United States Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program

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United States Naval Nuclear
Propulsion Program
9/12/2001
Afghanistan
Iran
Pakistan
India
FIRST SHIPS ON STATION CVN 65, CVN 70, SSN 719,
SSN 722
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NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM

• FOCUSED MISSION
• Provide militarily effective nuclear propulsion
  plants and ensure their safe, reliable, and
  long-lived operation
• CLEAR, TOTAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
  FOR ALL ASPECTS
• Research, development, design, construction
• Maintenance, repair, overhaul, disposal
• Radiological controls, environment, safety, and
  health matters
• Officer operator selection, operator training
• Administration (security, nuclear safeguards,
  transportation, public information,
• procurement and fiscal management)
• Centralized control of Programs Industrial
  Base/Vendors
• Spent fuel custody
• SIMPLE, ENDURING, LEAN STRUCTURE
• Director tenure 8 years, 4-Star Admiral/Deputy
  Administrator in NNSA
• Dual agency structure with direct access to
  Secretaries of Energy and Navy
• Small headquarters, field activities

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12344 SET FORTH IN PUBLIC LAW
98-525 AND 106-65

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NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM
REPORT TO DIRECTOR - Ensures focus on mission -
Immediate identification of concerns
NUCLEAR POWERED FLEET
- 82 ships
- Over 40 of
major combatants
DEDICATED LABORATORIES
- Bettis Atomic
Power Laboratory - Knolls Atomic Power
Laboratory - GOCOs
SHIPYARDS 4 Public / 2 Private
RD/TRAINING REACTORS - Train 2500 students/year
SPECIALIZED INDUSTRIAL BASE - 1 dedicated
equipment prime contractor -
Hundreds of suppliers
SCHOOLS -
Nuclear Power School - Nuclear Field A
School
103 reactors operating worldwide
LEAN, CENTRALLY CONTROLLED, DEDICATED, SUCCESSFUL
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MASTERING NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY
Defense in Depth Design simple, rugged,
redundant, fail-safe, conservative Rigorous
quality control on-site reps, detailed specs,
HQ approval for deviations, separate
logistics/supply, documentation (quality
evidence) Comprehensive procedures and
procedural compliance Oversight NPEB,
squadron, type commander, field office People
carefully selected rigorous and continuous
training
THE KEY IS PEOPLE CAREFULLY SELECTED, HIGHLY
TRAINED, MOTIVATED
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ENGINEERING c1PEOPLE3

• Engineered systems are used by people
• Engineering analysis is done by people
• Engineered equipment is maintained by people

YOU CANT ENGINEER PEOPLE OUT OF THE EQUATION
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NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION PLANTPressurized Water
Reactor
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Multiple Safety Drivers...which can be in
tension.

• Reactor Safety
• Ship Safety
• Crew Worker Safety
• Public Safety
• Environmental Safety

The tyranny of the OR - Built to Last by James
Collins Jerry Porras

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TRUE TO OUR ROOTS

• Most technical requirements and administrative
  processes developed under ADM Rickover.
• His experience included time aboard ship
  (pre-WWII) and as head of Electrical Division of
  BUSHIPS.

One must create the ability in his staff to
generate clear, forceful arguments for opposing
view points as well as their own. Open
discussions and disagreements must be encouraged,
so that all sides of an issue will be fully
explored. Further, important issues should be
presented in writing. Nothing so sharpens the
thought process as writing down ones arguments.
Weaknesses overlooked in oral discussion rapidly
become painfully obvious on the written page. -
H. G. Rickover
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KEY SAFETY ATTRIBUTES

• Self-regulating
• Multiple safety barriers
• Large margins to core damage
• Long time for response for many casualties
• Operator back-up
• Thoroughly and continuously trained operators
• Multiple systems

Since engineering is a profession which affects
the material basis of everyones life, there is
almost always an unconsulted third party involved
in any contract between the engineer and those
who employ him that is the country, the people
as a whole Knowing more than the public about
the effects his work will have, the engineer
ought to consider himself an officer of the
court and keep the general interest always in
mind. - H. G. Rickover
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DEFENSE IN DEPTH IN ANALYSES

• Engineering modeling
• Reactor safety and ship reliability for
  casualties
• Public safety

the NRC staff comments positively on the
conservative design philosophy, the stringent
standards for construction and materials, the
incorporation of past operating experience, and
the consideration of human performance in the
VIRGINIA Class Submarines nuclear propulsion
plant. The VIRGINIA Class Submarines nuclear
propulsion plant represents an advancement in
safety over previous submarine classes that the
RNC has reviewed. - NRC letter of October 15,
2002
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SAFETY CULTURE

• IAEA definition The assembly of characteristics
  and attitudes in organizations and individuals
  which establishes that, as an overriding
  priority, protection and safety issues receive
  the attention warranted by their significance.
• Another definition a work environment where a
  safety ethic permeates the organization and
  peoples behavior focuses on accident prevention
  through critical self-assessment, pro-active
  identification of management and technical
  problems, and appropriate, timely, and effective
  resolution of the problems before they become
  crises. (Jonathan Wert, 1986)

Culture the quality in a person or society
that arises from an interest in excellence ....
development or improvement of the mind by
education or training. - The Random House
College Dictionary (1980)
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MAKING A SAFETY CULTURE

• Ingredients
• Assembly the whole must net out as viewing
  safety as important saying it is someone elses
  job does not suffice
• Characteristics organizational structure and
  rules must support
• Attitudes people have to believe, and show they
  believe, that safety is important
• Overriding if cost and schedule keep taking
  precedence, people get the message and the
  culture suffers
• Attention problems must be communicated to
  appropriate personnel
• Significance cognizant personnel must be
  capable of assessing impact on safety to do so,
  they must be trained, given authority, given
  complete information.
• Accident prevention before they become crises
  fix problems while they are still minor
• Self-assessment know how well you are doing the
  job
• Management AND technical problems are not
  limited just to hardware
• Summary Identify, communicate, resolve,
  self-assess, train.

SAFETY CONSCIOUS WORK ENVIRONMENT
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PROGRAM PHILOSOPHY

• Centralized technical control of all aspects
• Personal responsibility for technical, safety,
  radcon, environmental
• In-depth technical understanding of all aspects
  of work at all levels
• HQ involvement in all aspects (design,
  procedures, operations)
• Organization with internal checks to ensure
  thorough review
• Prompt reporting, evaluation, and correction of
  problems
• Rigorous theoretical and practical training
  continuing training at all levels
• Conservative designs with ample safety margins
  prevention first
• Rigorous quality assurance of all aspects
• Thorough testing of equipment prior to fleet
  application
• Formality, discipline, and precision
• Emphasis on close, frequent technical oversight
• Skepticism, frankness, self-criticism, integrity,
  attention to detail.

PREVENT BIG PROBLEMS BY WORKING HARD ON THE SMALL
ONES
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NNPP TRIANGLE VIEW OF PROBLEMS
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CENTRALIZED TECHNICAL CONTROL

• Director responsible for all aspects of work
• Frequent oral written reports from all Program
  activities
• HQ
• Outstanding personnel management technically
  trained
• Directly oversees adequacy of all technical
  requirements
• Exercises technical approval over contractors,
  SYs, vendors
• Multiple reporting chains ensure problems
  promptly brought to attention of cognizant
  personnel
• Oversees all personnel actions related to the
  Program
• Directs and oversees all logistic support
  functions
• Controls special nuclear material, including
  shipment
• Responsible from RD throughout life to final
  disposal
• Periodic audits by cognizant technical personnel

KNOWLEDGEABLE AND DEMANDING CUSTOMER
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CLOSE, FREQUENT TECHNICAL OVERSIGHT

• On-site field offices do surveillance, auditing
• Activity self-assessment capability reviewed
• Periodic HQ reviews (DOE labs) and audits
  (shipyards) by cognizant technical leads
• Regular letters to Admiral top HQ staff on
  issues
• Reporting deviations from normal operation
• HQ technical approval for almost every design
  detail and procedure

ASSURING PERFORMANCE TO HIGH STANDARDS
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ASSURE PLANTS OPERATE WITHIN SAFE LIMITS

• Compliance with technical requirements
• Detailed procedures and description
• Analyses for casualty conditions
• Operation only by highly trained, qualified
  operators
• Rapidly reporting deviations from normal
  operation via multiple paths
• Strong, continuing maintenance

QUESTIONING ATTITUDE
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CONTROL OF WORK

• Naval nuclear shipyard organization set
• Nuclear work groups
• Test and refueling organization
• Maintenance controlled by NR documents
• General process specified in NR manual
• Detailed testing prior to unrestricted operations
• Multiple oversight internal shipyard
  organization, ships crew, NR field office.

YOU GET WHAT YOU INSPECT, NOT WHAT YOU EXPECT
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NR HQ TECHNICAL APPROVAL PROCESS

• Cognizant technical organization submittal
• NR HQ review
• Lead engineer
• Internal section agreement
• Concurrence of other sections
• Copy to ADM
• Resolution of any dissent
• Additional iterations may be required

You must tell me the technically correct answer.
Once we decide that a way forward is technically
acceptable, we should then consider the schedule
and cost implications of these solutions. - ADM
Bowman
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LESSONS LEARNED

• Learn from your mistakes.
• Even better, learn from other peoples mistakes.
• When the unexpected happens, investigate.
• Understand the consequences had it happened under
  less fortuitous circumstanceswhat if?
• Dont assume it wont happen again.
• Evaluate need for corrective action.
• May need preliminary action (e.g., procedure or
  training change) while waiting for longer term
  (hardware modification)

Those who do not learn from history are doomed
to repeat it. - George Santayana
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EXAMPLES FROM PRIME CONTRACTOR

• Reactors and nuclear facilities are designed,
  constructed, maintained, and operated in
  accordance with applicable requirements and in a
  manner that protects people, the environment, and
  property.
• Every employee is personally responsible for
  performing their duties in a manner that
  preserved the nuclear safety values
• Line organizations have the primary
  responsibility for reactor and nuclear safety.
  This responsibility is not diminished by reviews
  external to the line organizations.
• Reactor and nuclear safety-related activities are
  formally reviewed by an organization of knowledge
  experts independent of the line organizations.

Line organizations have the primary
responsibility for reactor and nuclear safety
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QUESTIONS THAT SHOULD BE ASKED

• What are the acceptance criteria (i.e. , what is
  the basis for accepting this recommendation)?
• What is the consequence of failure that this
  recommendation is designed to prevent?
• What are the areas and levels of uncertainty (has
  there been an uncertainty analysis performed)?
• What is the level of conservatism or margin to
  failure?
• What change in the margin to failure will result
  from accepting the recommendation?
• Is there a precedent for the recommendation?
• How does this recommendation affect other design
  areas and/or how does it interact with other
  historical design changes and safety
  requirements?
• Why should this recommendation be accepted (i.e.,
  what is the benefit)?

QUESTIONING ATTITUDE
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ADM Bowmans Core Values - The Culture

• Technical Excellence - technically correct
  solution identified, technically expert decision
  makers, minority opinions, appropriate
  conservatism, simple/robust designs, cautiously
  challenge status quo
• Responsibility - own your job, face facts tell
  the truth, mainstream safety, overlapping
  responsibilities
• People - selectivity, continuing training,
  professional competence, personal responsibility,
  dedication, long-term perspective, decisive
• Formality and Discipline - decisions and their
  basis are documented, written procedures,
  procedural compliance, dont live with
  deficiencies, dont normalize deviance, effective
  communications

CONSTRUCTIVE DISSATISFACTION
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COMMITMENT TO SAFETY

• Mainstreamed carried out day-to-day as a normal
  way of doing work by all personnel.
• An enduring deep fundamental core value of the
  organization, not a short term program or add-on.

In a submarine environment, with these
constraints, there is only one way to ensure
safety it must be embedded from the start in
the equipment, the procedures, and, most
importantly, the people associated with the
work. - ADM F. Bowman (as quoted in NNBE
Progress Report of July 15, 2003 p 16)