BOMB IN A BOX

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BOMB IN A BOX

• Shipping Containers and International Security
• Dr. Edward M. Ifft

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Why Shipping Containers?

• Containers now essential to global trade and
  increasing rapidly
• Many millions in useperhaps 10,000,000 enter the
  U.S. each year. About 90-95 of world trade moves
  via containers
• Containers are efficient and inexpensive, though
  theft and smuggling have always been a problem
• 2 sizes20-foot (1 teu) and 40-foot
• Container ships can carry 8,000 teularger ships
  planned

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Logistics

• Key U.S. portsNY/NJ, LA/LB, SEA/TAC
• Largest European portsRotterdam, Hamburg,
  Antwerp
• Other major portsHong Kong, Singapore
• Containers arrive/leave by train, truck, barge
• Rotterdam31,000 ocean vessels, 133,000 inland
  vessels per year
• 50 of world container trade handled by 10
  operatorsnone U.S.business very competitive

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The Threat

• Containers are both large and strong
• 2 major terrorist scenarios
• -- Container itself as a weapon to attack
  portpopulation/industrial center/oil storage
• --Container as a vehicle to deliver weapons
  or weapons components to be used later
• Consider also bulk cargo/cars/LNG
• The Trojan Horse of the 21st Century?

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Vulnerabilities

• Cost to NYC from 9/11perhaps 90 billion
• Cost of West Coast port strike10 days/5 billion
• Brookings estimate of cost of closing all major
  U.S. ports after attack--1 trillion
• Major implications for entire global trade
  system, not just the port attacked
• Small inspected
• Many containers are under control of a single
  truck driver for long periods

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Technical Issues

• Single container could hold 30,000 kg of
  conventional explosivesprobably detectable
• CWpossible, but need large volumeperhaps
  detectable plenty of chemicals already here
• BWhopeless to detect and no reason to use
  container anyway small quantities lethal
• Nuclear weapon or weapon components or RDD (Dirty
  Bomb)

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Detection of Special Nuclear Materials

• Strongly dependent upon type and amount of
  material present, tamper, shielding, distance to
  detector, integration time, background, etc.
• Spontaneous fissions/kg/min
• U-235 18
• U-238 420
• Pu-239 600
• Pu-240 280,000,000

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Passive Detectors

• Passive neutron and gamma detectors might see Pu
  weapon, probably not HEU weapon
• Dirty bomb materials tend to be quite active and
  should be easier to detect
• Do not confuse what can be done in the lab with
  what will work on the dock!
• There will be false positives (ceramics)

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Other Detectors

• X-rays can detect dense materials, such as
  fissile material or shieldingalso gamma
  radiography
• IR detectors can detect heat
• Active detector methods, such as using 14-Mev
  neutrons, can activate HEU, but have health and
  safety issues
• Swipes and air samplersuseful for conventional
  explosives, chemicals or stowaways, but not very
  practical on a large scale
• We need a simple, reliable detector that can be
  mounted on a crane

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What is Inspection?

• Confusion on terminologysuggest we use three
  terms
• --Screenexamine documentation and
  sealsidentify high-risk shipments
• --Scan -use passive or active detectors
  from outside the container
• --Openphysically open container and
  examine contents

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ResponsesU.S.

• Container Security Initiative (CSI)
• Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
• Automated Manifest System (AMS)
• Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
  (C-TPAT)
• Megaport Initiative (DOE)
• Operation Safe Commerce

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Responses--International

• No one organization in charge of entire transport
  chain
• G-8call for common standards, etc.
• International Maritime Organization (IMO), London
• UN agency for improving maritime safety and
  cooperation expanded SOLAS International Ship
  and Port Security Code (ISPS)only applies to
  vessels over 500 gross tons only U.S. serious
  about enforcement?

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Responses--International

• Clever EU response to mad cow disease and hoof
  and mouth diseaseIDEA (Identification
  Electronique des Animaux)
• --Installed small boluses (RFIDs) in 1,000,000
  ruminants (cows, sheep, goats, buffaloes)
• --Big successunique identifier, reliable, read
  whether animal is still or moving, survives
  slaughter
• --An option now in the EU on small ruminants,
  required in 2008

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Responses--International

• World Customs Organization (WCO), Brussels--
• Independent intergovernmental body
• Framework of Standards to Secure and
  Facilitate Global Tradedraft prepared by
  high-level groupnow out for comments by industry
• International Organization for Standards (ISO),
  Genevanon-governmental body could help with
  seals, etc.

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Recommendations

• Must recognize this is risk management, not 100
  elimination of risk
• Solution must be international, not just U.S.
• Must have level playing field for industry
• Must not delay commerce too much or add great
  expense
• Collateral benefits reduced theft and smuggling,
  increase in taxes collected

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Recommendations

• Establish layered defense
• Standardize documentation and sealsunderstand
  that this is useless if documentation is false
• Try to develop smart containers
• Use passive nuclear scanners on all entering
  containers
• Use X-ray or other active devices in suspicious
  cases
• In highest risk cases, open the container

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