Contraception and Abortion

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Contraception and Abortion
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standard arguments

• Conservative
• CP1) Fetus is a person.
• CC) Abortion is morally wrong.
• Liberal
• LP1) Fetus is not a person.
• LC) Abortion is morally acceptable.
• These standard arguments are invalid.
• To make them valid, we need to add more premises
  thereby exposing the underlying assumptions.

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standard arguments

• Conservative
• CP1) Fetus is a person.
• CP2) Abortion killing a fetus.
• CP3) If x is a person, then killing x is
  morally wrong.
• CC) Abortion is morally wrong.
• Liberal
• LP1) Fetus is not a person.
• LP2) Abortion killing a fetus.
• LP3) If x is not a person, then killing x is
  morally acceptable.
• LC) Abortion is morally acceptable.
• Two assumptions
• 1. Abortion killing a fetus.
• 2. Killing a person is always wrong.
• If these assumptions are correct, then the key
  issue is personhood the acceptability of
  abortion depends on whether the fetus is a
  person.
• Are these assumptions correct?

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problem 1 the wrongness of killing

• Conservatives Is killing a person always morally
  wrong?
• What about
• killing a person in self-defense
• killing a person in a just war
• Liberals Is killing a non-person always morally
  acceptable?
• What about
• wantonly killing horses just for kicks
• blowing up a cat in a microwave just for kicks

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problem 2 personhood

• Imagine that aliens arrive on earth. Theyre
  trying to determine whether we are persons or a
  food source.
• What should they look for?
• What are the essential characteristics of
  personhood?
• What is to be a person?

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what makes x a person?

• Viability to be a person is to be capable of
  living as an independent entity
• Problems
• cats, dogs, and spiders are all viable
• artificial incubation makes a fetus of any age
  viable
• viability varies from infant to infant, culture,
  race
• Rational thought to be a person is to be capable
  of rational thought
• Problems
• what about infants and young children?
• what about the chronically comatose and severely
  mentally handicapped?

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what makes x a person?

• Parental bonding to be a person is to be
  emotionally connected to ones parents
• Problems
• penguins, whales, and chimpanzees all experience
  parental bonding
• what about parents who dont bond with child?
• what about children without parents?
• Social membership to be a person is to be able
  to communicate and function as a member of social
  group
• Problems
• elephants, wolves, and antelope all have social
  membership
• what about people who are alienated or
  dehumanized?

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what makes x a person?

• A future like ours to be a person is to be such
  that if one does not die prematurely, then one
  will have a future like ours
• Problems
• being a potential x doesnt make something an x
• what about the chronically comatose and severely
  mentally handicapped?
• A soul to be a person is to have a soul
• Problems
• souls are more controversial than the premises of
  the standard arguments
• which creatures have souls?
• how are we to tell if the fetus has a soul?

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what makes x a person?

• Human DNA to be a person is to have human DNA
• In argument form
• P1) If x has human DNA, then x is a person
• P2) The fetus has human DNA.
• C) Therefore, the fetus is a person.
• Problem
• dead skin cells have human DNA (so P1 is false)
• Revising the argument
• P1) If x is a person, then x has human DNA.
• P2) The fetus has human DNA.
• C) Therefore, the fetus is a person.
• Problem
• the revised argument commits the fallacy of
  affirming the consequent

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• Lets take a BREAK!

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shifting the debate

• We have seen that the appeal to personhood is
  misguided
• It is irrelevant (b/c some person-killings are
  acceptable and some non-person-killings are still
  wrong).
• It is unhelpful (b/c it is not clear what
  personhood is and whether fetuses have it).
• Thomson urges us to accept, for the sake of
  argument, that the fetus is a person from the
  moment of conception
• it seems to me to be of great interest to ask
  what happens if, for the sake of argument, we
  allow that the fetus is a person. How,
  precisely, are we supposed to get from there to
  the conclusion that abortion is morally
  impermissible? (Thomson, A Defense of Abortion)
• Answer typically, via an appeal to a right to
  life.

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the right to life argument

• P1) A fetus is a person.
• P2) A person has a right to life, which is
  stronger and more stringent than ones right to
  decide what happens in and to ones body.
• C1) Therefore, a fetus has a right to life,
  which is stronger and more stringent than ones
  right to decide what happens in and to ones
  body.
• P3) If x has a right to life, which is stronger
  and more stringent than ones right to decide
  what happens in and to ones body, then killing x
  is always wrong.
• C2) Therefore, killing a fetus is always wrong.
• Is a right to life always stronger and more
  stringent than ones right to decide what happens
  in and to ones body?

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the right to life

• Consider the violinist
• Imagine that you wake up in the morning and
  find yourself back to back in bed with an
  unconscious (famous) violinist. The violinist has
  a fatal kidney ailment, and so the Society for
  Music Lovers, upon discovering that you are the
  only person with exactly the right blood type,
  kidnapped you in order to have his circulatory
  system plugged into yours, so that your kidneys
  can be used to extract poisons from his blood as
  well as your own. You are told that everyone is
  very sorry, but its done the violinist is now
  plugged into you. To unplug him would be to kill
  him. But, they say, its only for nine months
  (he needs that much time to recover). (Thomson,
  A Defense of Abortion)

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the right to life

• Question
• Do you have a moral obligation to stay plugged
  into the violinist? What if the violinist needs
  you to stay plugged in for nine years? Or, the
  rest of your life?
• If the answer to any of these questions is no,
  then that shows that the right to life does not
  always trump ones right to decide what happens
  in and to ones body.
• Accordingly, (P2) is false and the argument is
  unsound.
• Relevant similarities between the violinist case
  and cases of pregnancy due to rape
• S1 Person stands to die.
• S2 Involuntary (no consent).

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the right to life

• Thomson is using an argument from analogy.
• Violinist
• x (is a person), y (needs use of your body), z
  (you did not consent) ? you have no moral
  obligation to keep person alive
• Abortion (rape case)
• x (is a person), y (needs use of your body), z
  (you did not consent) ? so, you have no moral
  obligation to keep person alive in this case as
  well

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the right to life

• The point
• The right to life consists not in the right not
  to be killed, but in the right not to be killed
  unjustly.
• The upshot
• It is by no means enough to show that the fetus
  is a person, and to remind us that all persons
  have a right to life we need to be shown also
  that killing the fetus violates its right to
  life, i.e., that abortion is unjust killing. And
  is it? The violinist case shows that in a case
  of pregnancy due to rape the mother has the
  right to unplug herself, so to speak.
• What about the moral acceptability/wrongness of
  abortion in cases of pregnancy that are not due
  to rape?
• Consider the following revised version of the
  right to life argument

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the invitation argument

• P1) A fetus is a person.
• P2) A person has a right to life, which is the
  right not to be killed unjustly.
• C1) Therefore, a fetus has a right to life,
  which is the right not to be killed unjustly.
• P3) If x has a right to life, which is the
  right not to be killed unjustly, then if y issues
  an invitation to x for x to use ys body, then
  ys killing x is morally wrong.
• C2) Therefore, if y issues an invitation to x
  for x to use ys body, then ys killing x is
  morally wrong.

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invitations

• Let us assume that an invitation entails
  obligation.
• This would explain why abortion in the case of
  pregnancy due to rape is morally acceptable
  there is no such invitation.
• But, Thomson asks,
• In what pregnancy could it be supposed that the
  mother has given the unborn person a right to
  the use of her body for food and shelter? It is
  not as if there are unborn persons drifting about
  the world, to whom a woman who wants a child
  says, I invite you in.
• One might object that if a woman voluntarily
  engages in intercourse, undertaken in full
  knowledge of the chance a pregnancy might result
  from it, and then she does become pregnant, she
  is partly responsible for the presence of the
  unborn child inside her, and so has a moral
  obligation to stay plugged in, so to speak.

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the revised invitation argument

• P1) A fetus is a person.
• P2) A person has a right to life, which is the
  right not to be killed unjustly.
• C1) Therefore, a fetus has a right to life,
  which is the right not to be killed unjustly.
• P3) If x has a right to life, which is the
  right not to be killed unjustly, then if y
  voluntarily A-s in full knowledge of the chance
  that A-ing might result in there being some x
  that needs to use ys body in order to live, then
  if ys A-ing results in there being some x that
  needs to use ys body in order to live ys
  killing x is morally wrong.
• C2) Therefore, if y voluntarily A-s in full
  knowledge of the chance that A-ing might result
  in there being some x that needs to use ys body
  in order to live, then if ys A-ing results in
  there being some x that needs to use ys body in
  order to live ys killing x is morally wrong.

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invitations

• Consider the burglar
• Imagine that your room is stuffy. You open a
  window to air it (knowing that there is a 1
  chance a burglar might be around), and a burglar
  climbs in.
• Question
• Do you have a moral obligation to allow the
  burglar to stay?
• In this scenario, you opened the window
  voluntarily, with full knowledge of what burglars
  are and do. But, still, despite that, you have no
  obligation to allow the burglar to stay. It
  would be absurd to claim otherwise.
• The upshot
• It cannot be true that voluntary action
  undertaken with full knowledge of the possible
  (though unlikely and undesired) consequences
  entails an obligation to accept those
  consequences.
• Accordingly, (P3) is false and the revised
  invitation argument is unsound.

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invitations

• This is another argument from analogy.
• Burglar
• x (is a person), y (needs to stay), z (was able
  to enter because of an action which you
  voluntarily engaged in with full knowledge of the
  possible consequences) ? you have no moral
  obligation to keep person alive
• Abortion (contraception case)
• x (is a person), y (needs to stay), z (was able
  to enter because of an action which you
  voluntarily engaged in with full knowledge of the
  possible consequences) ? so, you have no moral
  obligation to keep person alive in this case as
  well
• One might object that the burglar is not
  innocent, whereas the fetus is.

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the doubly revised invitation argument

• P1) A fetus is a person.
• P2) A person has a right to life, which is the
  right not to be killed unjustly.
• C1) Therefore, a fetus has a right to life,
  which is the right not to be killed unjustly.
• P3) If x has a right to life, which is the
  right not to be killed unjustly, then if y
  voluntarily A-s in full knowledge of the chance
  that A-ing might result in there being some
  innocent x that needs to use ys body in order to
  live, then if ys A-ing results in there being
  some innocent x that needs to use ys body in
  order to live ys killing x is morally wrong.
• C2) Therefore, if y voluntarily A-s in full
  knowledge of the chance that A-ing might result
  in there being some innocent x that needs to use
  ys body in order to live, then if ys A-ing
  results in there being some innocent x that needs
  to use ys body in order to live ys killing x is
  morally wrong.

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invitations

• Consider the homeless person
• Imagine that it is not a burglar who climbs in,
  but a wandering, innocent, homeless person who
  falls in.
• Question
• Do you have an obligation to allow the homeless
  person to stay?
• In this scenario, we can assume that you opened
  the window voluntarily, with full knowledge of
  what wandering, innocent, homeless people are and
  do. But, still, despite that, you have no
  obligation to allow the homeless person to stay.
  It would be absurd to claim otherwise.
• The upshot
• It cannot be true that voluntary action
  undertaken with full knowledge of the possible
  (though unlikely and undesired) consequences
  entails an obligation to accept those
  consequences, even in the case where the person
  affected is innocent.
• Accordingly, (P3) is false and the doubly revised
  invitation argument is unsound.

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invitations

• Consider the people seeds
• Imagine that there were such things as people
  seeds, and they drift about in the air like
  pollen, and if you open your windows, one may
  drift in and take root in your carpets and
  upholstery. You dont want children, so you fix
  up your windows with mesh screens, the very best
  you can buy. But, as it happens, one of the
  screens in a window is defective, and a seed
  drifts in and takes root, and begins to develop.

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invitations

• In this case, you knowingly keep carpets and
  upholstered furniture, and you know that the
  screens are sometimes defective. You could live
  without furniture and with bare floors, or with
  sealed windows and doors, but you dont.
• But the fact that you do these things
  voluntarily, with full knowledge of the potential
  consequences, does not seem to make it so that
  you have a moral obligation to allow the
  people-plants to develop in your house.
• for by the same token anyone can avoid
  pregnancy due to rape by having a hysterectomy,
  or anyway by never leaving home without a
  (reliable!) army.

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invitations

• Thomsons homeless person and people seeds cases
  are intended to show that abortion is acceptable
  in at least some cases of contraceptive failure.
• Some relevant similarities amongst these cases
• S1 Innocent person stands to die.
• S2 Reasonable precautions taken.
• S3 Defect in protection.
• The argument is once again an argument from
  analogy

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invitations

• Homeless person and people seeds
• v (is an innocent person), w (needs to stay), x
  (was able to enter because of an action which you
  voluntarily engaged in with full knowledge of the
  possible consequences), y (you took reasonable
  precautions to prevent y), z (y resulted because
  of a defect in protection) ? you have no moral
  obligation to keep person alive
• Abortion (contraceptive failure case)
• v (is an innocent person), w (needs to stay), x
  (was able to enter because of an action which you
  voluntarily engaged in with full knowledge of the
  possible consequences), y (you took reasonable
  precautions to prevent y), z (y resulted because
  of a defect in protection) ? so, you have no
  moral obligation to keep person alive in this
  case as well

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in-class activity

• Assess Thomsons people-seeds analogy
• Come up with what you think might be considered a
  morally relevant disanalogy between the
  people-seeds case and cases of abortion due to
  contraceptive failure.
• Explain (1) why it might be considered a
  disanology and (2) why it might be considered
  morally relevant.

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risky behavior

• One might object that abortion is still morally
  wrong. For
• if it is morally wrong to voluntarily do that
  which one knows may result in killing a person,
  then, morally speaking, one must not voluntarily
  do that act to do that act is morally wrong.
• Lets see whether this objection is plausible
• P1) One must not voluntarily do that which one
  knows may result in killing a person to do so
  is morally wrong.
• P2) Driving a car is a voluntary action that we
  know may result in killing a person.
• C) Therefore, one must not drive a car to do
  so is morally wrong!

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risky behavior

• Of course, driving a car is not morally wrong.
• Even though driving may result in killing a
  person (and despite the fact that we all know
  that this is so), it is clearly morally
  acceptable to drive.
• We need not take the precaution here prescribed
  namely, not driving.
• So, we may conclude that there must be something
  wrong with the claim that it is morally wrong to
  voluntarily do that which one knows may result in
  killing a person.
• Unless there is a relevant difference between
  these cases, we lack reason to think that
  abortion is wrong in those cases in which a woman
  voluntarily engages in contraceptive sex,
  undertaken in full knowledge of the chance a
  pregnancy might result.

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risky behavior

• Again, consider some of the relevant similarities
  between having contraceptive sex and driving
• S1 Voluntary (consent).
• S2 Reasonable precautions taken.
• S3 If there is an accident (a defect in
  protection), then a person dies.
• S4 Done anyways.
• One might object that sex was designed to make
  babies, whereas driving was not designed to
  kill someone

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risky behavior

• But, consider the argument applied to shooting
  guns (which were designed to kill)
• P1) One must not voluntarily do that which one
  knows may result in killing an innocent person
  to do so is morally wrong.
• P2) Shooting a gun is a voluntary action that
  we know may result in killing an innocent person.
• C) Therefore, one must not shoot guns to do
  so is morally wrong!
• Of course, shooting a gun isnt wrong when you
  take the necessary precautions. If, after taking
  such precautions your shooting the gun results in
  someones death, due to a defect in protection,
  you are not doing anything morally wrong by
  shooting the gun.
• Applied to the case of abortion, this suggests
  that abortion isnt wrong when you take the
  necessary precautions. If, after taking such
  precautions your sexual activity still results in
  someones death, due to a defect in protection,
  you are not doing anything morally wrong by
  having an abortion.

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sometimes...

• Thomson clearly does not think that it follows
  from her argument that abortion is acceptable in
  all cases. She maintains that there are many
  cases in which an abortion is indeed morally
  wrong
• e.g., if a woman wants an abortion during her
  seventh month simply in order to avoid the
  nuisance of postponing a trip abroad, or if the
  fetus could be removed from her body without
  killing it or harming her, etc.
• Question
• People can be negligent in both sex and driving
  what counts as taking appropriate precautions?
• When is our behavior appropriate and when is it
  negligent?