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Shane MotlhalogaMalepa Holdings (Pty) Ltd935
Church Street, Arcadia 0083P O Box 90775
Garsfontein 0042 Tel [phone] Fax
27 (12) 430 4888 www.malepa.co.za
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Resurgence of Nuclear Energy
Thirty nuclear plants are being built today in 12
countries around the world, and over 100 planned
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Resurgence of Nuclear Energy
France is to replace its 58 nuclear reactors with
new units from 2020, at the rate of one 1600 MW
reactor per year.
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Government Support
with regard to energy, we will also expedite our
work to ensure greater reliance on nuclear power
generation, natural gas and the various forms of
renewable sources of energy - President Thabo
Mbeki - State of the Nation Address - 09
February 2007.
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Treaty on the Non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons

• The IAEA has become the instrument with which to
  verify that the peaceful use commitments.
• Safeguards role - Activities by which the IAEA
  seeks to verify that states do not to use nuclear
  programmes for nuclear weapons purposes.
• Safeguards system aims to provide assurance not
  only that declared material is not diverted but
  also that there are no undeclared nuclear
  activities.
• This in turn, helps to allay security concerns
  among states wrt to the development of nuclear
  weapons.

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Treaty on the Non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons

• SA acceded to the NPT in 1991 and submitted its
  nuclear programme to IAEA safeguards.
• In 1995, IAEA was able to declare that it was
  satisfied all materials were accounted for and
  the weapons programme had been terminated
  dismantled.
• South Africa further signed the additional
  protocol (AP) on 13 September 2002.

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Additional Protocol

• The AP enables the IAEAs verification efforts to
  focus not only on what has been declared, but
  also on possible undeclared activities.
• Under the AP, a state is required to provide the
  IAEA with broader information covering all
  aspects of its NFC-related activities, incl
  research and development uranium mining.

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Safeguards System

• Ultimately the strength of the IAEA safeguards
  system depends upon 3 interrelated elements
• The extent to which the IAEA is aware of the
  nature and locations of states nuclear-related
  activities
• The extent to which IAEA inspectors have physical
  access to relevant locations for the purpose of
  providing independent verification of the
  exclusively peaceful intent of a States nuclear
  programme and
• The will of the international community, through
  the UNSC to take action against States not
  complying with their safeguards commitments to
  the IAEA.

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Challenges

• The nuclear non-proliferation regime today faces
  a broad array of challenges and is certainly
  being tested.
• Vulnerabilities in the system have been exposed
  in recent years, and changes are clearly needed
  if the proliferation of nuclear weapons is to be
  avoided.
• Why are these changes needed?

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Challenges

• The answer is quite simple. The world is
  undergoing rapid changes on many fronts -
  socially, politically, technologically and
  otherwise.
• The NPT was ratified almost 40 years ago. It
  shouldnt surprise us that the solutions of 1968
  are not a perfect fit to the challenges of 2007
  beyond.
• The problem is that the IAEA have not in all
  cases made the necessary adjustments to match
  these new challenges.

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Challenges

• In particular, we have seen 3 developments
  related to international security, stability and
  politics as far as nuclear proliferation is
  concerned
• the increased dissemination of nuclear technology
  nuclear "know-how"
• a renewed drive on the part of a few States and
  non-state actors to acquire nuclear weapons and
• the emergence of clandestine nuclear procurement
  networks.

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Challenges

• In addition to these trends, the renewed interest
  in nuclear power on the part of many countries -
  and the expectation for an expansion in new
  nuclear construction - makes it even more
  important that there are strong mechanisms in
  place to minimize the risks of proliferation.
• With regard to nuclear proliferation and arms
  control, the basic solution is clear either we
  begin finding innovative solutions or the
  international nuclear safeguards regime will
  become obsolete.

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How do we meet new challenges?

• (1) Better Control of Access to NFC Technology
• Under the NPT regime, there is nothing illegal
  about any State having enrichment or reprocessing
  technology. A relatively small number of
  countries have mastered part or all of the
  nuclear fuel cycle.
• As more countries gain NFC expertise, concerns
  have arisen regarding the margin of security
  resulting from this situation.
• If a country with a full nuclear fuel cycle to
  produce enriched uranium or plutonium were to
  decide to break away from its non-proliferation
  commitments, a nuclear weapon capability could be
  within reach in a relatively short time.

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How do we meet new challenges?

• (2) Ensuring the Protection of Nuclear Material
• Several agreements have been reached on how to
  enhance nuclear security.
• The UN Security Council adopted resolution 1540
  in 2004.
• The International Convention on the Suppression
  of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was adopted by the
  UN General Assembly.
• Both resolution 1540 and the Convention call on
  countries to criminalize the illicit possession
  and use of radioactive material, and aim to
  enhance efforts to detect and combat illicit
  trafficking.
• The parties to the Convention on the Physical
  Protection of Nuclear Material - also agreed on
  major changes to better protect nuclear
  facilities and material.

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How do we meet new challenges?

• (3) Supporting Effective Nuclear Verification
• One key to the effectiveness of verification is
  the extent of access that the IAEA inspectors are
  given to information and locations. In todays
  security environment, inspections that only
  verify what a country has declared under a
  comprehensive safeguards agreement are not likely
  to be considered effective enough, in terms of
  the degree of assurance they provide.
• Both safeguards agreements and additional
  protocols are focused principally on nuclear
  material. Therefore, the IAEAs legal authority
  to investigate possible parallel weaponization
  activity is limited, unless there is some nexus
  linking the activity to nuclear material.

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How do we meet new challenges?

• The biggest problem with the additional protocol
  is that it has not been universally applied.
• The IAEAs verification efforts will not be
  regarded as "fully effective" as long as its
  inspection rights remain uneven from country to
  country.
• For the nuclear non-proliferation regime to be
  regarded as credible, it seems clear that the
  additional protocol must become the universal
  standard for how nuclear non-proliferation
  commitments are verified.

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In conclusion

• The major concerns of the nuclear community are
  (a) how to achieve more universality of the
  additional protocol, and (b) how soon will
  integrated safeguards be implemented, so that
  more effective and efficient safeguards be
  performed?
• By entrusting to an impartial, independent IAEA
  inspectorate the task of verifying the peaceful
  use of nuclear energy, the international
  community has taken an important step towards
  improving the transparency of nuclear activities,
  and thereby indicated its strong support for
  international peace security.
• Though the IAEA rely on an increasing amount of
  information and remote monitoring technologies,
  its the physical access by IAEA inspectors to
  sites, information persons that remain the
  pivotal points of the verification regime.

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Lastly

• Thank You