On The Interaction Between Overlay Routing and Underlay Routing - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

1 / 20
About This Presentation
Title:

On The Interaction Between Overlay Routing and Underlay Routing

Description:

An overlay network choose routes at application level to minimize its own delay or cost ... bimodal normal model of traffic demand. 3 overlay nodes. 12 ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:105
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 21
Provided by: honggan
Category:

less

Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: On The Interaction Between Overlay Routing and Underlay Routing


1
On The Interaction Between Overlay Routing and
Underlay Routing
  • Yong Liu, Honggang Zhang,
  • Weibo Gong, Don Towsley

Presented by Honggang Zhang
Univ. of Massachusetts Amherst
2
Motivation Interactions Between Application
Level Network and Physical Network
  • physical network control
  • routing, congestion control,
  • add an overlay
  • and another
  • Result?
  • interactions?
  • controllers mismatch?

3
Outline
  • Problem Formulation
  • Simulation Study
  • Game-theoretic Study
  • Conclusions

4
Routing in Underlay Network
  • Routing on physical network level
  • Inter-domain BGP, etc.
  • Intra-domain OSPF, MPLS, etc.
  • determine routes for all source-destination
    traffic demand pairs
  • minimize network-wide delay, cost, etc.

traffic demand pair A-gtB traffic demand pair
A-gtC traffic demand pair C-gtB
5
Routing in Overlay Network
Overlay demand A-gtB logical routes A-gtC-gtB and
A-gtB
  • An overlay network choose routes at application
    level to minimize its own delay or cost

C
A
  • Overlay
  • gains advantage
  • better path delay, loss, throughput, etc
  • is selfish
  • potential performance degradation to other
    non-overlay traffic

B
C
D
E
A
B
demand pair A-gtC
demand pair C-gtB demand pair A-gtB
6
Considering overlay and underlay together ?
  • How do they interact with each other?
  • How does selfish behavior of overlay routing
  • affect overall network performance?
  • affect non-overlay traffic performance?
  • affect its own performance?

7
Interactions Between Overlay Routing and
Underlay Routing
Overlay Routing Optimizer To minimize overlay
cost
Underlay Routing Optimizer To minimize overall
network cost
8
Related Work
  • On Selfish Routing in Internet-like
    Environments, L. Qiu, Y. R. Yang, Y. Zhang, and
    S. Shenker, ACM/SIGCOMM, August 2003
  • "Can ISPs Take the Heat from Overlay
    Networks?,R. Keralapura, N. Taft, C. N. Chuah,
    and G. Iannaccone, ACM/HotNets-III, November
    2004

9
Our Approach
  • Focusing interaction in a single AS
  • Considering two routing models for overlay and
    one routing model for underlay
  • Simulating the interaction dynamic process
  • Studying this process in a Game-theoretic
    framework

10
Routing Models
  • Overlay routing model
  • Selfish source routing
  • Individual user controls infinitesimal amount of
    traffic, to minimize its own delay
  • Optimal overlay routing
  • A central entity minimizes the total delay of all
    overlay traffic demands
  • Underlay routing model
  • Optimal underlay routing
  • A central entity minimizes the total delay of all
    network traffic, e.g. Traffic Engineering MPLS

11
Simulation Study Optimal Overlay and Optimal
Underlay
14 node tier-1 POP network (Medina et.al.
2002) bimodal normal model of traffic demand 3
overlay nodes
Node without overlay
Node with overlay
Link
12
Simulation Study ( case 1 8 overlay traffic)
Optimal Overlay and Optimal Underlay
  • Iterative process
  • Underlay takes turn at step 1, 3, 5,
  • Overlay takes turn at step 2, 4, 6,

13
Simulation Study (case 2 10 overlay traffic)
Optimal Overlay and Optimal Underlay
  • Iterative process
  • Underlay takes turn at step 1, 3, 5,
  • Overlay takes turn at step 2, 4, 6,

14
Game-theoretic Study
  • Two-player non-zero sum game

15
Game-theoretic Study
16
Optimal Underlay Routing v.s. Optimal Overlay
Routing
  • Overlay
  • One central entity calculates routes for all
    overlay demands, given current underlay routing
  • Assumption it knows underlay topology and
    background traffic

X(k)
1-X(k)
We denote overlays routing decision with a
single variable X(k) overlays flow on path ACB
after round k
17
Best-reply Dynamics
  • There exists unique Nash equilibrium x,
  • x globally stable x(k) ?x, from any initial
    x(1)

When x(1)0, overlay performance improves
18
Best-reply Dynamics
  • There exists unique Nash equilibrium x,
  • x globally stable x(k) ?x, from any initial
    x(1)

When x(1)0.5, overlay performance degrades
Overlay Delay Evolution
Overlay Routing Evolution
Underlays turn
delay
Overlays turn
x(k)
BAD INTERACTION!
x(k)gtx(k1)gtx
x
x(k)ltx(k1)ltx
Round k
Round k
19
Conclusions Open Issues
  • Selfish overlay routing can degrade performance
    of network as a whole
  • Interactions between blind optimizations at two
    levels may lead to lose-lose situation
  • Future work
  • larger topology analysis/experimentation
  • overlay routing and inter-domain routing
  • interactions between multiple overlays
  • implications on design overlay routing
  • regulation between overlay and underlay

20
Thank you!Questions?
Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
About PowerShow.com