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Extracting Valuable Data from Classroom Trading Pits

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The first scientific experiments in economics were ... Remarked on difference from competitive equilibrium outcome. Observed excess trading. ... Remarks ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Extracting Valuable Data from Classroom Trading Pits


1
Extracting Valuable Data from Classroom Trading
Pits
Ted Bergstrom Eugene Kwok University of
California, Santa Barbara
2
The Origin of Experimental Economics
  • The first scientific experiments in economics
    were classroom market experiments
  • by Edward Chamberlin at Harvard in 1940s.

3
Chamberlins experiments
  • Assigned Buyer Values and Seller Costs.
  • Let students mill around and trade.
  • Recorded prices.
  • Remarked on difference from competitive
    equilibrium outcome.
  • Observed excess trading.

4
Revival at Purdue
  • Chamberlins experiments went almost unnoticed
    until
  • Vernon Smith revisited them in his classroom at
    Purdue.

5
Smiths experiments
  • Gave competition a better chance.
  • Two main differences from Chamberlin.
  • Double oral auction, not pit trading
  • Ran 3-5 rounds, repeating same setup
  • Found outcomes very close to competitive
    equilibrium

6
Founders of Experimental Economics
  • Edward Chamberlin
  • Vernon Smith

7
Our Data
  • Classroom experiments from Experiments with
    Economic Principles, a principles text by
    Bergstrom and Miller
  • Experiments conducted in 31 classrooms, 10
    universities.

8
The Apple Market
  • Students assigned roles as apple suppliers or
    apple demanders.
  • Suppliers supply at most 1 bushel.
  • Demanders demand at most 1 bushel.

9
Buyer Values and Seller Costs
  • Two types of demanders
  • High ValueBuyer Value is 40
  • Low ValueBuyer Value is 20
  • Two types of suppliers
  • High CostSeller Cost is 30
  • Low CostSeller Cost is 10

10
Session 1
  • 2/3 of Sellers have low cost, 1/3 high.
  • 2/3 of Demanders have low value, 1/3 high.

11
Demand and Supply in Session 1
12
Session 2
  • 2/3 of Sellers have high cost, 1/3 low.
  • 2/3 of Demanders have high value, 1/3 low.

13
Demand and Supply in Session 2
14
  • Session 1 Distribution of Average Prices

15
  • Session 2 Distribution of Average Prices

16
  • Session 1 Distribution of Quantity Deviations

17
  • Session 2 Distribution of Quantity Deviations

18
Enough to convince crudulous students, maybe
  • But does the evidence show that competitive
    theory is empirically useful?

19
An alternative hypothesis Profit Splitting
  • Demanders meet suppliers chosen at random.
  • If mutually profitable trade is available they
    trade, splitting the profits.
  • Demander with value 40 and supplier with cost
    30 trade at 35, etc.
  • There is trading at 15, 25, and 40.
  • If high cost seller meets low value demander, no
    trade.
  • .

20
Average Prices are predicted better by
Profit-Splitting

Session 1 Session 2
Competitive 20 30
Profit-Split 20.7 29.3
Actual, Rd 1 21.2 27.0
Actual Rd 2 21.2 28.5
21
Detailed predictions
  • Competitive theory and profit splitting theory
    both make detailed predictions beyond average
    price and total quantity.
  • Distribution of prices
  • Competition implies uniform price.
  • Splitting implies trading at 15, 25, and 40.
  • Both theories predict who trades with whom as
    well as total number of trades.

22
Demand and Supply in Session 1
23
Session 1 Detailed Price Predictions
Competitive vs Profit-splitting
Price Range 14-16 24-26 34-36 19-21
Competitive 0 0 0 100
Profit-splitting 57 29 14 0
Actual shares, Rd 1 24 18 6 20
Actual shares, Rd 2 16 19 2 30
24
  • Session 1 Distribution of All Prices

25
Demand and Supply in Session 2
26
Session 2 Detailed Price Predictions
Competitive vs Profit-splitting
Price Range 14-16 24-26 34-36 29-31
Competitive 0 0 0 100
Profit-splitting 14 29 57 0
Actual shares, Rd 1 7 20 8 32
Actual shares, Rd 2 2 24 8 42
27
  • Session 2 Distribution of All Prices

28
Session 1 Detailed Quantity Predictions
Competitive vs Profit-Splitting
Buyer Value Seller Cost LowLow Low High High Low High High Total Trades
Competitive Prediction 197 0 241 0 438
Profit-Splitting Prediction 290 0 145 73 508
Actual, Round 1 221 9 207 34 471
Actual Round 2 218 0 209 38 465
29
Session 2 Detailed Quantity Predictions
Competitive vs Profit-Splitting
Buyer Value Seller Cost LowLow Low High High Low High High Total Trades
Competitive Prediction 0 0 241 201 442
Profit-Splitting Prediction 74 0 148 296 518
Actual, Round 1 26 6 218 211 461
Actual Round 2 18 2 218 213 451
30
Remarks
  • Sometimes trading environment is like Smiths,
    much repetition with same environments and public
    trading.
  • Sometimes more like Chamberlins or like ours.
  • Seems worth understanding what happens in
    environments with intermediate levels of
    information.

31
Mining Classroom Trading Pits
  • Data is cheap and abundant.
  • Design is less flexible.
  • But worth saving and studying.
  • Remember where experimental economics started.

32
Thats all for now
  • Mine tailings
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