Title: 802'11 Denial of Service Attacks
1802.11 Denial of Service Attacks
- Bianca McNair
- Duane Fairfax
2References
- Stallings, William (2002). Wireless
Communications and Networks. New Jersey
Prentice-Hall. - http//csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/
- http//ramp.ucsd.edu/bellardo/pubs/usenix-sec03-8
0211dos-html/aio.html
3Introduction
- What is a wireless LAN (WLAN)?
- IEEE 802.11 based wireless access networks
experienced widespread deployment - Economical alternative
- Approximately 5.28 million American households
equipped with wireless networks - Popularity of wireless networks makes it an
attractive target for potential attackers
4Agenda
- Background
- Architecture
- Media Access Controls (MAC) layer
- Components
- Services
- Functions
- Physical Layer (PHY)
- Versions
- Benefits
- Disadvantages
- Security flaws
- Confidentiality
- Availability
- Vulnerabilities
- Identity
- Media Access Controls (MAC)
- Attack Infrastructure
- Denial of Service Attacks (DoS)
- Deauthentication Attack
- Virtual Carrier-Sense Attack
- Countermeasures
- Conclusion
5Section I
- IEEE 802.11 Standard Protocol
6IEEE 802.11 Foundation
- IEEE networking standards
- Adopted 802 in 1990
- Adopted 802.11 in 1997
- ALOHANET
- University of Hawaii researchers created first
wireless network - 1-2 Mbps data transmission rate
- 802.11 standard revisions
- 802.11a
- 802.11b
- 802.11g
7Architecture MAC Layer
8MAC Layer Components (1)
- STA (Station)
- Consists of a MAC and a PHY
- Referred to as network adaptor, network
interface card - BSS (Basic Service Set)
- Basic building block of an IEEE 802.11 LAN.
- A set of STAs that communicate with one another.
- A group of STAs under the direct control of a
single coordination function.
9MAC Layer Components (2)
- Independent BSS (IBSS)
- The most basic type of a IEEE 802.11 LAN.
- Each STA can communicate DIRECTLY with any
others. - Often used for temporary internetworked
communications, without the aid of an
infrastructure. - Official name of ad-hoc network.
10MAC Layer Components (3)
- Infrastructure BSS (BSS)
- Communications are through AP STA1 ? AP ? STA2
- AP (Access Point)
- A special STA to forward communications
11MAC Layer Components (4)
- DS (Distribution System)
- The abstract medium for APs in different BSSs to
communicate. - Can be wired, wireless network, or even not a
network. - Portal
- Used to integrate with other kind of IEEE 802
LANs. - A logical point, at which traffic enter from
other LANs into 802.11 DS. - ESS (Extended Service Set)
- A set of infrastructure BSSs to extend mobility
range. - APs communicate among themselves to forward
traffic from one BSS to another, via DS.
12MAC Layer Services (1)
- Station Services
- Authentication
- Open System Authentication Figure 1
- Shared Key authentication Figure 2
- Deauthentication
- Privacy
- MAC Services Data Unit (MSDU) delivery
13MAC Layer Services (2)
- Distribution System Services
- Association, Disassociation
- Distribution( route to 802.11)
- Integration( route to 802.x)
- Reassociation( hand-off, roaming)
14802.11 Portal
15Architecture Overview
16MAC Layer Frames
- Management frame
- Station association and disassociation with AP
- Timing and synchronization
- Authentication and deauthentication
- Control frame
- To end contention-free period (CFP)
- Handshaking during the contention period (CP)
- ACK during CP
- Data frame
- Data frame (in both CFP and CP)
- Combined with polling and ACK during CFP
17MAC Layer Frame Format
18MAC Layer Functions
- MAC layer covers three functional areas
- Reliable data delivery
- Frame Exchange Protocol
- Access control
- Distributed Coordination Function (DCF)
- Point Coordination Function (PCF)
- Security
- Wired Equivalency Protection (WEP)
19Reliable Data Delivery
- Frame exchange protocol (2 frames)
- Source station transmits data
- Destination responds with acknowledgment (ACK)
- If source doesnt receive ACK, it retransmits
frame - Four frame exchange
- Source issues request to send (RTS)
- Destination responds with clear to send (CTS)
- Source transmits data
- Destination responds with ACK
20Access Control DCF (1)
- Priority Access to the wireless medium through
three Inter-Frame Space (IFS) intervals - Short IFS (SIFS)
- Shortest IFS
- Used for immediate response actions (ACK, CTS,
Poll Response) - Point coordination function IFS (PIFS)
- Midlength IFS
- Used by centralized controller in PCF scheme when
using polls - Distributed coordination function IFS (DIFS)
- Longest IFS
- Used as minimum delay of asynchronous frames
contending for access
21Access Control DCF (2)
- DCFs responsibility
- Support asynchronous data transfer
- Support contention services
- CSMA/CA
- Physical carrier sensing
- Virtual carrier sensing
- By sending medium reservation through RTS and CTS
frames - Duration field in these frames
- An NAV (Network Allocation Vector)
22Access Control DCF (3)
Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision
Avoidance (CSMA-CA)
23Access Control DCF (4)
- Backoff Time Random a SlotTime
Contention Window
24DCF MAC Frame Exchange (1)
25DCF MAC Frame Exchange (2)
26Architecture Physical Layer
- Physical Layer
- Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS)
- Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS)
- Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM)
- Infrared (IR)
27Access Control
2.4 GHz OFDM Up to 54 Mbps
802.11 g
28802.11 Current Versions (1)
- 802.11a
- Developed in 1999
- Work in the 5GHz band supporting 54Mbps
- PHY OFDM
- 802.11b
- Developed in 1999
- Operates in 2.4-2.48 GHZ band supporting 11Mbps
- PHY DSSS
- 802.11g
- Still in draft
- Operates in 2.4 GHZ band and supports 54Mbps
- Backwards compatible with 802.11b
29802.11 Current Versions (2)
- Advantages
- User mobility
- Rapid Installation
- Flexibility
- Scalability
- Disadvantages
- User Authentication
- Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks
30IEEE 802.1X
- Advantages
- User based identification
- Extensible authentication protocol (EAP) support
- Allow additional authentication methods
- Password authentication
31SECTION II
- Vulnerabilities and Practical Solutions
32802.11 Security Issues
- WEP
- Runs on RSA RC4 algorithm
- Ensures no eavesdropping
- Authenticate client and not users
- 802.1x standard
- User based identification
- Extensible authentication protocol (EAP) support
- Allow additional authentication methods
- Password authentication
33Vulnerabilities
- Vulnerabilities result from additional
functionality - Identity
- Deauthentication
- Disassociation
- Power Saving
- MAC
- Channel monopolization
- Network Allocation Vector (NAV)
34Vulnerabilities Identity (1)
- Deauthentication messages from client/AP are not
authenticated - Attacker can spoof the message
- AP/client will exit authenticated state
- Persistent exploitation can deny services
indefinitely
35Vulnerabilities Identity Fig. 1
36Vulnerabilities Identity (2)
- Association message determine the AP that will be
used by client - Disassociation messages are similar to
deauthentication - The disassociation attack is less efficient than
deauthentication attack
37Vulnerabilities Identity (3)
- Power conservation functions present
vulnerabilities - Clients are allowed to enter a sleep state
- Client polls AP occasionally
- Rely on time synchronization
- Adversary options
- Can spoof polling message on behalf of client
- Can spoof the traffic identification map (TIM)
- Cause client to enter an indefinite sleep period
38Vulnerabilities MAC
- Physical and virtual carrier sense can be
exploited - Attacker can monopolize channel through SIFS
- Attacker can assert a large duration field
- Advantages of using RTS frame
- Propagate attack through other nodes
- Anonymity
39Attack Infrastructure
- Software implementation attacks
- Firmware limits use of NICs by attacker
- Overcome NIC limitations by reconfiguring
hardware - Choice Microsystems example
40Attack Infrastructure Fig. 1
41Deauthentication Attack (1)
- Demonstration Application Swat
- Consist of iPAQ H3600 Pocket PC
- Running Familiar Linux
- DLink DWL-650 PCMCIA
- Monitors wireless channels for AP and clients
- Identify potential targets by MAC addresses
- Issue spoofed deauthentication after association
response
42Deauthentication Attack (2)
- Testbed
- 802.11 network with 7 computers (1-attacker,
1-access point, 1-monitoring station,
4-legitimate clients - Conditions
- Large ftp transfer through AP
- Transfer exceeded testing period
- Mounted two network attacks
43Deauthentication Attack Fig. 1
44Deauthentication Attack (3)
- Countermeasure
- Delaying effects of deauthentication and
disassociation requests - Advantage
- Implemented with simple firmware modification
- Drawbacks
- Vulnerable while roaming between APs
45Deauthentication Attack Fig. 2
46Access Point Roaming (1)
- Intelligent APs
- Explicit means of coordination for handoff avoid
disassociation timeout - Use proprietary protocols between homogeneous
devices
47Access Point Roaming (2)
- Dumb APs
- No explicit means of coordination
- Rely on layer 2 for coordinating handoff
48Virtual Carrier-Sense Attack (1)
- Exploits NAV Vulnerability
- Packet streams with large duration values
- Exploiting RTS/CTS feature
- Much harder to defend than the deauthentication
attack
49Virtual Carrier-Sense Attack Fig. 1
50Virtual Carrier-Sense Attacks (2)
- Testbed 1 AP, 18 static client nodes, 1 static
attacker node - Conditions FTP used to generate long- lived
network traffic modified ns 802.11 MAC Layer
implementation to allow arbitrary duration values
51Virtual Carrier-Sense AttacksFig. 1
52Virtual Carrier-Sense Attacks (3)
- Countermeasures
- Limit placed on duration value accepted by nodes
(ie. large durations truncated to maximum value) - Further improvement would require abandonment of
802.11 MAC functionality (ie. Frame types
duration values)
53Virtual Carrier-Sense Attacks Fig. 2
54Conclusion
- 802.11 MAC Layer Vulnerabilities can be exploited
to deny service to legitimate users - Low overhead procedures (short-term)
- Per-packet authentication (long-term)
55???? Questions ????
56MAC Layer Services Fig. 1
57MAC Layer Services Fig. 2