Poor People, Local Governments and Conflict

1
Poor People, Local Governments and Conflict

• By. James S. Wunsch

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The Issue Managing and Resolving Contention
Over

• Resource management and access
• Public goods and services
• Principal-agent relationships
• Frictional conflict
• Fears of exclusion

3
Poor People, Local Governments and Conflict
Case Studies

• I. Natural resources in drought prone N.E.
  Nigeria (Yoba State)
• II. Primary education in rural Chad
• III. Primary education in Uganda (Jinja)
• IV. Ethnic conflict in Mali
• V. Lessons of experience

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I. Natural Resources in Drought Prone N.E.
Nigeria

• A. Issues
• Allocating and sustaining water (resource
  conflict)
• Compensation for crops damaged by livestock
  (frictional conflict)
• B. Solutions community-based rules of access,
  timing and compensation
• C. Outcomes excellent, except for damages
  caused by non-local herdsman

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NRM in Nigeria (cont) D.
Insights

• Use of local time and place information
• Rules are readily accepted by community (social
  capital, abounded problem)
• Rules established through historical community
  institutions (historic social/political
  infrastructure, social capital)
• Rules are self-enforced (interdependence and
  obligation, social capital)

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NRM in Nigeria (cont) D.
Insights (part 2)

• Local autonomy (ability to learn and act)
• Live with consequences (incentives to learn and
  act)
• Local accountability
• Rules not effective with outsiders (need for
  multiple levels of governance

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II. Primary Education in Rural Chad

• A. Issues
• Provision of education (collective good
  provision)
• Supervision of school (principal-agent issues)
• Managing M.E., problems beyond local capacity
  (IGR)
• B. Solutions
• Establish local councils
• Community-wide taxation
• Local councils supervise teachers and budgets
• Establish linkages with neighboring communities
  ignore M.E.
• C. Outcomes
• Effective schools at costs localities can bear

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Primary Ed in Chad (cont)D.
Insights

• Defined local demand (boundaries)
• Historical social capital and political
  infrastructure establish councils, collect taxes,
  link with neighborhoods
• Local time and place information to set taxes and
  fees

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Primary Ed in Chad (cont)D. Insights

• Taxes paid willingly (social capital,
  independence and obligation)
• Local dwellers may act and bear results of
  actions (autonomy, incentive to learn)
• Close supervision of teachers and schools (short
  feedback loops, social capital, bear consequences
  of actions)
• Accountability of local councils to local people

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III. Primary Education in Uganda in Post-UPE Era
(Jinja)

• A. Issues
• National government cannot fund or supervise UPE
  (capacity)
• M.E ties eliminated funding and supervision
  (PTAs) (frictional conflict)
• Provision of education (collective good)
• Managing teachers and schools (principal-agent
  relations)
• B. Solutions
• All levels accept others existence, negotiate
  roles
• P-A issues handled by community-level governance
  PTAs
• Fees collected, allocated by PTAs
• Formal LGs supervise PTAs to avoid abuses, assure
  equity

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Primary Education in Uganda (cont)

• C. Outcomes
• Improved education across Jinja
• D. Insights
• PTAs local accountability and social capital
  enhances ability to
• Raise resources
• Supervise teachers and school budgets
• Negotiate with formal governments
• PTAs functional specialization enhances
  effectiveness (clear boundaries)

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Primary Education in Uganda (cont)

• D. Insights (cont)
• New, cross-ethnic communities develop around
  shared problem (interdependence, social capital,
  autonomy, bear consequences of actions)
• Formal local governments improve PTA (performance
  nested and multiple levels of governance)
• Out of muddle of competing jurisdictions comes
  improved service delivery (nested and multiple
  levels of governance)

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IV. Ethnic Conflict in Mali

• A. Issues
• Fears of exclusion and suppression by Taureg
  (ethnic exclusion and subordination)
• B. Solutions
• Negotiate with Taureg
• Under Malian law and constitutions establish
  local autonomy
• C. Insights
• End of the ethnic insurgency, continued integrity
  of Malian state

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Ethnic Conflict in Mali (cont)

• D. Insights
• Conflict caused by over-centralized state (fears
  of ethnic exclusion and subordination
• Need new institutional structure
• Importance of effective state to negotiate and
  implement resolution (multiple levels of
  governance rule of law)
• Capacity of Taureg leaders to negotiate with
  state, implement solution (social capital,
  traditional political infrastructures, multiple
  levels of governance)

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V. Lessons of Experience Effective Local
Governance and Conflict Resolution for Poor People

• Local social capital and historic/traditional
  political infrastructure exist
• Boundaries of problem and L.G. are congruent
• L.G. has autonomy to act
• L.G. is locally accountable
• Interdependence exists among L.G. residents

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Lessons of Experience Effective Local
Governance and Conflict Resolution for Poor People

• L.G. residents bear consequences of L.G. actions
• Local time and place information is used
• L.G. is nested in other effective governance
  institutions
• State provides security, law and order through
  rule of law