CIVIL CONTINGENCIES SECRETARIAT Horizon scanning for disruptive challenges

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BUILDING FLU PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS Bruce
Mann Head of Civil Contingencies
Secretariat Cabinet Office

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Risk and Priority

• World Health Organisation
• Experts agree that another pandemic is likely to
  happen but are unable to say when.
• Governments and their partners need to develop
  strategies and programmes to prepare for a
  pandemic.

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Planning Assumptions the virus

• A new pandemic will be due to a new sub-type of
  influenza A.
• A pandemic strain could first emerge anywhere,
  including the UK, but is most likely to emerge in
  China or the Far East ..
• In the event of a novel influenza virus causing
  significant outbreaks of human illness elsewhere
  in the world, it is unlikely that the UK could
  prevent importation (except by closing all
  borders) even a 99.9 restriction on travel into
  the country would only be expected to delay
  importation of the virus by up to two months
• Spread from an origin in Asia is likely to
  follow the main routes of travel and trade.
• Spread from the source country to the UK is
  likely to take around a month modern travel may
  result in wide international spread even more
  rapidly than this.

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Planning Assumptions UK spread

• following arrival in the UK it will take a
  further 2-3 weeks until cases are occurring
  across the whole country.
• Once influenza levels exceed the baseline
  threshold influenza activity in the UK may last
  for 3-5 months, depending on the season, and
  there may be subsequent waves, weeks or months
  apart.
• All ages will be affected, but children and
  otherwise fit adults could be at relatively
  greater risk, particularly should elderly people
  have some residual immunity from exposure to a
  similar virus earlier in their lifetime.

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Planning Assumptions UK impact

• UK Influenza Pandemic Contingency Plan
• for planning purposes the base scenario is a
  cumulative clinical attack rate of 25 of the
  population over one or more waves of around 15
  weeks each, weeks or months apart. The second
  wave may be the more severe...
• The impact of overall case fatality rates
  between 0.37 and 2.5 have been considered.

Range of possible excess deaths, UK population
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Planning workstreams

• Gathering information and getting it to those who
  need it, at all levels.
• Modelling the virus its spread its impact
  response measures.
• The medical response vaccines anti-virals
  masks treatment protocols and clinical
  guidelines
• Policies on response in particular settings
  schools further and higher education social
  care courts prisons transport.
• Management of the dead.
• British nationals overseas
• Ensuring business continuity
• Communications.
• Crisis management arrangements.
• Exercises and other testing and assurance.
• Wider international engagement.

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Guidance

• UK Health Depts Pandemic Influenza Plan March
  2005 and October 2005. Basis for planning in
  health sector.
• See Dept of Health website for this Plan, plus
  further info
• Explaining Pandemic Flu
• Pandemic Flu Key Facts
• Pandemic Flu, important information for you and
  your family
• Additional guidance available for the non-health
  sector (Cabinet Office guidance issued in Feb
  2006 and Business Continuity Check list in May
  2006 on ukresilience website)
• Expect to issue further guidance over coming
  months (schools, managing dead)

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Crisis co-ordination

• National, regional and local structures to manage
  the consequences
• Department of Health lead
• Civil Contingencies Committee (COBR) for
  central Government
• Based on understanding of the virus, COBR will
  issue firm advice on the full range of response
  policies
• Regional Civil Contingencies Committees.
• Local multi-agency GOLD crisis co-ordination
  arrangements
• International dimension WHO EU G8.

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Business continuity

• Overall message business as usual, as far as
  practicable
• Medical countermeasures not a silver bullet
  solution
• Staff absences assume at peak in large
  organisation could be up to 15 for 2-3 weeks
  small businesses or critical teams should plan
  for 30 absence at peak.
• Possible additional social measures and travel
  restrictions will be considered by COBR.
• Would be considered early.
• Presumption against imposing such measures
  unlikely to use Civil Contingencies Act/emergency
  powers
• BUT local planning should consider how to
  implement in the event that COBR
  recommends/advises such measures

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BUILDING FLU PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS Bruce
Mann Head of Civil Contingencies
Secretariat Cabinet Office