States are rational actors who use power to
  maximize own short-term interests
• Context anarchic system which lacks central
  authority inherent insecurity
• Power capabilities (mainly military) as leverages
  in bargaining over outcomes

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A Contemporary Liberal Critique of Realist
Assumptions

• Not full anarchy, evolution of order through
  norms and institutions
• States are not unitary actors with coherent
  preferences internal bargaining non-state
  actors
• Rationality implies not to resort to war (costly)
  but to forgo short-term individual interests for
  long-term collective benefits

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Critique of Realist Assumptions

• Alternative definition of Anarchy
• Alternative definition of Rationality
• Alternative definition of Power (not power over
  others but power to accomplish mutual benefits)

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Liberalism (S)

• Individual as primary unit of analysis
• Liberty of the individual (freedom)
• Economic interdependence leads to peace
• Primary objective improve human welfare mutual
  benefit assumption
• Focus free trade, democracy (democratic peace)

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Liberalism (T)

• International system is hierarchic
• Actors will cooperate for common good -
  cooperation is possible

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Liberalism (I)

• International Institutions foster cooperation
  resolve free rider problem
• Rules and norms exist that govern behavior

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Different Trends

• Liberal institutionalism
• Neo-liberal institutionalism

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Liberal Institutionalism

• Focus on Institutions and new actors (NGOs, IGOs,
  transnational corporations)
• Focus on new patterns of interaction (economic
  interdependence, integration)

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Neo-Liberal Institutionalism

• Focus on initiation and maintenance of
  cooperation under conditions of anarchy
• 1980s new liberal school with basic assumptions
  close to neo-realism (states as unitary actors
  rationally pursuing self-interest in anarchic
  world) but rational states cooperate because in
  their interest to do so Keohane, Oye, Young
  etc..

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Neo-Liberal Institutionalism

• Cooperation is essential in a world of economic
  interdependence, and shared economic interests
  create a demand for international institutions
  and rules.
• R. Keohane, After Hegemony, Cooperation Discord
  in the World Political Economy, 1984

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Neo-Liberal Assumptions

• Institutions are mediators and means to achieve
  cooperation
• Multilateralism needed to secure national
  interests and absolute gains in competitive
• and anarchic IS
• Free trade and democracy as part of foreign
  policy
• States achieve superior type of rationality, i.e
  with long-term self-interest

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Cooperation under Anarchy

• Cooperation among egotists (Oye)
• Cooperation problem cheating or non-compliance
• What strategies can states adopt to foster the
  emergence of cooperation?

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Cooperation under Anarchy

• Benefits of mutual cooperation (CC) relative to
  mutual defection (DD) benefits of unilateral
  defection (DC) relative to unilateral cooperation
  (CD)
• For mutual benefits to exist, actors must prefer
  unilateral defection (DC) to unilateral
  cooperation (CD).
• Cooperation desirable but not automatic

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Neo-Liberals the Resolution of Cooperation
Problems

• Strategic interaction
• Game theory
• Political relationships are Positive-Sum (vs.
  realists Zero-Sum games)

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Zero-Sum Game
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Positive-Sum Game

• (Prisoners Dilemma)

Prisoner C
Prisoner R
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Strategic Interaction

• Explanatory factors
• Payoff structure
• Shadow of the future
• Number of players

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Strategic Interaction

• Payoff structure mutual conflicting
  preferences in a round of play (payoff matrix)
• Shadow of the future repeated interaction in
  future (iterated games), not just single-play
  games expectation of future interaction

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India Pakistans Arms Race

• (Prisoners Dilemma)

Pakistan
India
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Strategies to Impact on Payoff Structures

• Subject to change through unilateral, bilateral
  and multilateral strategies
• Possible bilateral strategy issue-linkage
  (combine dissimilar games)

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Collaboration Problems

• Equilibrium outcomes are suboptimal defection is
  dominant strategy (e.g, prisoners dilemma)
• Cooperation unlikely in single-play
• Need to monitor and increase shadow of the
  future if prisoner expects to be placed in
  similar situation in future, prospects for
  cooperation are increased

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Reciprocity as Solution to Anarchy

• Expectation of continued interaction iterated
  environment (Oye, 1986)
• Lengthening shadow of future
• Decompose interactions over time (Schelling,
  1963 Axelrod, 1984)
• Issue-Linkage cooperation on one issue
  contingent on cooperation in a separate future
  issue

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Tit-for-Tat

• Conditional Cooperation Tit-for-Tat (Axelrod,
  1984)
• Strict reciprocity after initial cooperative move
  in repeated PD game

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Problems w/ N-Person Games

• Increased actors, increased complexity
• Rising transaction and information costs
• Failure of conditional cooperation (works best in
  2 person-game)
• Cooperation is more difficult
• Increased likelihood of autonomous defection

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The Numbers Problem

• Significant asymmetry of interests among multiple
  states
• Smaller states have strong incentive to free-ride
  since public goods will be provided by larger
  states (Olson, 1965)

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Solutions to N-Person Games

• Reduce number of actors common interests
• Collective enforcement mechanisms
• Strategies of institutionalization and
  decomposition (link to hegemonic stability theory
  regime creation) next weeks course