Human Factors

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Human Factors Virtual RealitySimone
ColomboPolitecnico di Milano

• POPRAD (SK)

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End-User representation
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Aim

• Aim of this presentation is to provide a feasible
  way out to
• Include HF into HAZOP-like methods in a
  systematic and consistent manner
• Include HF into logic trees in a systematic and
  consistent manner
• Provide a way out to measure the possible
  occurrence of erroneous actions (PRISMs specific)

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Produce safety ?

• Safety is produced when the three safety actions,
  namely
• Safety management ? Decision Making Audit
• Safety analyses ? Risk Assessment and Accident
  Investigation
• Training (individual and group) ? selection and
  transfer of knowledge
• are synergistically, systematically and
  recurrently performed.

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Looking for realistic Safety Analyses outcomes ?

• In order to have a realistic and not misleading
  snapshot of the level of risk it is necessary to
  perform all the three complementary analyses
• Operability Analysis (HAZOP HAZOP-like)
• Fault Tree Analysis
• Event Tree Analysis

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Looking for realistic Safety Analyses outcomes ?

• and, furthermore, it is necessary to integrate
  HF into them in a systematic and consistent way.

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Usefulness of HF

• Broadly speaking the outcomes of Human Factors
  analyses serve to
• Offer an adequate (contexts sensitive) training
• Perform integrated risk analyses and accident
  investigations
• Support the decision making process.

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Why HF are not systematically included into SA ?

• There have been identified 3 main issues
• There are no paradigms on how to integrate HF
  into HAZOP-like methods that enable to directly
  extract TEs
• There are no paradigms on how to include HF into
  logic trees (Fault Tree, Event Tree, Incidental
  Sequence Diagram, )

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HF not explicitly included?
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Why HF are not systematically included into SA ?

• It is quite hard to measure human reliability, or
  rather, to measure the occurrence of the
  identified critical erroneous actions

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1. Inclusion of HF into HAZOP-like methods
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Recursive HAZOP
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Classical VS Recursive HAZOP

• Pros Cons
• Recursive Operability Analysis (ROA) does not use
  the heavy, tedious and sometime misleading guide
  words approach
• The correct execution of a ROA may be heavily
  dependent on the correct subdivision of a plant

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Classical VS Recursive HAZOP

• ROA requires the identification of boundary
  nodes, as well as internal ones, i.e., points
  were deviations of a process variable (T, P,
  Flow) may develop or propagate (operation that
  must go hand in hand with the identification of
  the process variables regarded as significant for
  the analysis)

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Classical VS Recursive HAZOP

• ROA is certainly more accurate, reliable than the
  classical HAZOP (OA)
• BUT, maybe, more demanding in terms of time

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Classical VS Recursive HAZOP

• in all instances however, it has not to
  substitute the classical HAZOP which is extremely
  useful to rough out the identification of main
  hazards (of any kind).

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E.G. The Chiefs Assistant
1. Fryer, 2. Oil, 3. Thermostat, 4. High T cut
off switch, 5. Smoke detector, 6. Sprinkler)
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E.G. The Chiefs Assistant
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E.G. The Chiefs Assistant
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2. Inclusion of HF into Logic Trees
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From implicitness towards explicitness
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From implicitness towards explicitness
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From implicitness towards explicitness
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3. Possible way forward to measure Human Failure
Probabilities (HFP)
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1st generation HRA methods

• The innocence of the Performance Shaping Factors
  (PSFs)
• f error frequence
• C costant
• Wk weight of the kth PSF

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1st generation HRA methods
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1st generation HRA methods

• Inherent limitations
• Human Error Rate can be expressed without making
  any assumptions with regard to cognition
• PSFs are simply additive not realistic
• Concepts behind the estimation are not clear.

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1st generation HRA methods

• E.g.
• If the probability of making a failure, such as
  missing a step in a procedure, is estimated to be
  p0,01, the influence of a PSF, such as moderate
  stress, is simply assumed to double the value.
  Thus, moderate stress in defined (measured)
  independently or as that condition which doubles
  the failure rate?

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From 1st to 2nd generation HRA methods

• Despite keeping the Human Reliability Analysis
  Event Tree approach for calculating probabilities
  of occurrence, the transition from 1st to 2nd
  generation Human Reliability Assessment methods
  has much complicated the estimation of Human
  Failure Events (HFEs)

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Available Methodologies

• There are many HRA methods. Amongst those
• First generation ones
• THERP
• HEART
• JHEDI
• Second generation
• ATHEANA
• CREAM
• HERMES

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From 1st to 2nd generation HRA methods
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1 VS 2 generazione HRA
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1 VS 2 generazione HRA

• Quantificazione proposta da ATHEANA

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1 VS 2 generazione HRA

• Quantificazione proposta da ATHEANA

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How to measure HFP

• At present the unique way is to turn to the
  expert judgement applying methodologies like
• Scenarios Analysis (Herman Kahn)
• Delphi Method
• Cross impact analysis.

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Limits of Expert Judgement

• It is extremely demanding in terms of
  competencies needed by the analyst for performing
  the analysis
• It could hold inherently strong uncertainties
  associated with the subjectivity of the analysis
  (expectable by any subjective method)

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Limits of Expert Judgement

• It needs several experts, working together and
  supported at least by a human factors expert, to
  gain credible HFP estimates
• It needs a strong facilitator to ensure that each
  expert shows his/her evidence and substantiate
  its foundations.

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Limits of Expert Judgement

• It takes much time to reach the consensus final
  probability distribution
• and that is probably why is not much applied in
  practice by industry

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What was the aim of WP7 within PRISM?

• Having this all in mind, the idea was to merge
  Human Factors (HF) knowledge with Virtual Reality
  (VR) technologies with the aim of
• Enabling the assessment of human reliability, in
  each of the 7 areas of application, by using the
  most advanced HF techniques (i.e.
  second-generation)

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Areas of application

• Exploration Drilling
• Construction
• Commissioning
• Operation
• Maintenance, Repairs Modifications
• Decommissioning.

• Design stage
• Operational stages
• (Emergency stage)

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New Tech

• The combination of HF VR enable to produce a
  new tech formed by
• Prevention tools
• Detection tools
• Demonstration tools
• to apply at the
• Design stage
• Operational stages
• Emergency stage.

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Overall benefits

• The new tech will allow to move from a paper
  simulation (strongly relying on analysts
  creativity and imagination) to a virtual
  simulation where safety analyses are carried out
  in a concerted way.

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Overall benefits
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Overall benefits

• To support decision makers in making
  safety-critical decisions and best resources
  allocation,
• To support safety analysts in anticipating
  inadequacies associated with HF, conceiving new
  design strategies, and deciding the adequate
  level of competences,

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Overall benefits

• To support trainers in making more incisive and
  effective training courses
• To produce adequate competencies for running
  safely new and more complex technologies both at
• Operational stage
• Emergency stage.

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Overall benefits

• To improve the learning and self-learning process
  efficiency of trainees
• To identify and measure the effects on operators
  reliability and performance of modifications
  brought to

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Overall benefits

• The Process (both hardware software),
• The Organizational set-up,
• The Training contents,
• The Roles and Rules definition,
• The Task allocation.

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At the design stage

• Exploiting VR allow
• To prefigure potential human failures before they
  are actually made in reality
• To immediately search for suitable solutions,
  following a human-centred approach, so to avoid
  their occurrence in reality.

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At the design stage

• To retrieve data and information, specifically
  associated with the working environment at hand,
  essential to run present Human Factors
  methodologies

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At the operational stage

• At the operational level it allow
• To keep the appropriate awareness, promptness and
  preparedness of the workforce in place
• To improve skills and understanding
• To design better training programs
• To measure the efficiency of learning processes

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At the operational stage

• To bring out human capabilities
• To visualise accident dynamics and stress
  critical aspects (spatio-temporal emphases), such
  as
• Inappropriate actions (short-cuts, barriers
  elimination, etc.)
• Technological limitations
• Awkward operational conditions
• Inter- and Intra-Team coordination.

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At the operational stage

• To demonstrate the reasons why procedures, tasks,
  working rules, crews composition, barriers, etc.,
  have been devised in that specific way.

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At the emergency stage

• The main advantage relate to the opportunity of
  simulating the entire emergency situation,
  including the consequences.

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Position statements

• The New Tech can substantially contribute to
  support safety production by supporting
• The application of advanced HF methodologies
• The decision making process
• The Emergency preparedness.

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Position statements

• Merging VR technology HF methodologies can
  sensibly
• Reduce the costs of safety production (at least
  for what concern the HF analyses part)
• Reduce the time to perform safety analyses
• Increase the efficiency in safety production and
  emergency management.

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Whats Human Factors?

• Ergonomics scientific discipline dealing with
  issues associated with human work and that, by
  summing up, elaborating and integrating
  researches and solutions coming from various
  disciplines (such as medicine, physiology,
  psychology, sociology and cognitive sciences),
  tends to realise an optimal adaptation of the
  socio-technical working environment to the
  psycho-physical limitations of the human being.