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802'11 Denial of Service Attacks

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Title: 802'11 Denial of Service Attacks


1
802.11 Denial of Service Attacks
  • Bianca McNair
  • Duane Fairfax

2
References
  • Stallings, William (2002). Wireless
    Communications and Networks. New Jersey
    Prentice-Hall.
  • http//csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/
  • http//ramp.ucsd.edu/bellardo/pubs/usenix-sec03-8
    0211dos-html/aio.html

3
Introduction
  • What is a wireless LAN (WLAN)?
  • IEEE 802.11 based wireless access networks
    experienced widespread deployment
  • Economical alternative
  • Approximately 5.28 million American households
    equipped with wireless networks
  • Popularity of wireless networks makes it an
    attractive target for potential attackers

4
Agenda
  • Background
  • Architecture
  • Media Access Controls (MAC) layer
  • Components
  • Services
  • Functions
  • Physical Layer (PHY)
  • Versions
  • Benefits
  • Disadvantages
  • Security flaws
  • Confidentiality
  • Availability
  • Vulnerabilities
  • Identity
  • Media Access Controls (MAC)
  • Attack Infrastructure
  • Denial of Service Attacks (DoS)
  • Deauthentication Attack
  • Virtual Carrier-Sense Attack
  • Countermeasures
  • Conclusion

5
Section I
  • IEEE 802.11 Standard Protocol

6
IEEE 802.11 Foundation
  • IEEE networking standards
  • Adopted 802 in 1990
  • Adopted 802.11 in 1997
  • ALOHANET
  • University of Hawaii researchers created first
    wireless network
  • 1-2 Mbps data transmission rate
  • 802.11 standard revisions
  • 802.11a
  • 802.11b
  • 802.11g

7
Architecture MAC Layer
8
MAC Layer Components (1)
  • STA (Station)
  • Consists of a MAC and a PHY
  • Referred to as network adaptor, network
    interface card
  • BSS (Basic Service Set)
  • Basic building block of an IEEE 802.11 LAN.
  • A set of STAs that communicate with one another.
  • A group of STAs under the direct control of a
    single coordination function.

9
MAC Layer Components (2)
  • Independent BSS (IBSS)
  • The most basic type of a IEEE 802.11 LAN.
  • Each STA can communicate DIRECTLY with any
    others.
  • Often used for temporary internetworked
    communications, without the aid of an
    infrastructure.
  • Official name of ad-hoc network.

10
MAC Layer Components (3)
  • Infrastructure BSS (BSS)
  • Communications are through AP STA1 ? AP ? STA2
  • AP (Access Point)
  • A special STA to forward communications

11
MAC Layer Components (4)
  • DS (Distribution System)
  • The abstract medium for APs in different BSSs to
    communicate.
  • Can be wired, wireless network, or even not a
    network.
  • Portal
  • Used to integrate with other kind of IEEE 802
    LANs.
  • A logical point, at which traffic enter from
    other LANs into 802.11 DS.
  • ESS (Extended Service Set)
  • A set of infrastructure BSSs to extend mobility
    range.
  • APs communicate among themselves to forward
    traffic from one BSS to another, via DS.

12
MAC Layer Services (1)
  • Station Services
  • Authentication
  • Open System Authentication Figure 1
  • Shared Key authentication Figure 2
  • Deauthentication
  • Privacy
  • MAC Services Data Unit (MSDU) delivery

13
MAC Layer Services (2)
  • Distribution System Services
  • Association, Disassociation
  • Distribution( route to 802.11)
  • Integration( route to 802.x)
  • Reassociation( hand-off, roaming)

14
802.11 Portal
15
Architecture Overview
16
MAC Layer Frames
  • Management frame
  • Station association and disassociation with AP
  • Timing and synchronization
  • Authentication and deauthentication
  • Control frame
  • To end contention-free period (CFP)
  • Handshaking during the contention period (CP)
  • ACK during CP
  • Data frame
  • Data frame (in both CFP and CP)
  • Combined with polling and ACK during CFP

17
MAC Layer Frame Format
18
MAC Layer Functions
  • MAC layer covers three functional areas
  • Reliable data delivery
  • Frame Exchange Protocol
  • Access control
  • Distributed Coordination Function (DCF)
  • Point Coordination Function (PCF)
  • Security
  • Wired Equivalency Protection (WEP)

19
Reliable Data Delivery
  • Frame exchange protocol (2 frames)
  • Source station transmits data
  • Destination responds with acknowledgment (ACK)
  • If source doesnt receive ACK, it retransmits
    frame
  • Four frame exchange
  • Source issues request to send (RTS)
  • Destination responds with clear to send (CTS)
  • Source transmits data
  • Destination responds with ACK

20
Access Control DCF (1)
  • Priority Access to the wireless medium through
    three Inter-Frame Space (IFS) intervals
  • Short IFS (SIFS)
  • Shortest IFS
  • Used for immediate response actions (ACK, CTS,
    Poll Response)
  • Point coordination function IFS (PIFS)
  • Midlength IFS
  • Used by centralized controller in PCF scheme when
    using polls
  • Distributed coordination function IFS (DIFS)
  • Longest IFS
  • Used as minimum delay of asynchronous frames
    contending for access

21
Access Control DCF (2)
  • DCFs responsibility
  • Support asynchronous data transfer
  • Support contention services
  • CSMA/CA
  • Physical carrier sensing
  • Virtual carrier sensing
  • By sending medium reservation through RTS and CTS
    frames
  • Duration field in these frames
  • An NAV (Network Allocation Vector)

22
Access Control DCF (3)
Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision
Avoidance (CSMA-CA)
23
Access Control DCF (4)
  • Backoff Time Random a SlotTime

Contention Window
24
DCF MAC Frame Exchange (1)
25
DCF MAC Frame Exchange (2)
26
Architecture Physical Layer
  • Physical Layer
  • Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS)
  • Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS)
  • Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM)
  • Infrared (IR)

27
Access Control
2.4 GHz OFDM Up to 54 Mbps
802.11 g
28
802.11 Current Versions (1)
  • 802.11a
  • Developed in 1999
  • Work in the 5GHz band supporting 54Mbps
  • PHY OFDM
  • 802.11b
  • Developed in 1999
  • Operates in 2.4-2.48 GHZ band supporting 11Mbps
  • PHY DSSS
  • 802.11g
  • Still in draft
  • Operates in 2.4 GHZ band and supports 54Mbps
  • Backwards compatible with 802.11b

29
802.11 Current Versions (2)
  • Advantages
  • User mobility
  • Rapid Installation
  • Flexibility
  • Scalability
  • Disadvantages
  • User Authentication
  • Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks

30
IEEE 802.1X
  • Advantages
  • User based identification
  • Extensible authentication protocol (EAP) support
  • Allow additional authentication methods
  • Password authentication

31
SECTION II
  • Vulnerabilities and Practical Solutions

32
802.11 Security Issues
  • WEP
  • Runs on RSA RC4 algorithm
  • Ensures no eavesdropping
  • Authenticate client and not users
  • 802.1x standard
  • User based identification
  • Extensible authentication protocol (EAP) support
  • Allow additional authentication methods
  • Password authentication

33
Vulnerabilities
  • Vulnerabilities result from additional
    functionality
  • Identity
  • Deauthentication
  • Disassociation
  • Power Saving
  • MAC
  • Channel monopolization
  • Network Allocation Vector (NAV)

34
Vulnerabilities Identity (1)
  • Deauthentication messages from client/AP are not
    authenticated
  • Attacker can spoof the message
  • AP/client will exit authenticated state
  • Persistent exploitation can deny services
    indefinitely

35
Vulnerabilities Identity Fig. 1
36
Vulnerabilities Identity (2)
  • Association message determine the AP that will be
    used by client
  • Disassociation messages are similar to
    deauthentication
  • The disassociation attack is less efficient than
    deauthentication attack

37
Vulnerabilities Identity (3)
  • Power conservation functions present
    vulnerabilities
  • Clients are allowed to enter a sleep state
  • Client polls AP occasionally
  • Rely on time synchronization
  • Adversary options
  • Can spoof polling message on behalf of client
  • Can spoof the traffic identification map (TIM)
  • Cause client to enter an indefinite sleep period

38
Vulnerabilities MAC
  • Physical and virtual carrier sense can be
    exploited
  • Attacker can monopolize channel through SIFS
  • Attacker can assert a large duration field
  • Advantages of using RTS frame
  • Propagate attack through other nodes
  • Anonymity

39
Attack Infrastructure
  • Software implementation attacks
  • Firmware limits use of NICs by attacker
  • Overcome NIC limitations by reconfiguring
    hardware
  • Choice Microsystems example

40
Attack Infrastructure Fig. 1
41
Deauthentication Attack (1)
  • Demonstration Application Swat
  • Consist of iPAQ H3600 Pocket PC
  • Running Familiar Linux
  • DLink DWL-650 PCMCIA
  • Monitors wireless channels for AP and clients
  • Identify potential targets by MAC addresses
  • Issue spoofed deauthentication after association
    response

42
Deauthentication Attack (2)
  • Testbed
  • 802.11 network with 7 computers (1-attacker,
    1-access point, 1-monitoring station,
    4-legitimate clients
  • Conditions
  • Large ftp transfer through AP
  • Transfer exceeded testing period
  • Mounted two network attacks

43
Deauthentication Attack Fig. 1
44
Deauthentication Attack (3)
  • Countermeasure
  • Delaying effects of deauthentication and
    disassociation requests
  • Advantage
  • Implemented with simple firmware modification
  • Drawbacks
  • Vulnerable while roaming between APs

45
Deauthentication Attack Fig. 2
46
Access Point Roaming (1)
  • Intelligent APs
  • Explicit means of coordination for handoff avoid
    disassociation timeout
  • Use proprietary protocols between homogeneous
    devices

47
Access Point Roaming (2)
  • Dumb APs
  • No explicit means of coordination
  • Rely on layer 2 for coordinating handoff

48
Virtual Carrier-Sense Attack (1)
  • Exploits NAV Vulnerability
  • Packet streams with large duration values
  • Exploiting RTS/CTS feature
  • Much harder to defend than the deauthentication
    attack

49
Virtual Carrier-Sense Attack Fig. 1
50
Virtual Carrier-Sense Attacks (2)
  • Testbed 1 AP, 18 static client nodes, 1 static
    attacker node
  • Conditions FTP used to generate long- lived
    network traffic modified ns 802.11 MAC Layer
    implementation to allow arbitrary duration values

51
Virtual Carrier-Sense AttacksFig. 1
52
Virtual Carrier-Sense Attacks (3)
  • Countermeasures
  • Limit placed on duration value accepted by nodes
    (ie. large durations truncated to maximum value)
  • Further improvement would require abandonment of
    802.11 MAC functionality (ie. Frame types
    duration values)

53
Virtual Carrier-Sense Attacks Fig. 2
54
Conclusion
  • 802.11 MAC Layer Vulnerabilities can be exploited
    to deny service to legitimate users
  • Low overhead procedures (short-term)
  • Per-packet authentication (long-term)

55
???? Questions ????
56
MAC Layer Services Fig. 1
57
MAC Layer Services Fig. 2
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