REGIMES DE QUALIDADE DOS PRODUTOS AGRO-ALIMENTARES PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Title: REGIMES DE QUALIDADE DOS PRODUTOS AGRO-ALIMENTARES


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Future challenges for competition enforcement in
Europe a proposal for a multi-level approach
Conferência em Defesa da Concorrência e Defesa
Comercial Brasília 21-22 de Maio de 2009
Aurelio La Torre Prime Minister Office Department
for Legal and Juridical Affairs RIA Office
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Let me introduce myself
  • ? Director within the Presidency of the Italian
    Council of Ministers c/o the Department of legal
    affairs (Head of RIA Unit).
  • ? Degrees cum laude in both Law and Political
    Sciences (with thesis in competition) and two
    postgraduate degrees in European affairs.
  • ? Overall experience of almost 18 years in
    competition policy, legal drafting, European
    affairs and public administration.
  • ? Competition official within the Italian
    Competition Authority for more than 4 years.
  • ? Responsible for the competition component in
    three different PHARE Twinning Projects in
    Romania designed to help Romanias accession to
    the UE (2006-2008, 2003-2005 and 2001-2002).

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Content of the presentation
  • Introduction
  • Common difficulties in competition enforcement
  • Conclusion need for a multi-level approach

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Common difficulties in enforcement of competition
  1. Frequent lack of a well-defined priority strategy
    for enforcement with little use of ex officio
    investigations
  2. Need to better design a strategy in order to
    foster competition in the area of public
    procurements
  3. Need to deepen the synergies between competition
    policy and anti corruption strategies
  4. Various problems in antitrust enforcement caused
    by legislation
  5. Need to strengthen administrative capacity and/or
    internal organisation and/or adequate HR
    management within the National Competition
    Authorities

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1. Frequent lack of a well-defined priority
strategy for enforcement with little use of ex
officio investigations
  • Competition authorities around the world tend to
    be more reactive than pro-active in their
    fight against anticompetitive practices.
  • Indeed, investigations are normally opened
    following a complaint or where companies blow
    the whistle on a cartel to benefit from
    leniency.
  • The percentage of investigations opened
    ex-officio is generally low.

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What are the benefits of a pro-active
investigative policy? (1/2)
  • A reactive investigative policy (as opposed to
    a pro-active investigative policy) may have
    several important shortfalls
  • It may force the authoritys resources to focus
    on cases having a small impact on the national
    economy and fail to achieve tough competition in
    some economic sectors which are fundamental for
    the national economy
  • It may detect anticompetitive practices long
    after they have been in place, causing lasting
    damages to the structure of the market (e.g. RTE
    practices against Magill Microsoft practices
    against Netscape)
  • It is unlikely to reach anticompetitive practices
    targeting consumers directly (e.g. excessive
    prices charged by a monopolist), who are not
    sufficiently organised to complain against such
    practices

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What are the benefits of a pro-active
investigative policy? (2/2)
  1. It may receive scarce media coverage and reduce
    the authoritys visibility and reputation
    complaints, due also to their confidential
    character, are unlikely to attract the attention
    of the media
  2. It reduces the ability of the competition
    authority to gather evidence of the infringement,
    since in the majority of cases the alleged
    infringer has been warned of or is likely to
    guess the other partys intention to lodge a
    complaint
  3. It may have scarce deterrent effect, since a
    non-interventionist authority - especially in
    markets which are unlikely to be the object of a
    complaint - is unlikely to be perceived by
    companies as a threat to their ability to
    conclude anticompetitive practises
  4. It may fail to attract new entrants in the
    market(s) where anticompetitive practises (for
    instance, cartel agreements or exclusionary
    practises implemented by dominant companies)
    represent a disincentive for new entrants.

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What criteria for ex-officio investigations?
  • Decisions to open ex-officio investigations need
    to follow a pre-determined policy by drafting
    specific guidelines.
  • Priority should be given to investigations
    concerning hardcore restrictions of competition
    having an effect at national level (as opposed to
    local level) and relating to sectors essential
    for the national economy.

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Antitrust enforcement overcome the spider-web
paradox
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(No Transcript)
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Key sectors for enforcement (e. g. Romania 2005-7)
  • Public Procurement
  • Media ( )
  • Energy ( )
  • Communication and Information Technology ( )
  • Transport ( )
  • Banking ( )
  • Insurance ( )
  • Construction
  • Pharmaceuticals
  • Steel Industry
  • Postal services ( )
  • Real Estate Transactions
  • Mechanical Engineering
  • Tourism
  • Area including network industries
  • Area including sector(s) under competence of
    a Regulation Authority

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3. Need to better design a strategy in order to
foster competition in the area of public
procurements
  • Advantages
  • ensuring transparency in Public Administration
  • fighting corruption
  • maintaining in place a functioning free market
    economy

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The main competition problems in public
procurement procedures
  • Award directly a contract without organising a
    public tender
  • Requirements tailored to the advantage of one
    specific bidder
  • Discrimination among potential bidders (e.g.
    unjustified high turnover thresholds that can
    discriminate SMEs and/or many years of experience
    in the field of activity to block the access of
    the newcomers)
  • Lack of transparency
  • Tight deadlines insufficient visibility and
    inadequate time for submitting bids
  • Bid rigging (i.e. illegal co-ordination between
    firms aimed at affect the outcome of any sale or
    purchasing process in which bids are submitted)
  • Corruption related practices - these are
    instances where a representative of the
    contracting authority agrees with one or more
    bidders to false the tendering process.

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Role of competition Authority in public
procurement
  • analyse PP legislation
  • address recommendation to Government and
    Parliament (advocacy)
  • draft guidelines for all tenders organisers
  • draft internal instructions and checklist
  • internal training and referee
  • bilateral cooperation with PP Agency

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4. Need to deepen the synergies between
competition policy and anti corruption
strategies
  • The higher is the corruption, the higher is the
    alteration in the business environment,
    especially in the strategic and high
    remunerative markets

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Role of competition Authority
  • analyse anti-corruption legislation
  • set up or increase cooperation with
    Anti-corruption Authority
  • identify field of inter-relation (e.g. public
    procurement)
  • promote studies on influence of non ethical
    behaviours on the functioning of market economy
    (CFR. Current financial crisis)

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5. Problems in antitrust enforcement caused by
legislation
  • Many competition distortions originate from
    legislation.
  • Competition agencies are generally entrusted with
    advocacy powers.
  • Nevertheless, these powers are not binding and
    are implemented ex post.
  • When did this become a crucial problem?

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  • Is legislation encouraging or distorting free
    competition?
  • The Bosses of the Senate," Lithography, 1889

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The Bosses of the Senate," Lithography, 1889
  • Huge figures stand behind rows of Senate desks.
    The four figures in top hats, with big bellies,
    are the Iron Trust, Standard Oil Trust, Copper
    Trust, Steel Beam Trust, all with dollar signs on
    their stomachs.
  • The sign at top reads "This is a Senate for the
    Monopolists, By the Monopolists and of the
    Monopolists!" Some Senators look up at them.

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(No Transcript)
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Examples of legislative measures that may have an
anticompetitive impact include
  • public tenders applying unfair or discriminatory
    terms
  • measures fixing prices or tariffs
  • measures granting exclusive rights
  • measures discouraging market entry by increasing
    standards or introducing new administrative
    barriers (licences, authorisations etc.)
  • measures obstructing import or export of
    products/services
  • measures granting state aid or otherwise
    favouring domestic over foreign companies

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The Structure of the Italian RIA model (2008)
  • 1. Context and objectives.
  • 2. Procedures of consultation.
  • 3. Assessment of the non-intervention option
  • (zero option).
  • 4. Assessment of the alternative options of
    regulatory intervention.
  • 5. Justification of the proposed regulatory
    option.
  • 6. Impact on the correct competitive market
    functioning and on the Country competitiveness.
  • 7. Implementing modalities of the regulatory
    intervention.

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Basic competition RIA filter test (Italy 2008)
  • Does regulation
  • Limit the number or type of providers?
  • Limit the competition possibilities of providers?
  • Reduce the incentives for providers to compete?
  • N.B. Italy is preparing specific guidelines and a
    more detailed checklist

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To what regulation should we apply the
competition filter test?
  • Must be submitted to RIA legal provisions that
    have business or competition impacts.
  • Business impacts arise in the case that proposed
    regulations
  • (1) govern the entry or exit into or out of
    market
  • (2) control prices or production levels
  • (3) restrict the quality, level, or location of
    goods and services available
  • (4) restrict advertising and promotional
    activities
  • (5) restrict price or type of inputs used in the
    production process
  • (6) are likely to confer significant costs on
    business, or may provide advantages to some firms
    over others.

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6. Need to strengthen administrative capacity,
internal organisation, HR management within the
National Competition Authorities
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Enhancing the administrative capacity of
Competition Agencies some issues
  • personnel selection procedures
  • carrier and status
  • internal promotion system
  • training on
  • public speaking
  • lobbying and negotiating skills
  • leadership
  • team building

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Conclusions
  1. Adopt a well-defined priority strategy for
    enforcement with adequate use of ex officio
    investigations
  2. Verify your strategy in order to foster
    competition in the area of public procurements
  3. Consider to study the synergies between
    competition policy and anti corruption strategies
  4. Consider to adopt RIA in order to face
    competition distortions caused by legislation
  5. Pay attention to the human factor

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Obrigado! Aurelio La Torre
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  • www.planejamento.gov.br/gestao/dialogos
  • dialogos.setoriais_at_planejamento.gov.br
  • Departamento de Cooperação Internacional
  • Secretaria de Gestão SEGES
  • Ministério do Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão
  • Esplanada, Bloco K, 4 andar
  • (61) 2020- 4906
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