Bridge

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Bridge Tunnel Security Against Terrorism

• Hossein Ghara, P.E.
• Tulane Engineering Forum
• December 2004
• U.S. DOT AASHTO, Recommendations for Bridge
  Tunnel Security, 2003 Source of Data, Tables
  and Graphs

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Terrorism In America

• September 11, 2001
• Al-Qaeda and other Terrorist groups are perceived
  to be unyielding, tenacious and patient
• Al-Qaeda terrorist training manual captured in
  England contains information about blasting and
  destroying Bridges leading into and out of the
  Cities in the U.S.
• Captured Al-Qaeda leader revealed Bridges in San
  Francisco or San Mateo

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The Blue Ribbon Panel (BRP)

• FHWA AASHTO Sponsorship
• A panel of Bridge and Tunnel experts from
  Professional Practice, Academia, Federal State
  agencies and Toll Authorities
• Chaired by Mr. James E. Roberts, Consulting
  Bridge Engineer, Imbsen Associates, Inc.
• Dr. John M. Kulicki, as Vice Chair,
  President/CEO and Chief Engineer, Modjeski
  Masters
• Mr. Dwight Beranek, Deputy Director of Military
  Programs, U.S. Army Corp of Engineers

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The Blue Ribbon Panel (CONT.)

• Mr. Joseph M. Englot, Assistant Chief
  Engineer/Design, Port Authority of New York New
  Jersey
• Dr. John Fisher, Professor Emeritus, Lehigh
  University
• Mr. Henry Hungerbeeler, Director, Mississippi DOT
  Chair, AASHTO Transportation Security Task
  Force
• Several others

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FHWAS Charge to the Panel

• Develop Short - and Long - term strategies for
  improving the safety and security of the Nations
  Bridges and Tunnels and provide guidance to
  highway infrastructure owners/operators

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September 2003

• Recommendations for Bridge Tunnel Security,
  published and released on September 2003

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• AASHTO Subcommittee on Bridges and
  Structures, Technical Committee on Bridge and
  Tunnel Security, T-1
• Louisiana is a member
• Engineering Design for Structural Hardness

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T-1s Latest Scope

• To review current transportation security related
  Scientific, Engineering and Technological
  resources and provide guidance to highway
  infrastructure owners/operators to implement
  industry-wide design specifications, risk
  management, technology and other short and long
  term strategies for improving the safety and
  security of the nations Bridges and Tunnels from
  a malevolent actions, while working within an
  environment where sensitive information is
  appropriately managed

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Facts Myths

• Success and Safety of Transportation System
• Parallel Routes
• Transportation System is Robust not susceptible
  to significant disruption by the terrorist
  attacks
• BRP opinion
• Above Conclusion is Incorrect

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Facts Myths ( CONT.)

• Straining Transportation Systems throughout the
  Country and struggles to keep up with demand of
  society and economy
• The nations Highway System has vulnerabilities,
  which must be addressed
• This is important enough to be a matter of
  National Security Policy

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Statistical Facts

• 600,00 Bridges in U.S.
• Studies show 1000 Bridges Substantial
  Casualties, Economic disruption and Societal
  ramifications would result from isolated attacks.
• 337 Tunnels
• 211 Transit Tunnels, many located beneath bodies
  of water with limited alternative routes due to
  geographical constraints

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Statistical Facts ( CONT.)

• Effects of Transportation - Related consequences
  of the September 11th attack
• Recent Barge collision in Oklahoma
• BRPs determination is that loss of a critical
  Bridge or Tunnel at one of numerous choice
  points in the highway system could result in
  hundreds of thousands of causalities, billion of
  dollars worth of direct reconstruction costs and
  even a greater socioeconomic costs
• Improvements in homeland security must address
  improvements to critical Bridges and Tunnels

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Statistical Facts (CONT.)

• Construction cost to replace a major long-span
  Bridge or Tunnel on a busy interstate highway
  corridor in the U.S. may be 1.75 Billion
• Reconstruction following major earth quakes
  (replacement can double the expediting cost of
  construction)
• Hundreds of fatalities may have possible
  environmental consequences
• Site will be a crime scene under investigation,
  compounds recovery and replacement

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Statistical Facts ( CONT.)

• BRPs opinion on the value cost of the loss of
  a critical Bridge or Tunnel could exceed 10
  billion
• A concerted attack on two or more facilities
  would result in a synergy where the total cost
  would be more than the sum of individual costs
• Economic consequences of a major coordinated
  terrorist attack on multiple facilities are
  almost unable to be estimated
• September 11th 2001 , attacks on the World Trade
  Center resulted in significant job losses in the
  area

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More Stunning Numbers

• Manhattan has lost some 85,000 jobs
• 28,000 jobs lost were related to firm relocation
  from Manhattan and the remaining 57,000 to
  recession related cut backs and secondary
  employment losses triggered by the disaster
• 1/3 of job loss, or 30,000 jobs were in Finance
  Insurance and 20,000 in service

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More on Socio-economic Loss

• The PATH commuter Rail Line and Station were
  rendered unusable
• 67,000 passengers each weekday were transported
  to lower Manhattan and was closed for about 2
  years
• This was a major factor in relocating 103 firms,
  1.1 million square feet of office space, and
  11,700 jobs from lower Manhattan to New Jersey

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Identify Critical Transportation Infrastructure

• Imperative, particularly with Bridges and Tunnels
• Provide strategic guidance for investing in
  Countermeasures Risk mitigation strategies

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Six Steps of Conducting a Vulnerability
Assessment of Transportation Assets

• Step 1 Identify Critical Assets
• Step 2 Assess Vulnerability
• Step 3 Assess Consequences
• Step 4 Identify Counter Measures
• Step 5 Estimate Counter Measures Costs
• Step 6 Review Operational Security Planning

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Critical and Vulnerability Matrix

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BRPs Over-arching Recommendations

• Reduce the vulnerability of Bridges Tunnels to
  attacks
• Institutional Recommendations (Interagency
  Coordination outreach and communication
  strategies, clarification of Legal
  responsibility)
• Fiscal Recommendations(New funding eligibility )
• Technical Recommendations ( Technical Expertise
  or Engineered R D and Implementation)/ The
  AASHTO, T-1 committee

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Vulnerability and Threats

• Assessment of Vulnerability requires
  consideration of the means of inflicting damage
  to a facility
• Effective countermeasures and associated costs
  cant be developed without the assessment of
  threat
• For the near term assessment of structures the
  National Bridge Inventory System (NBIS)
  maintained by FHWA is very useful
• Location, structure type, span characteristics,
  average daily traffic volume, military
  significance, etc. Can be provided by state DOT

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Threats

• Low-Tech and high tech conventional explosives
• Explosively formed penetrating devices
  (EFP, Kinetic Energy Penetrators)
• Low-Tech, hand-held cutting devices
• Truck-size/Barge-size conventional explosives
• HAZMAT release in tunnels
• Intentional ramming via ship or barge

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Damage Types

• Threats to the integrity of the structure
  (Resulting in replacement)
• Damage that inhibits the structures
  functionality for an extended period of time
• Contamination of a tunnel resulting in closure or
  loss of functionality
• Catastrophic failure resulting from an attack

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Countermeasures

• What if the process of prioritization and risk
  assessment concludes that Bridge or Tunnel need
  more security
• Take Countermeasures
• Singly
• In Combination
• Reduce attractiveness and/or vulnerability
• Reduce consequences if attacked

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Countermeasures ( CONT.)

• Management and operational Practices
• Exchange of practical information among
  owners/operators
• Review security management practices
• Clarification of responsibilities among agencies
  such as Federal, State, and Local entities
• Preparation for response to attack
• Personnel and vehicle security
• Communication/outreach (Other agencies, Media)

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Countermeasures (CONT.)

• Information Security
• Procurement practices on security-sensitive
  technologies without public disclosure (Also
  during construction)
• Information security such as controlling public
  access to as built drawings

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Countermeasures (CONT.)

• Mobilization and Response
• Threat warning-protocols for timely notification
  of owners/operators concerning imminent threats
  to specific assets
• Early response - policies and technologies needed
  to execute preparedness plans in response to
  attacks

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Countermeasures (CONT.)

• Recovery(Past event, Seismic events)
• Damage assessment-Technology
• Functional Continuity- Contingency Plan for
  reestablishing assets functionality

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States Countermeasures(CONT.)

• BRP has addressed the full range of security
  strategies
• BRPs primary focus has been narrowed on the
  Design and Engineering

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Primary Countermeasures Functions

• Ds
• Deter
• Deny Identify the Critical Structures
  and Prioritize
• Detect
• Delay
• Defend
• Design

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Prioritization Risk Assessment

• Joint effort between FHWA State DOT
• National Prioritization will require funding
• Due to a large number- two tier approach
• First Tier is done in two steps
• Step 1. Data driven approach such as NBIS data
  base (FHWA)
• Step 2. Additional data from owner
• ADT, Peak Occupancies, Criticality to
  Emergency Evaluation, Military, Alternative
  Route, Media Exposure
• Mixed use such as Highway and Rail Collateral
  Damage, Commercial vs. Passenger Revenue Streams,
  Border Crossing

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Prioritization Risk Assessment (CONT.)

• Second Tier- Risk assessment of high priority
  Bridges taken from the first Tier to determine
  vulnerability and evaluate counter measures

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The Risk (R)

• R O x V x 1
• O Occurrence the likelihood that terrorists
  will attack the asset

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• Vvulnerability An indication of how much the
  facility or population will be damaged or
  destroyed

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• IImportanceAn indication of consequences to
  the region or nation in the event of destruction
  or unavailable

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Critical bridge components

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States Countermeasures

• Example of sample State DOT countermeasures for
  Critical / Vulnerable Bridges
• One state Dot identified the
  following on their list of counter measures for
  critical bridges
• Increased patrol by law enforcement
• Increased patrol by Coast Guard
• Rapid removal of abandoned vehicles Barriers
  around bridge piers
• Construction of barriers around cable anchors
• (Suspension bridges)
• Higher level of identification for personnel
  working on or around the affected bridge
• Security cameras, monitors, and related software
  to monitor sensitive areas
• Removal of vegetation to provide clear lines of
  site.
•    

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Proposed Scope of T-1 Committee

• To review current transportation security
  related scientific, engineering, and
  technological resources and provide guidance to
  highway infrastructure owners/operators to
  develop and implement industry-wide design
  specifications, risk management methodology, and
  other short and long term strategies for
  improving the safety and security of the Nations
  bridges and tunnels from malevolent actions,
  while working within an environment where
  sensitive information is appropriately managed.  

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• T-1s has Submitted 4
• Research Topics to T-11
•    

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FRP Strengthening of Highway Bridge Subjected to
Blast Loads

• 600,000 3 years
• Eric Williamson, Ph.D.
• Principal Investigator Pooled-Fund Research
• Project TPF 5 (056) Design of Bridges for
  Security
• Assistant Professor
• The University of Texas at Austin

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Behavior of Pre-tensioned and Post-tensioned
Systems Subjected to Blast Loads

• 800,000 4 years
• Eric Williamson, Ph.D.
• Principal Investigator Pooled-Fund Research
• Project TPF 5 (056) Design of Bridges for
  Security
• Assistant Professor
• The University of Texas at Austin
• Oguzhan Bayrak, Ph.D.
• Assistant Professor
• The University of Texas at Austin
• Mark Bloschock, P.E.
• Texas Department of Transportation

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Minimum Detailing Requirementsfor Extreme Event
Loads

• 100,000 18 months
• Rick Land, P.E.
• Chair, AASHTO T-3 Technical Committee for Seismic
  Design
• State Bridge Engineer
• California Department of Transportation

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Hardening of Suspenders and Stays in Suspension
and Stayed Bridges Issues and Answers

• 800,000 18 months
• Mr. G-N Fanjiang, P.E.
• Principal
• Weidlinger Associates, Inc.
• Dr. Jeremy Isenberg, P.E.
• President and CEO
• Weidlinger Associates, Inc.
• Mary Lou Ralls, P.E.
• Chair, AASHTO T-1 Technical Committee for Security

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QUESTIONS?