Security

1
Security Trust

• An NGO Opinion

2
Security Trust

• Margaret McGaley
• PhD candidate at National University of Ireland,
  Maynooth
• Founder of Irish Citizens for Trustworthy Evoting
  (http//evoting.cs.may.ie)

3
Security Trust

• Requirements on voting systems
• e.g. Accuracy, reliability, anonymity
• Cannot be met perfectly
• Must be met well enough to give trustworthy
  results

4
Security

• Protection from malicious attack
• A matter of compromise
• Making attack more trouble than its worth

5
Security - Paper

• Distributed in nature
• Attacks offer limited rewards
• Example of attack tampering with ballot boxes
  during transport
• Limited value one constituency, once
• Requires serious collusion
• High risk of detection

6
Security - Electronic

• Single point of attack
• High-value, low-risk attacks
• Example of attack tampering with voting machine
  software
• High value
• Low collusion consider insider attack
• Low risk of detection

7
Security - Electronic

• Ken Thompson
• you can't trust code that you
• did not totally create yourself."

8
Trust

• Change from paper to electronic
• Not just new storage medium
• Voter denied tangible evidence

9
Trust - Paper

• Transparency a great strength
• Individual voters can observe and understand
• Nothing secret or impenetrable

10
Trust - Electronic

• Cannot offer transparency
• Voter loses sight of vote
• Internals cannot be observed
• Errors may go undetected
• Lack of transparency erodes voter trust

11
Trust Electronic

• No independent record results cannot be audited
• Subtle errors undetectable
• Obvious errors uncorrectable
• Purely electronic voting machines cannot be
  trusted

12
Electronic Voting - Advantages

• Quick results
• Elimination of some human error
• Access for voters with special needs
• No paper
• Improvement to Irish count system

13
Can Evoting be Saved?

• Yes!
• Voter Verified Audit Trail (VVAT)
• Rebecca Mercuri http//www.notablesoftware.com/e
  vote.html
• David Dill http//www.verifiedvoting.or
  g
• FIPR
  http//www.fipr.org/

14
Can Evoting be Saved?

• Voter Verified Audit Trail
• Paper ballot, verified by voter
• Sealed in a traditional ballot box
• Official records of votes cast

15
Can Evoting be Saved?

• Fortune magazine has declared
• paperless voting
• Worst Technology of 2003.

16
Further Precautions

• System developed to highest standards
• Safety critical
• Sophisticated techniques, methodologies
• Independent commission
• Policy of openness

17
A Trustworthy Evoting System

• Voter Verified Audit Trail
• Developed to highest standards
• Overseen by independent commission with policy of
  openness

18
Security Trust

• Questions?