Behavioural Safety at the Carrington Site

1
Behavioural Safety at the Carrington Site

• From a plateau to an iceberg, trying to avoid a
  few crevasses
• Peter Webb, HSEQ Manager, Basell Polyolefins
  Carrington Site

2
Outline

• What is behavioural safety
• How we implemented a behavioural programme
• Some key learning points

3
Safety . A potted history
Technological Improvements
Management Systems
We are here!
INCIDENTS
Human Factors
TIME
4
Why Behavioural Safety?
Its just another tool in the human factors tool
box
5
What does a Behavioural Approach Comprise?

• All behavioural safety programmes have a system
  of OBSERVATION and FEEDBACK
• The observations can be done by anybody on
  anybody
• Its all about people talking to each other about
  safety

6
The Observation Process

• Stop and observe
• Put the person being observed at ease
• Explain what you are doing and why
• Discuss the job being carried out
• Observe the work activity for a few minutes
• Praise safe behaviours
• Discuss any at risk behaviours
• What
• Why
• Discuss what the worst consequences could have
  been
• Ask what corrective action is required
• Get commitment to act
• Finally record the observation - but no names!

Observation
On the spot Feedback
7
Why do we behave the way we do?
Values
Attitudes
Behaviours
Our behaviour is driven by our attitudes and
values
8
What Are Behaviours?
Value I think safetys important
Attitude Im going to use the right tools for
the job
Behaviour !!! Ive brought the wrong tool
out with me. But Im not going to use it, because
that would be unsafe. Im going to walk back to
the workshop and get the right one.
Our behaviour is driven by our attitudes and
values
9
How can you modify At Risk Behaviours?

• At risk behaviours are driven by attitudes and
  values
• But you cant modify peoples values and
  attitudes directly . They are too deep within
  us.
• So you use a system of observations which address
  the at risk behaviours.
• If you work on modifying the at risk
  behaviours, eventually the at risk attitudes
  and values change too.
• We used to feel it was safe to ride in a car
  without a seat belt.

10
Modify the behaviour and the value will follow
Value I feel uncomfortable and exposed in my
car without a seat belt
Value I feel safe in my car without a seat belt
Attitude Wearing seat belts is unnecessary
Attitude Wearing seat belts is a responsible
thing to do
Behaviour I dont wear my seat belt in my car.
Behaviour I wear my seat belt in my car.
Behaviour modification You must wear your seat
belt, its the law!
11
Carrington Site
12
How did we come to BBS

• 1980s
• Systems initiatives in HSE.
• Total recordable injury rate reduced from 18 to
  10 injuries per million hours worked.
• Mid 1990s
• Safety performance had plateaued
• 1996 became aware of behavioural programmes
• Decision was taken to pilot it on one plant
  (Styrocell)
• Engaged BS provider to assist in implementation
• Started with observations in January 1997.

13
BBS Programme
Carrington implementation followed classical
approach ...
Ref HSE CRR 430/2002
14
BBS Programme

• Some specifics of our implementation
• List of critical behaviours
• Developed by reviewing near miss reports.
• Follow up
• We dont wait for trends to develop. We follow up
  on the individual at risks - prioritised short
  list.
• Facilities vs behaviour
• We dont limit the at risks to behaviour related
• We allow at risks which are related to the
  facilities as well
• The most important thing is that people are doing
  the observations face to face

15
BBS Programme

• Styrocell programme was a great success.
• Great enthusiasm amongst (most/enough)
  technicians.
• Programme was rolled out to rest of site in
  1997/8.
• Steering groups set up in each dept
• Separate list of critical behaviours in each dept
• Cross site facilitators group
• Approx 10 - 15 of workforce were observers (now
  its 100 plus contractors)
• A lot of creativity and energy put into it

16
(No Transcript)
17
Total Recordable Injury Rate (per 106 hrs)
gt 18 Before 1990
BBS introduced
18
Resuscitation

• In 1999 it was clear there were problems
• Fall off in observations
• Technicians were saying
• The same observations are being done on the same
  tasks
• People cant be bothered
• Its the same people being observed all the
  time
• Observation process is too formal
• Carrington is already safe, so why bother?
• Whats coming out of it?
• Data input to database is difficult

19
Resuscitation

• Managers were saying the same as the technicians,
  and
• Theres not enough visible output.
• We need more performance metrics contact rate,
  observation quality
• Vision is that everybody needs to be an
  observer.
• Whole process needs to become part of the
  existing HSE system.
• We need to move on from the original concept and
  make BBS our own.

20
Resuscitation

• It was not delivering to its full potential
• But we thought the approach was fundamentally
  sound
• So we launched a resuscitation
• Decision to work without the original BS provider
• .. A representative team identified 4 issues

21
Resuscitiation Issue 1 Organisation

• Issue
• Need to make line supervisors part of the
  process.
• Need to integrate BBS into the site HSE systems.

22
Resuscitiation Issue 1 Organisation
The BBS organisation we started with
Made up of Managers and technicians
Only Technicians
23
Resuscitiation Issue 1 Organisation
And the organisation we changed to .
Its fully integrated!
Managers supervisors and technicians Subgroup
made up of Improvement Leader and cell focal
points
Key person
Site divided into cells of 6 - 8 people Everybody
is an observer, including contractors
24
Resuscitiation Issue 2 Perceptions

• Issue
• Overcome the complacency Its already safe at
  Carrington
• People dont see the value.
• Response
• At the end of the observation, during the
  feedback, if there are at risks to discuss,
  jointly agree what was the worst consequence
  which could have happened.
• Jointly agree a ranking (L, M, H) for the
  potential outcome on a defined scale ranging from
  slight injury (first aid), through to fatality.
• Gets people to visualise what could go wrong

25
Resuscitation Issue 3 Reporting

• Issue
• Need to pull out learning points.
• Need to give feedback to observers.
• Integrate into the business link with near miss
  reporting.
• Response
• Every month ..
• Overall KPIs reviewed by site HSE Council
  (chaired by Site Manager)
• Department HSE committees review performance
  against KPIs
• Cell members receive a report showing status of
  the at risks

26
Resuscitation Issue 4 Observations

• Issue
• People should want to carry out observations.
• Need to simplify the observation process.
• Need to make recording simpler.
• Response
• Original programme design comprised a different
  list of critical behaviours in each department
• Created a generic list to be used by everybody
• Allows any observer to carry out observations
  anywhere on site
• The generic list is quite short, observation time
  can be as short as 5 minutes
• Some people even do it without the checklist!

27
Other things weve learned!

• Key Performance Indicators
• Currently have 3 KPIs
• Number of observations, 1 per person per month
  (all employees and contractors)
• Quality, Percent of observations for which the
  what and the why are filled out gt 80
• Close-out of High at risks, 100 in lt 3 months
• Number of observations forms part of bonus scheme
• 1800 observations in 2001, 2400 in 2002
• . We dont have a KPI on safe!
• If you get 100 safe, does that mean youve
  finally made it? A safe work place at last?
• Or does it mean people arent looking hard
  enough?
• With our generic list of critical behaviours,
  its hard to imagine we could reach 100 safe.

28
Other things weve learned!

• Management Commitment
• Everybody knows its important, but what can they
  do to show it
• By taking an active interest
• Management team must be active observers
• Use managers to coach in the observer training

29
Other things weve learned!

• Hold an away day in a nice hotel!
• Organised by the BBS department focal points
• Attended by site management team, cell focal
  points, term contractors
• Generated several action items for enhancing the
  programme
• Demonstrates management commitment, generates
  good ideas, gets buy in.

30
Other things weve learned!

• Organisational readiness
• Implementing BBS is a big commitment - you dont
  want it to fail!
• Organisational readiness (climate/culture) is a
  key factor which influences likelihood of
  success.
• HSE CRR 430/2002 - of 8 providers interviewed, 3
  said they would proceed regardless of readiness.
• To avoid a costly failure, discuss up front, or
  conduct independent culture survey.

31
Other things weve learned!

• Can be extended to other areas
• e.g. We have now included environmentally
  critical behaviours in the programme
• Is environmental protection equipment available
• Is pollution prevention achieved
• Releases controlled
• Waste disposed of appropriately
• Energy used efficiently

32
Other things weve learned!

• Major Accident Hazards
• Behavioural safety has been driven by injury
  frequency
• Our inventory of critical behaviours was
  developed by reviewing near miss/incident reports
  -gt focus on workplace safety
• It doesnt follow that a reduction in the risks
  due to major accident hazards will occur
• It depends on the list of critical behaviours
• Heres an example of how BBS added to the major
  accident hazard risk!

33
Major Accident Hazards

• Manlid was not only used for process reasons, but
  was also a relief device
• Handle had been fitted to solve a manual handling
  at risk after a BBS observation.
• Plant change procedure was not followed
• Bolts interfered with sealing surface
• Pentane vapour leakage
• Completely lost sight of the MAH risks

Handle
Bolts
34
Major Accident Hazards

• Incident investigations indicated Procedures
  were often a root cause
• Procedures often relate to controlling major
  accident hazards (plant change, safe operation,
  permit to work etc.)
• Weve added procedures to our inventory of
  critical behaviours

35
Major Accident Hazards

• Procedures
• permit to work
• safe operation
• plant change
• control of contractors
• etc

Yes
Was the procedure appropriate?
Yes
You can substitute the word Training for Procedure
NO
At risk
Yes
Safe
36
References

• Health Safety Executive (2002). Strategies to
  promote safe
• behaviour as part of a health and safety
  management system,
• Contract Research Report 430/2002,
  www.hse.gov.uk
• PRISM (2002). Behavioural Safety Application
  Guide,
• www.prism-network.org

37
Summary

• The organisation must be ready for it
• Management commitment is essential
• It needs to be easy to carry out the observations
• Needs to be integrated into the HSE MS
• Need at least a few enthusiastic people to keep
  things going in their departments
• People need to see some output
• Make sure the programme addresses all the issues
  which are important for your organisation - Dont
  forget about major accident hazards
• We think BBS works, but its not easy
• The End!