HFE Considerations for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations

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HFE Considerations for Stabilization and
Reconstruction Operations
CNS Technologies, Inc.
DoD HFE TAG-56 Monterey, CA 6-9 November 2006
Albert A. Sciarretta President, CNS Technologies,
Inc. asciarretta_at_cnsti.com 703-517-2143
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Reference for this Presentation

• Stabilization and Reconstruction (SR) Operations
  Study at the Center for Technology and National
  Security Policy (CTNSP), National Defense
  University (NDU)
• Requested by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
  the Army for Research and Technology
• Objective Assess technological capability gaps
  in the U.S. Armys ability to conduct SR
  operations
• Authors Dr. Richard Chait, Mr. Dennis Shorts,
  Mr. Al Sciarretta
• To be published soon in approximately two weeks
• Currently listed as downloadable report 37 at
  http//www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/Defense_Tech_Papers.htm
  with other CTNSP reports
• Email me your mailing address and Ill send you a
  printed copy

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SR Definitions

• Stabilization Operations
• Spectrum of military and civilian activities,
  from peace to conflict
• Used to establish or maintain order in states and
  regions, as well as provide security for
  reconstruction operations
• Combination of peacekeeping, cooperative
  activities, and coercive actions in response to
  crisis
• Reconstruction Operations
• Reestablishment of the governmental, security,
  judicial, health, transportation, commercial, and
  other infrastructures
• Includes
• Identification and training of appropriate
  personnel
• Reestablishment of governmental, transportation,
  health, education, and other related institutions
• Facilities construction and the reconnection of
  communications, water, waste disposal, gas,
  electric, oil, and other utilities

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Some Emphasized Differences in SR Operations

• Rules of Engagement (ROEs) and Restrictions on
  Firing
• Want to minimize collateral damage
• Mode of operations is more dismounted policeman
  than mounted Warfighter
• Restricted maneuverability
• Units assigned to static bases
• Constraints on damaging civilian homes, cars,
  etc.
• Tanks no longer have the right of way
• Inability to understand the environment
• Understanding local people, reading street signs,
  etc.
• Much more background clutter than in combat
• EM emissions, pedestrians, civilian automobiles,
  etc.
• Reconstruction efforts span large areas and cross
  many maneuver unit boundaries
• Long haul logistics are more the norm

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Issues With Abrams Tanks

• When buttoned-up for attack from rooftop
• Crew cannot see upwards
• Most viewing systems are oriented forward
• Tank Cmdr loader cant fire MGs
• No daylight/night sights
• Main gun use restricted by freedom of movement
  and ROEs
• Coax MG cant be elevated high enough
• Crew cannot talk to dismounted infantry

• When maneuvering in streets
• Restrictions in 3-dimensions
• Difficult to move in reverse
• Tank Cmdr loader exposed
• Difficulties with protestors in front of tank
• Difficult to traverse turret
• Language translation systems needed
• Many protection issues

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HFE Upgrades to Abrams Tank With The Tank Urban
Survivability Kit (TUSK)
Loaders Thermal Weapon Sight (LTWS)
M1A1 Commanders Thermal Weapon Sight (CTWS)
Loaders Armor Gun Shield (LAGS)
M1A2 SEP Common Remote Operated Weapon Station
(CROWS)
Tank Infantry Phone
Abrams Reactive Armor Tiles (ARAT)
Abrams Situational Awareness Camera
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Long Haul Logistics

• Driving military tactical trucks is very tough on
  the operator
• Cabs heat up dramatically in summer desert
  environment
• No air conditioning or cold water
• Often had dehydration problems
• Driver security guard need night vision
• Supply and service equipment not designed for
  long hauls
• Most communications systems are digital text
  difficult to use while driving
• Language translation systems needed
• Especially for mixed convoys

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Communications

• Dismounted patrols is the norm
• Difficult for armored units
• Vehicle mounted radios are too large for
  dismounted patrol
• Must stay close to HMMWVs
• Range of military radios not very good
• Interference from urban environment and
  background clutter
• Need a repeater type radio
• Enhanced Position Location Reporting System
  (EPLRS) works well but it is vehicle mounted
• In the U.S., communications systems are tested to
  adhere to bandwidth/frequency constraints.
• These constraints are not an issue in Iraq, so
  the systems should be designed to take advantage
  of this situation.
• Portable power for radios and other electronic
  devices an issue
• Far too many types of batteries

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Self-Location

• Most systems are vehicle mounted
• Not supportive of dismounted personnel
• Dismounted personnel have individually purchased
  commercial systems
• Interface is not suited for SR operations in
  Iraq
• Current systems (military commercial) do not
  work well inside large structures and underground

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Battle Command Systems

• Need better views of urban areas
• At resolution to track individuals
• Need 3-dimensional views
• Cant display 3-dimensional data in lower echelon
  C2 systems
• Need better icons
• At individual combatant level
• For non-standard targets, e.g.,
• Civilian with RPG
• Suicide bomber
• That can deal with tracking of multitude of
  civilians

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Information Overload

• Static base scenario dictates need for perimeter
  security
• Commercial perimeter security systems require
  individual to look at a bank of video monitors
• Too much stress on the user to watch multiple
  streaming videos
• Needs automation
• Battle Command systems are not designed to
  efficiently track all the civilian clutter

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Use of Non-Lethal Weapons

• Non-lethal weapons must be designed to allow
  users to quickly transition to lethal weapons
• There is an HFE issue from the perspective of the
  people on the receiving end of the non-lethal
  weapon
• They may perceive a non-lethal weapon as a lethal
  weapon and may react as if it is

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Personal Gear

• Not all soldiers need to be exactly alike with
  personal equipment. For example, differences in
  missions or personal weapons may dictate for some
  soldiers to have more pouches than others.
• In stabilization and reconstruction operations
  there is a need for more flexible, non-weapon
  oriented equipment.
• Helmet
• Advanced Combat Helmet was cut shorter in the
  back and above the ears to allow a person to look
  up while in the prone position.
• In stabilization operations one normally isnt in
  the prone position when an IED goes off, so
  additional wounds occur because too much of a
  soldiers head is exposed.
• Soldiers have done much to modify their personal
  equipment
• Examples documented in Soldier Innovation Report
  1 Soldier Innovations, Ideas, and Standard Item
  Modifications in Iraq and Afghanistan,
  Operational Forces Interface Group, U.S. Army
  Soldier Systems Center, Natick, MA, 15 Dec 04

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Rapid Fielding of Equipment

• Often new equipment is rapidly placed in the
  hands of soldiers with little training and
  logistical support.
• A case in point is the Multiband Inter/Intra Team
  Radio (MBITR)
• When the one unit received its MBITRs, they were
  trained to use them for local communications.
• It wasnt until they came in contact with a USMC
  unit that the this unit found out the MBITRs
  could be used for Joint operations like talking
  to an AC-130 gun ship.
• In SR Operations there has been a tendency to
  quickly field solutions to problems as eaches
• Without integration, a dismounted warrior may be
  carrying too many items

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Summary

• SR operations tend to generate unique HFE issues
• Some issues have been addressed others being
  addressed
• Still room for improvement
• Questions???