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Lessons Learned From Down Round Financings

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Title: Lessons Learned From Down Round Financings


1
  • Lessons LearnedFrom Down Round Financings

Executive Breakfast Briefing November 15, 2001
2
Presenters
  • John Yates, Moderator Chair, Technology
    Practice Group
  • Phone 404/504-5444
  • Email jyates_at_mmmlaw.com
  • Charles Chuck Johnson, General Partner,
    Noro-Moseley Partners
  • Phone 404/233-1966
  • Email cjohnson_at_noro-moseley.com
  • Phillip Hodges, Partner, Ernst Young
  • Phone 404/817-5822
  • Email phillip.hodges_at_ey.com
  • Rosemarie Thurston - Partner, Emerging Companies
    Practice Group
  • Phone 404/504-7635
  • Email rthurston_at_mmmlaw.com

2
3
The Setting
  • Killer-App Software, Inc.
  • Atlanta-based technology company
  • Formed in November 1998 by three founders
  • Raised Series A round in July 1999 at high
    valuation
  • Approximately 10 million to reach cash-flow
    positive
  • Strong sales pipeline of prospects, but hasnt
    reached customer revenue objectives to date

3
4
The Problem
  • Company begins to falter
  • Additional financing is required
  • Cash burn is high, and cash will run out in 3-6
    months
  • Valuation has eroded
  • If no new VC is willing to lead the round,
    insider-priced round
  • If new VC leads the round, new terms may be
    crammed down on existing investors forcing them
    to give up negotiated rights

4
5
The Down Round
  • Company pursues additional equity capital
  • Proposed valuation is substantially below last
    round
  • Proposed valuation triggers anti-dilution rights
    of existing investors
  • Existing investors (who have representatives on
    Board) have preemptive rights to participate in
    equity financings
  • Management stock options will be under water
    after this down round (may be virtually worthless)


5
6
The Term Sheet
Lower valuation together with tough nonprice
terms
  • Staggered investment (milestone-based)
  • Senior liquidation preference (up to 4x)
  • Participating preferred
  • Cumulative dividends
  • Full ratchet antidilution price protection
  • Increased board control
  • Broad protective voting rights
  • Senior registration rights
  • Senior co-sale rights
  • Drag-along rights

6
7
A Practical Example
  • Company Series A Capitalization
  • 1,000,000 shares of Common Stock outstanding
  • 1,000,000 shares of Series A Preferred Stock,
    purchased _at_ 1.00/share in July 2000, convertible
    into 1,000,000 shares of Common Stock
  • Optionees hold options to purchase 300,000 shares
    (13 of the Company)
  • Common stockholders and Series A Preferred
    Stockholders each own 43.5 of the Company


7
8
(A Practical Example)
  • Down Round (assuming full-ratchet anti-dilution
    protection for holders of Series A Preferred
    Stock)
  • Company issues 20,000,000 shares of Series B
    Preferred Stock to investors _at_ 0.25/share
    (5,000,000 raise) in November 2001, each
    convertible into one share of Common Stock


8
9
(A Practical Example)
  • Effect of Down Round on Companys Capitalization
  • 1,000,000 shares of Common Stock outstanding
    after funding
  • 300,000 options outstanding
  • 1,000,000 shares of Series A Preferred Stock,
    convertible into 4,000,000 shares of Common Stock
    after funding
  • 20,000,000 shares of Series B Preferred Stock
    outstanding, convertible into 20,000,000 shares
    of Common Stock


9
10
(A Practical Example)
  • BEFORE AFTER
  • Common - 43.5 Common - 4
  • Series A - 43.5 Series A - 16
  • Optionees - 13 Series B - 79
  • Optionees - 1
  • Antidilution adjustments to Series A can have
    impact of washing out common stock and options
  • Waiver of anti-dilution would reduce dilution
    to common stockholders and optionholders


10
11
The Cram-Down Financing Condition
  • Classic Cram-Down -- financing scheme where
    venture capitalists refuse to invest unless
    earlier investors give up negotiated rights (i.e.
    waive anti-dilution and/or reduce liquidation
    preference and possibly subordinate liquidation
    preference to a new class of senior preferred
    securities having higher liquidation preference,
    i.e., up to 4 times the original price per share)

11
12
Pay to Play
  • New investors may require prior preferred
    investors to particpate in down round in order to
    keep antidilution rights (or even require prior
    investors to convert preferred to common stock if
    they dont invest)
  • Unless earlier investors are able to put up new
    money for new round, the likelihood of their
    realization of a return on their investment in
    the Company is significantly diminished (i.e.,
    need to pay-to-play in order to preserve
    possible return), but may be good money chasing
    bad money

12
13
Stakeholders who may object
  • Holders of Common Stock
  • Founders, original investors, employees and other
    minority shareholders
  • Optionees with underwater and diluted options
  • Strategic warrant holders
  • Other preferred shareholders who are impacted
    (forced to give up rights or cannot invest in
    Down Round)

13
14
The Legal Issues for Directors
  • Satisfaction of Fiduciary Duties
  • Care
  • Loyalty
  • Business judgment rule generally protects
    decisions of Directors from stockholder challenge
  • Effect of conflict of interest (if majority of
    directors are conflicted, business judgment rule
    does not apply)

14
15
Conflicting Interests
  • Director who is an existing investor (either
    individually or as a representative of a venture
    fund investor) and/or an investor in the Down
    Round
  • Management directors when term sheet provides for
    new management incentives for certain key
    employees as condition to investment.


15
16
(Conflicting Interests)
  • Director/Investor with an interest in acquiring
    the struggling Company (possibly at lower
    valuation out of bankruptcy)
  • Venture fund director also owes duties to his/her
    employer, and, in the case of most Venture
    Capital firms, its Limited Partners
  • As Company nears insolvency or shutdown,
    Directors duties shift from the shareholders to
    the Companys creditors

16
17
Steps to Fulfill These Duties
  • Assume youll have to prove the entire fairness
    of the transaction anyway
  • Build a record of the Boards full and thorough
    consideration of all available alternatives
    including other liquidation events
  • Show that Down Round is fair and was the best
    available option
  • Must assume a court will use fairness standard
  • Price is the predominant factor
  • Hire investment banking firm to
  • Explore strategic alternatives
  • Conduct market checks
  • Advise on valuation and terms
  • Render fairness opinion


17
18
(Steps to Fulfill These Duties...)
  • Disclose all conflicts of interest (as defined by
    applicable state law) and have decisions passed
    by disinterested Directors
  • Consider appointing a special committee of
    independent and disinterested Directors (if there
    are at least two) to negotiate on behalf of the
    Company and make recommendations to the full
    Board
  • Where possible, have a new investor lead
    negotiations (helps court view negotiations as
    arms-length)


18
19
(Steps to Fulfill These Duties...)
  • If stockholder approval is necessary for the Down
    Round for any reason (i.e., amending charter),
    try to seek stockholder approval of the Down
    Round itself (but make sure you can get it!)
  • If stockholders approve the Down Round, better
    insulation from lawsuit for breach of fiduciary
    duties
  • Offer Down Round to all (accredited) shareholders
    if possible
  • Make sure DO policy is maintained!

19
20
Re-Incenting Managementand Key Employees
  • Managements stock and options now have little
    value (common stock is unlikely to receive any
    value in a liquidating event due to magnitude of
    the preferred liquidation preferences and options
    are dramatically underwater)
  • Alternative incentive plans include
  • Stock option plan allowing for preferred stock
    options with a liquidation preference senior to
    common
  • Change of control bonus plans (can be calculated
    based on valuation at sale in a lump sum or fixed
    percentage, generally total pool of 5-10 of
    targeted valuation) with sliding scale to incent
    employees to build the valuation prior to sale
  • Issue new round of options at lower exercise
    price (top up grants) or consider repricing

21
Accounting Issues Concerning Stock Option
Repricing
  • To be provided by Phillip Hodges

22
Now What?Revisiting Exit Strategies after the
Down Round
  • Down round proceeds may be enough to get company
    cash flow break-even
  • Company may raise just enough money to buy it
    time to position for a sale
  • If company reaches important revenue milestones,
    an up round may be feasible in the future
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